300-740 Designing and Implementing Secure Cloud Access for Users and Endpoints (SCAZT) Question and Answers

The screenshot from Cisco Secure Cloud Analytics shows a Role Violation alert. According to the “Supporting Observations” pane, the device with IP 10.201.0.15 is assigned the role of Domain Controller but has demonstrated traffic behavior matching an FTP client, connecting to ports 20, 21, 115, 152, 989, and 990. This discrepancy triggered the alert.

Cisco SCAZT documentation emphasizes that devices acting outside their expected network roles (e.g., a domain controller acting as an FTP client) indicate potential compromise or misuse. Role-based anomaly detection is part of Visibility and Assurance mechanisms where baseline behaviors are continuously monitored and flagged when changes occur outside expected policy or operational norms.

The exhibit shows DNS Block as the reason and lists 10.1.108.100 as the Responder IP, with the Initiator being 10.1.113.7. In Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center reports, the “Initiator IP” is the source of the request and the “Responder IP” is the source of the response. Since the DNS security intelligence engine flagged the traffic, and 10.1.108.100 was the responder, the blocked traffic corresponds to a DNS response from that IP.

According to the SCAZT documentation, web application firewalls (WAFs) designed to protect against zero-day Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks leverage adaptive and behavioral-based algorithms. These algorithms dynamically analyze traffic patterns, baseline normal behavior, and detect anomalies that could indicate novel or zero-day attacks. Unlike signature-based detection, adaptive and behavioral methods adjust in real-time to emerging threats, learning from ongoing traffic without relying on pre-defined rules. This proactive approach enables rapid detection and mitigation of unknown DDoS vectors, critical for cloud and network security where threats evolve constantly.

The flow data in the exhibit shows multiple short-duration, high-volume HTTPS connections (443/TCP) from IP 10.10.10.10 to multiple destination IPs in the 50.10.10.0/24 network. All flows are 22 seconds long and transfer exactly 1.77M of data. This uniform behavior to a large set of IP addresses strongly indicates a Denial of Service (DoS) pattern, where an internal host (10.10.10.10) is overwhelming external systems in the 50.10.10.0/24 range.

The SCAZT guide (Section 6: Threat Response, Pages 114–117) explains how Secure Cloud Analytics uses NetFlow and behavioral modeling to identify such volumetric threats. Key identifiers include:

Same connection size (1.77M)

Multiple unique peer IPs in a single external subnet

Same destination port and protocol (HTTPS)

Zero TCP connections completed, indicating unacknowledged connections

This matches the behavioral pattern of a DoS originating from an internal host.

Cisco Telemetry Broker (CTB) is designed to act as an intermediary that filters, enriches, and routes telemetry data—such as NetFlow, Syslog, and SNMP—across various tools. It optimizes resource usage by preventing overload and ensures only relevant telemetry is forwarded to appropriate analytics platforms.

The SCAZT guide (Section 5: Visibility and Assurance, Pages 93–95) describes CTB’s role in applying filters and transformations to raw telemetry data to enhance visibility and reduce noise.

Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) use rate-based rules as one of the primary mechanisms to detect and mitigate Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. According to the SCAZT Study Guide, Section 3 (Network and Cloud Security, Pages 74–77), rate-based rules dynamically detect unusual spikes in traffic and can throttle or block connections exceeding predefined thresholds. This form of protection is more adaptive and intelligent than standard ACLs or static filtering, enabling protection against zero-day and volumetric attacks that may not follow known patterns.

The JSON configuration shown is missing a specific Layer 4 parameter definition for port 25 (SMTP). Although the protocol (proto: 6, which is TCP) is defined, without specifying the actual port in the l4_params array, traffic filtering will not trigger on SMTP. Therefore, the engineer must add "port": [25, 25] to the l4_params section to ensure traffic on port 25 is blocked.

The Secure Cloud Analytics alert log shows multiple SSH connections on port 22 from diverse and geographically distributed IP addresses targeting a single GCP instance (www-gcp-east-4c). According to the Cloud Analytics alert logic described in SCAZT (Section 6: Threat Response, Pages 113–116), this behavior indicates “Geographically Unusual Remote Access.” It typically triggers when a host receives connections from countries not normally associated with the network’s usage profile. This is often linked to reconnaissance or brute-force SSH attempts.

The Cisco SAFE architecture uses the concept of Secure Domains as foundational blocks. These domains represent areas of the network (e.g., Branch, Data Center, Cloud, Edge) that require specific security controls. Each domain aligns with controls across visibility, segmentation, threat protection, and identity services.

Based on the alert of “Geographically Unusual Remote Access” from Secure Cloud Analytics and the SSH logs from foreign IPs, this device (linux-gcp-east-4c) has likely been compromised. According to SCAZT Section 6: Threat Response (Pages 114–117):

B: Isolating/quarantining the host is an immediate incident response step to prevent lateral movement and data exfiltration.

E: A firewall rule blocking inbound SSH to the GCP VM from external sources would be the appropriate access control response to prevent recurrence.

Options A and C (reinstallation) may be used later during recovery but are not immediate containment steps. Blocking outgoing SSH (Option D) is less relevant than restricting inbound SSH in this scenario.

The SCAZT documentation emphasizes that when Cisco Secure XDR identifies a high-risk threat (e.g., risk score 8 out of 10 for malware distribution, as shown in the exhibit), the first priority is to prevent lateral movement and data exfiltration. The recommended first response action is to isolate the affected endpoint from the network.

Cisco Secure Endpoint and XDR allow you to trigger an "isolate" response directly from the dashboard, cutting off all non-management communication from the compromised device. This preserves the environment and enables forensic analysis before removing malware or taking destructive actions like rebuilding the system.

From the firewall access rules provided, Rule 1 allows traffic from 20.1.1.10 (GCP VM) to 20.1.1.1 using HTTPS. However, this destination is not the actual mail server—the mail server resides at 192.168.200.10 (inside network). Therefore:

A: Rule 1 must be updated to reflect the correct destination: 192.168.200.10. Without this change, traffic is not permitted to the mail server.

D: NAT (Network Address Translation) is needed to translate the external address (e.g., 20.1.1.10) to access internal addresses (like 192.168.200.10). As per SCAZT and Cisco firewall policies, NAT enables proper packet delivery from public to private zones.

Rule 2, which denies all other traffic, is correctly placed after the specific allow rule. Therefore, moving it (Option B) would not help, and Options C and E are unrelated to resolving the immediate firewall access and routing issue.

To integrate Cisco Webex with Duo SSO using the Duo Access Gateway, the engineer must:

E: Add Cisco Webex as a new SAML application to Duo.

C: Configure the Webex application settings, including Entity ID, Assertion Consumer Service URL, and signing requirements.

Uploading XML metadata (Option A) is typically used when importing IdP settings, not for Duo application configuration. JSON (Option B) is not used in SAML-based Duo app configurations.

Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) is the central policy engine for posture assessments. As outlined in the SCAZT guide (Section 2: User and Device Security, Pages 39–44), to implement posture assessment and client provisioning correctly, an administrator must create posture policies within Cisco ISE and configure the Network Access Device (NAD)—such as a switch, WLC, or firewall—for redirection. This redirection sends the user to the posture portal, where ISE verifies the Secure Client modules (such as AnyConnect) and enforces compliance with antivirus signatures and OS updates.

ISE evaluates endpoint health based on pre-defined compliance rules and supports automatic remediation via the client provisioning portal. This ensures consistency and policy enforcement across distributed environments.