Security-Operations-Engineer Google Cloud Certified - Professional Security Operations Engineer (PSOE) Exam Question and Answers

Comprehensive and Detailed 150 to 250 words of Explanation From Exact Extract Google Security Operations Engineer documents:

The most reliable, automated, and low-maintenance solution is to use the native Google Security Operations (SecOps) SOAR capabilities. A playbook block is a reusable, automated workflow that can be attached to other playbooks, such as the standard case closure playbook.

This block would be configured with a conditional action. This action would check a case field (e.g., case.escalation_status == "escalated"). If the condition is true, the playbook automatically proceeds down the "Yes" branch, which would use an integration action (like "Send Email" for Gmail or Outlook) to send the case details to the director. After the email action, it would proceed to the "Close Case" action. If the condition is false (the case was not escalated), the playbook would proceed down the "No" branch, which would skip the email step and immediately close the case.

This method ensures the process is "reliably sent" and "automatic," as it's built directly into the case management logic. Options C and D are incorrect because they rely on manual analyst actions, which are not reliable and violate the "automatic" requirement. Option A is a custom, external solution that adds unnecessary complexity and maintenance overhead compared to the native SOAR playbook functionality.

(Reference: Google Cloud documentation, "Google SecOps SOAR Playbooks overview"; "Playbook blocks"; "Using conditional logic in playbooks")

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation

The correct solution is Option B. The key requirements are "comprehensive monitoring" and "as soon as possible" in a "multi-cloud environment."

Google Security Operations provides Curated Detections, which are out-of-the-box, fully managed rule sets maintained by the Google Cloud Threat Intelligence (GCTI) team. These rules are designed to provide immediate value and broad threat coverage without requiring manual rule writing, tuning, or maintenance.

Within the curated detection library, the Cloud Threats category is the specific rule set designed to detect threats against cloud infrastructure. This category is not limited to Google Cloud; it explicitly includes detections for anomalous behaviors, misconfigurations, and known attack patterns across multi-cloud environments, including AWS and Azure.

Enabling this category is the fastest and most effective way to meet the requirement. Option A (using Gemini) requires manual effort to generate, validate, and test rules. Option C (Applied Threat Intelligence) is a different category that focuses primarily on matching known, high-impact Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) from GCTI, which is less comprehensive than the behavior-based rules in the "Cloud Threats" category. Option D is procedurally incorrect; Customer Care provides support, but detection content is delivered directly within the SecOps platform.

Exact Extract from Google Security Operations Documents:

Google SecOps Curated Detections: Google Security Operations provides access to a library of curated detections that are created and managed by Google Cloud Threat Intelligence (GCTI). These rule sets provide a baseline of threat detection capabilities and are updated continuously.

Curated Detection Categories: Detections are grouped into categories that you can enable based on your organization's needs and data sources. The 'Cloud Threats' category provides broad coverage for threats targeting cloud environments. This rule set includes detections for anomalous activity and common attack techniques across GCP, AWS, and Azure, making it the ideal choice for securing a multi-cloud deployment. Enabling this category allows organizations to start identifying threats immediately.

Comprehensive and Detailed 150 to 250 words of Explanation From Exact Extract Google Security Operations Engineer documents:

This question is a balance between enabling detection and managing cost. Event Threat Detection (ETD) identifies threats by analyzing logs, and the specific detection for data exfiltration requires Data Access audit logs.

Data Access audit logs are disabled by default because they are high-volume and can be expensive. The key requirement is to "minimize Cloud Logging costs" while still enabling the detection for specific sensitive resources.

Data exfiltration is a "data read" operation. Therefore, to meet the requirements, the organization only needs to enable "data read" audit logs. Enabling "data write" logs (Option B) is unnecessary for this detection and would add needless cost. Enabling logs for all resources (Option C) would be prohibitively expensive and violates the "minimize cost" constraint. While ETD does use VPC Flow Logs (Option D) for many network-based detections, they do not provide the resource-level detail (i.e., which bucket or dataset was accessed) required for this specific data exfiltration finding. Therefore, enabling "data read" logs only for the sensitive resources is the most precise, cost-effective solution.

(Reference: Google Cloud documentation, "Event Threat Detection overview"; "Enable Event Threat Detection"; "Cloud Logging - Data Access audit logs")

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation

The correct actions are C and D, as they represent the standard, parallel process for incident response: technical investigation and procedural/communicative response.

Technical Investigation (Option D): The immediate priority is to understand the alert. An analyst must review the Container Threat Detection finding in Security Command Center (SCC) to understand what was detected. This is followed by investigating the affected pod, its container, the node it's running on, and any associated service accounts to determine the initial blast radius and gather forensic data. Researching the binary and related TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) helps contextualize the attack.

Procedural Response (Option C): Concurrently, the organizational response plan must be activated. This involves notifying the business-critical workload owner (stakeholder communication), initiating the formal, documented incident response playbook, and escalating to specialized teams, like threat hunting, for deeper root cause analysis that goes beyond the initial triage.

Option A is incorrect because deleting the pod immediately is a premature remediation step that destroys critical forensic evidence. Option B is incorrect because "keeping the cluster and pod running" without any containment is reckless and could allow an attacker to pivot. Option E is incorrect because an unauthorized binary execution in a critical workload is a high-severity event, not a low-severity finding to be silenced.

Exact Extract from Google Security Operations Documents:

Responding to Container Threat Detection findings: When a Container Threat Detection finding is generated, it indicates a potential security issue that requires investigation. The first step is to review the finding details in Security Command Center (SCC) to understand the nature of the threat, such as K8S_BINARY_EXECUTED.

The recommended workflow involves:

Investigate: Examine the affected Kubernetes resources, such as the Pod, Container, and Node. Use tools like kubectl to inspect the pod configuration, running processes, and network connections. Research the associated attack and response methods to understand the threat actor's TTPs.

Respond: Follow the organization's incident response playbook. This includes notifying the workload owner and relevant stakeholders. Contain the threat by isolating the pod or node, but avoid deleting resources immediately to preserve evidence for forensic analysis.

Escalate: For complex incidents, engage the threat hunting or forensics team to conduct a thorough investigation, identify the root cause, and determine the full scope of the compromise.

Comprehensive and Detailed 150 to 250 words of Explanation From Exact Extract Google Security Operations Engineer documents:

The correct, low-impact solution for augmenting a Google-managed parser is to use a parser extension. The problem states that the base parser is still working, but needs to be supplemented to map two new fields.

Copying the entire parser (Option A) is a high-impact, high-maintenance solution ("Customer Specific Parser"). This action makes the organization responsible for all future updates and breaks the link to Google's managed updates, which is not a minimal-impact solution.

The intended, modern solution is the parser extension. This feature allows an engineer to write a small, targeted snippet of Code-Based Normalization (CBN) code that executes after the Google-managed base parser. This extension code can access the raw_log and perform the specific logic needed to extract the two unmapped fields and assign them to their proper Universal Data Model (UDM) fields.

This approach is the fastest to deploy and minimizes change management impact because the core parser remains managed and updated by Google, while the extension simply adds the custom logic on top. Option B, "Extract Additional Fields," is a UI-driven feature, but the underlying mechanism that saves and deploys this logic is the parser extension. Option D is the more precise description of the technical solution.

(Reference: Google Cloud documentation, "Manage parsers"; "Parser extensions"; "Code-Based Normalization (CBN) syntax")

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation

The correct solution is Option D. This approach correctly uses the integrated Google Cloud-native tools for both monitoring and alerting.

Google Security Operations (SecOps) automatically streams all ingestion metrics to Google Cloud Monitoring. This includes metrics for throughput (e.g., chronicle.googleapis.com/ingestion/event_count, chronicle.googleapis.com/ingestion/byte_count), parsing errors (e.g., chronicle.googleapis.com/ingestion/parse_error_count), and the health of collection agents (e.g., chronicle.googleapis.com/ingestion/last_seen_timestamp).

Receive a notification (15 minutes): The Data Ingestion and Health dashboard (Option A) is for visualization, and its "reports" are scheduled summaries, not real-time alerts. The only way to get a 15-minute notification is to use Cloud Monitoring. An alerting policy can be configured to trigger when a "metric absence" is detected for a specific collection agent's last_seen_timestamp, fulfilling the "silent source" requirement.

Visualize metrics: Cloud Monitoring also provides a powerful dashboarding service. A Cloud Monitoring dashboard can be built to graph all the necessary metrics—throughput, parsing errors, and agent status—in one place.

Option C is incorrect because it suggests using the Bindplane Observability Pipeline, which is a separate product. Option B is incorrect as Risk Analytics is for threat detection (UEBA), not platform health.

Exact Extract from Google Security Operations Documents:

Use Cloud Monitoring for ingestion insights: Google SecOps uses Cloud Monitoring to send the ingestion notifications. Use this feature for ingestion notifications and ingestion volume viewing.

Set up a sample policy to detect silent Google SecOps collection agents:

In the Google Cloud console, select Monitoring.

Click Create Policy.

On the Select a metric page, select Chronicle Collector > Ingestion > Total ingested log count.

In the Transform data section, set the Time series group by to collector_id.

Click Next.

Select Metric absence and set the Trigger absence time (e.g., 15 minutes).

In the Notifications and name section, select a notification channel.

You can also create custom dashboards in Cloud Monitoring to visualize any of the exported metrics, such as Total ingested log size or Total record count (for parsing).

Comprehensive and Detailed 150 to 250 words of Explanation From Exact Extract Google Security Operations Engineer documents:

The most direct and efficient method to "quickly gather more context and assess the reputation" of an unknown IP address is to check it against the platform's integrated threat intelligence. The **Alerts & IoCs page**, specifically the **IoC Matches** tab, is the primary interface for this.

Google Security Operations continuously and automatically correlates all ingested UDM (Universal Data Model) events against its vast, integrated threat intelligence feeds, which include data from Google Threat Intelligence (GTI), Mandiant, and VirusTotal. If the unfamiliar external IP address is a known malicious Indicator of Compromise (IoC)—such as a command-and-control (C2) server, malware distribution point, or known scanner—it will have already generated an "IoC Match" finding.

By searching for the IP on this page, an analyst can immediately confirm if it is on a blocklist and gain critical context, such as its threat category, severity, and the specific intelligence source that flagged it. While Option B (finding the user) and Option C (viewing the asset) are valid subsequent steps for understanding the internal scope of the incident, they do not provide the *external reputation* of the IP. Option D is a *response* action taken only *after* the IP has been assessed as malicious.

*(Reference: Google Cloud documentation, "View alerts and IoCs"; "How Google SecOps automatically matches IoCs"; "Investigate an IP address")*

***

Comprehensive and Detailed 150 to 200 words of Explanation From Exact Extract Google Security Operations Engineer documents:

The key requirement is to hunt for unknown C2 nodes. This implies that the indicators will not exist in any current threat intelligence feed. Therefore, Option C is incorrect as it only hunts for known IoCs. Option A is also incorrect as Security Health Analytics (SHA) is a posture management tool, not a threat hunting tool.

Option D describes a classic and effective hypothesis-driven threat hunt. Attackers frequently use Newly Registered Domains (NRDs) for their C2 infrastructure, as these domains have no established reputation and are not yet on blocklists.

Google Security Operations (SecOps) allows an engineer to write a YARA-L rule that joins real-time event data (UDM network traffic) with contextual data (the entity graph or a custom lookup). An engineer can ingest WHOIS data or a feed of NRDs as context. The YARA-L rule would then compare outbound network connections against this context, looking for any communication with domains registered within the last 30-90 days. By executing this rule as a retrohunt, the engineer can scan all historical data to "generate a list of potential matches" for this high-risk, anomalous behavior, which is a strong indicator of unknown C2 activity.

(Reference: Google Cloud documentation, "YARA-L 2.0 language syntax"; "Run a YARA-L retrohunt"; "Context-aware detections with entity graph")

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation

The correct answer is Option C. The incident description makes it clear that endpoint containment (by EDR) was insufficient, as the attacker successfully pivoted to privileged service accounts and began post-compromise activities (credential dumping, scheduled tasks).

The goal is to automate containment and minimize dwell time.

Option A is an enrichment/investigation action, not a containment action.

Option B is the opposite of automation; adding a manual approval step increases dwell time and response time.

Option D is a detection engineering task (creating a YARA-L rule), not a SOAR playbook (response) action.

Option C is the only true automated containment action that directly addresses the new threat. The anomalous behavior of the privileged accounts would raise their Entity Risk Score within Google SecOps. A modern SOAR playbook can be configured to automatically trigger on this high-risk score and execute an identity-based containment action. Revoking tokens and suspending sessions for the compromised high-privilege accounts is the most effective way to immediately stop the attacker's lateral movement and malicious activity, thereby accelerating containment and minimizing dwell time.

Exact Extract from Google Security Operations Documents:

SOAR Playbooks and Automation: Google Security Operations (SecOps) SOAR enables the orchestration and automation of security responses. Playbooks are designed to execute a series of automated steps to respond to an alert.

Identity and Access Management Integrations: SOAR playbooks can integrate directly with Identity Providers (IdPs) like Google Workspace, Okta, and Microsoft Entra ID. A critical automated containment action for compromised accounts is to revoke active OAuth tokens, suspend user sessions, or disable the account entirely. This action immediately logs the attacker out of all active sessions and prevents them from re-authenticating.

Entity Risk: Detections and anomalous activities contribute to an entity's (e.g., a user or asset) risk score. Playbooks can be configured to use this risk score as a trigger. For example, if a high-privilege account's risk score crosses a critical threshold, the playbook can automatically execute identity containment actions.

Comprehensive and Detailed 150 to 250 words of Explanation From Exact Extract Google Security Operations Engineer documents:

The core of this problem is the unreliable data quality for the file hash. A robust detection strategy cannot depend on an unreliable data point. Options B and C are weak because they create a dependency on the SHA256 hash, which the prompt states is "not reliably captured." This would lead to missed detections. Option A is far too broad and would generate massive noise.

The best detection engineering practice is to use the reliable IoCs in a flexible and high-performance manner. The domain is a reliable IoC (from DNS logs), and the hash is still a valuable IoC, even if it's only intermittently available.

The standard Google SecOps method for this is to create a List (referred to here as a "data table") containing both static IoCs: the hash and the domain. An engineer can then write a single, efficient YARA-L rule that references this list. This rule would trigger if either a PROCESS_LAUNCH event is seen with a hash in the list or a NETWORK_DNS event is seen with a domain in the list (e.g., (event.principal.process.file.sha256 in %ioc_list) or (event.network.dns.question.name in %ioc_list)). This creates a resilient detection mechanism that provides two opportunities to identify the threat, successfully working around the unreliable data problem.

(Reference: Google Cloud documentation, "YARA-L 2.0 language syntax"; "Using Lists in rules"; "Detection engineering overview")

Comprehensive and Detailed 150 to 250 words of Explanation From Exact Extract Google Security Operations Engineer documents:

The standard, native, and minimal-effort solution for ingesting logs from on-premises sources into Google Security Operations (SecOps) is to use the Google SecOps forwarder. The forwarder is a lightweight software component (available as a Linux binary or Docker container) that is deployed within the customer's network. It is designed to collect logs from a variety of on-premises sources and securely forward them to the SecOps platform.

The forwarder can be configured to monitor log files directly (which is a common output for a MySQL database) or to receive logs via syslog. Once the forwarder is installed and its configuration file is set up to point to the MySQL log file or syslog stream, it handles the compression, batching, and secure transmission of those logs to Google SecOps. This is the intended and most direct ingestion path for on-premises telemetry.

Option C is incorrect because the log source is on-premises, not within the Google Cloud organization. Option B (API feed) is the wrong mechanism; feeds are used for structured data like threat intelligence or alerts, not for raw telemetry logs from a database. Option A (Bindplane) is a third-party partner solution, which may involve additional configuration or licensing, and is not the native, minimal-effort tool provided directly by Google SecOps for this task.

(Reference: Google Cloud documentation, "Google SecOps data ingestion overview"; "Install and configure the SecOps forwarder")

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation

The correct configuration is Option A. This answer addresses two key requirements from the question: the identity mechanism (Cloud Identity) and the required permission level (read-only access including detection rules).

Identity Mechanism (Google Group vs. Workforce Pool):

The prompt explicitly states the organization uses Cloud Identity as its identity provider (IdP). When Cloud Identity or Google Workspace is the IdP, the standard practice is to manage access using Google Groups. Users are added to a group, and IAM roles are granted to that group. Workforce identity federation (which uses workforce pools) is the mechanism used when integrating with a third-party IdP, such as Okta or Azure AD. Since the IdP is Cloud Identity, creating a Google Group is the correct approach. This eliminates options C and D.

Permission Level (roles/chronicle.viewer vs. roles/chronicle.limitedViewer):

The prompt requires "read-only access to all resources, including detection engine rules." The predefined Google SecOps IAM roles are specific about this distinction:

roles/chronicle.viewer (Chronicle API Viewer): Provides "Read-only access to Google SecOps application and API resources." This role includes permissions to view detection rules and retrohunts.

roles/chronicle.limitedViewer (Chronicle API Limited Viewer): Provides "Grants read-only access to Google SecOps application and API resources, excluding detection engine rules and retrohunts."

Therefore, roles/chronicle.limitedViewer (Option B) is incorrect because it excludes access to detection engine rules, which violates the prompt's requirement. The correct role is roles/chronicle.viewer (Option A), as it grants the necessary comprehensive read-only access.

Exact Extract from Google Security Operations Documents:

On the topic of IAM roles:

Google SecOps predefined roles in IAM

Predefined role in IAM

Title

Description

roles/chronicle.viewer1

Chronicle API Viewer2

Read-only access to Google SecOps application and API resources3

roles/chronicle.limitedViewer4

Chronicle API Limited Viewer5

Grants read-only access to Google SecOps application and API resources, excluding detection engine rules and retro6hunts.

On the topic of Identity Providers:

"You can use Cloud Identity, Google Workspace, or a third-party identity provider (such as Okta or Azure AD) to manage users, groups, and authentication. This page describes how to use Cloud Identity or Google Workspace."7

"8The following example grants the Chronicle API Viewer role to to a specific group:"

gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding PROJECT_ID \

--role roles/chronicle.viewer \

--member "group:GROUP_EMAIL"