SC-300 Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Question and Answers

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator study materials and Microsoft Learn modules under “Implement and manage Cloud App Security (Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps)”, the Cloud App Discovery feature in Microsoft Cloud App Security (now called Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps) is designed to identify and analyze the use of shadow IT — unmanaged or unsanctioned applications accessed by users within the organization.

Cloud App Discovery collects logs from network appliances such as firewalls, proxies, or Secure Web Gateways (SWGs). Administrators upload these logs into Cloud App Security or configure continuous log collection through automatic log uploaders. The service then parses and analyzes the data to detect which external applications are being accessed and which users are using them.

In this scenario, since users authenticate to the firewall with their on-premises Active Directory credentials, the firewall logs will contain user information and the external applications being accessed. By importing these logs into Cloud App Discovery, administrators can generate a detailed list of unmanaged (unsanctioned) external applications and identify the specific users connecting to them.

Microsoft documentation explicitly states:

“Cloud App Discovery analyzes traffic logs to identify all cloud applications used in your organization. It provides information about app usage, users, IP addresses, and risk levels to help you assess shadow IT.”

Hence, the correct and verified answer — based on official SC-300 curriculum and Azure AD Identity Governance content — is Cloud App Discovery in Microsoft Cloud App Securit

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Exam Study Guide and Microsoft Learn module “Implement and manage hybrid identity with Azure AD Connect”, when a VPN solution authenticates users through an on-premises Active Directory and does not natively support Azure MFA, the correct method is to integrate Azure MFA using the Network Policy Server (NPS) extension for Azure MFA.

The NPS extension acts as an intermediary between the VPN server and Azure AD. The VPN server sends authentication requests to the NPS server. The NPS server validates the credentials against the on-premises Active Directory, and then the NPS extension triggers the Azure MFA challenge for secondary authentication.

Microsoft documentation states:

“To enable Azure Multi-Factor Authentication for on-premises resources such as VPNs, RD Gateway, and other services using RADIUS authentication, you must install the Azure MFA extension for the Network Policy Server (NPS).”

Therefore, the correct recommendation is to deploy and configure NPS on-premises, install the Azure MFA NPS Extension, and configure the VPN server to forward RADIUS requests to NPS.

According to Microsoft’s Azure Active Directory roles and permissions reference, the User Administrator role has the following capabilities:

Reset passwords for most non-admin users and certain administrative roles.

Manage user and group properties, including license assignments.

While the License Administrator can manage product licenses, they cannot reset user passwords. Conversely, the Helpdesk Administrator can reset passwords but not manage licenses. Therefore, the only role that satisfies both requirements (reset passwords and manage licenses) is User Administrator.

Microsoft documentation confirms:

“The User Administrator can manage all aspects of users and groups, including resetting passwords, monitoring service health, and assigning licenses.”

According to the Microsoft Entra External Identities module within the SC-300 curriculum, control over which external domains can be invited as guest users is managed under External collaboration settings in the Entra admin center.

Administrators can specify “Allow invitations only to the specified domains” and list approved domains. This ensures that guest invitations can only be sent to trusted business partners while blocking all others.

Cross-tenant access settings control authentication and access policies between trusted tenants, not invitation restrictions. Linked subscriptions and identity providers manage billing and authentication federation but do not control guest invitations.

Therefore, to restrict guest invitations to specific external domains, you must configure the External collaboration settings in Microsoft Entra ID.

When an application running on an Azure VM needs to authenticate using its system-assigned managed identity, it must request a token from the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). This service is accessible via a non-routable IP address — 169.254.169.254.

The correct request URI pattern is:

http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token

This IP is used exclusively by Azure VMs to securely obtain tokens for managed identities without requiring credentials in the code.

Microsoft’s documentation specifies:

“Applications running on Azure resources can request tokens from the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) endpoint at 169.254.169.254.”

Other options:

127.0.0.1 — loopback address (not used for IMDS)

108.143.161.25 — external public IP (irrelevant)

172.16.1.5 — private VM IP, not used for token requests

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and official Microsoft Learn documentation (“Configure how end-users consent to applications”), application consent management in Microsoft Entra ID is governed by the Admin consent settings under Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions → User consent settings.

By default, users can grant delegated permissions to apps, but organizations often need to restrict which permissions users may consent to — for example, allowing consent only to low-impact permissions like User.Read (basic profile information).

Microsoft Documentation Reference:

“In the Admin consent settings, you can control how end users grant consent to applications. You can limit user consent to low-risk permissions, such as permissions that only allow apps to access the user’s basic profile data.”

The configuration steps outlined in Microsoft’s official SC-300 training materials are:

In the Entra admin center, go to Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions → User consent settings.

Under User consent for applications, choose Allow user consent for apps from verified publishers for selected permissions (recommended).

Under Select permissions to allow, specify User.Read and User.ReadBasic.All, which correspond to User.Read and User.Read profile delegated permissions.

This ensures that users can only consent to applications accessing their basic profile data and no additional permissions beyond what’s explicitly approved.

Why not the other options:

A. Security defaults: Controls basic security policies (e.g., MFA, legacy authentication) — unrelated to app consent.

C. Permission classifications: Used for labeling permission risk levels but doesn’t enforce consent behavior.

D. Identity Protection settings: Related to risky user or sign-in detections, not app consent control.

In Windows 10, Windows Hello for Business replaces passwords with strong two-factor authentication on PCs and mobile devices. This authentication consists of a new type of user credential that is tied to a device and uses a biometric or PIN.

After an initial two-step verification of the user during enrollment, Windows Hello is set up on the user's device and Windows asks the user to set a gesture, which can be a biometric, such as a fingerprint, or a PIN. The user provides the gesture to verify their identity. Windows then uses Windows Hello to authenticate users.

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn – “Manage Microsoft 365 Groups naming policies” documentation, group naming policies in Azure Active Directory (now Microsoft Entra ID) apply to end users who create Microsoft 365 groups, but do not apply to administrators who have roles that allow them to override naming restrictions.

The policy defines conventions such as prefixes, suffixes, blocked words, and enforced naming rules. However, certain administrative roles are exempt from this policy to allow organizational management and automation processes. The exempt roles are:

Global Administrator

User Administrator

These two roles can create Microsoft 365 groups without the naming policy constraints. Other users — including Groups Administrator and users without administrative roles — are subject to the naming policy when creating groups.

From the official documentation:

“Naming policies apply to all users who create groups, except for global administrators and user administrators. These roles can create groups that bypass the naming policy restrictions.”

Applying this rule:

User1 (Global Administrator) — exempt

User2 (User Administrator) — exempt

User3 (Groups Administrator) — affected by the policy

User4 (no role) — affected by the policy

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn documentation under “Add and configure custom domains in Microsoft 365”, when an organization acquires a new Microsoft 365 tenant, it starts with a default domain such as contoso.onmicrosoft.com. To use a friendly and company-branded domain like contoso.com for email and user principal names (UPNs), administrators must follow a specific sequence of steps to integrate the custom domain into Azure AD/Microsoft 365.

First, register the custom domain in Azure Active Directory. This action adds contoso.com to your tenant and prepares Microsoft 365 to validate ownership.

After adding the domain, Microsoft 365 provides a TXT record to add to your DNS zone (at your registrar or DNS host). This record proves that your organization owns the domain.

Once the TXT record is published and propagated, return to the Microsoft 365 admin center or use PowerShell to verify the domain. This step confirms domain ownership and completes the domain setup.

Finally, after verification, set contoso.com as the primary domain. Doing this ensures that all newly created users automatically receive user principal names (email addresses) ending in @contoso.com.

Microsoft documentation states:

“After verifying ownership of the custom domain, you can set it as the default (primary) domain for new users in Microsoft 365.”

Microsoft Entra Permissions Management (formerly CloudKnox) integrates with Azure subscriptions via a service principal that must read and write role assignments to analyze and right-size permissions. The User Access Administrator role provides this ability without full ownership privileges.

The SC-300 guide explicitly notes that to allow automatic monitoring and remediation of permissions, “the Permissions Management service principal must have the User Access Administrator role on the target subscription or management group to modify and create RBAC assignments.”

Reader (A) and Contributor (B) roles cannot manage RBAC permissions, while Owner (C) grants unnecessary broad control, violating the principle of least privilege.

According to Microsoft’s SC-300 Exam Guide and Microsoft Learn module: Manage Identity Governance in Azure AD, the removal and lifecycle management of external users (B2B guests) within Azure Active Directory’s Entitlement Management are configured through Entitlement management settings under the Identity Governance blade.

In scenarios where external partners (such as Fabrikam) are granted access via access packages, administrators can define lifecycle settings to ensure that when access is no longer required, the users are automatically removed from the directory. The Entitlement Management directory settings control two specific parameters:

Block external user from signing in to this directory — determines whether external users can still sign in after access expiration.

Remove external user — enables automatic deletion of the guest account after a specified number of days.

Number of days before removing external user — defines the delay period (in this case, 90 days).

Microsoft documentation states:

“To automatically remove external users from your directory after access expires, configure the Entitlement management settings. You can set whether to block sign-in and specify how many days after access expiration the user should be removed.”

The Microsoft Entra Terms of Use (ToU) documentation included in the SC-300 curriculum specifies that only PDF files are supported when uploading terms of use documents.

Microsoft Entra ID Premium licenses are required to configure Terms of Use, and when administrators create a new ToU, the upload field explicitly accepts a PDF document format. The PDF ensures consistent formatting across devices and preserves the legal structure of compliance statements.

The guide states:

“The terms of use document must be a PDF file. This ensures consistency in presentation and prevents tampering.”

Therefore, acceptable format: PDF only — formats such as HTML, DOCX, or RTF are not supported.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn documentation under “Manage Administrative Units in Azure Active Directory”, Administrative Units (AUs) provide a way to delegate administrative permissions over subsets of Azure AD resources — such as specific users or groups — without granting directory-wide privileges.

Department1 Administrative Unit contains User1, User2, Group1, and Group2.

Admin1 is assigned the User Administrator role scoped to Department1 AU.

Admin2 is assigned the User Administrator role scoped to the entire directory.

User3 and User4 are not members of Department1 AU — they belong only to Group2, but group membership does not automatically bring those users under AU scope.

Admin1’s permissions are limited strictly to users and groups within the Department1 AU.✅ Conclusion: Admin1 cannot reset the passwords of User3 and User4.Answer: No

Both User1 and Group2 are in the Department1 AU, but in Azure AD, the User Administrator role scoped to an AU cannot manage group memberships unless explicitly delegated with Group Administrator privileges or unless the AU is configured to allow it.

The User Administrator role allows password reset and user management, not group membership management.✅ Conclusion: Admin1 cannot add User1 to Group2.Answer: No

Admin2 has the User Administrator role assigned at the directory level, meaning global scope.

Therefore, Admin2 can manage user credentials, including password resets, for all users in the tenant — including User1.✅ Conclusion: Admin2 can reset the password of User1.Answer: Yes

Supporting Reference (Microsoft Learn):

“Administrative units restrict scope for delegated administrators. A User Administrator scoped to an AU can reset passwords only for users in that AU. A User Administrator assigned at the directory level can reset passwords for any user.”

Dynamic Azure AD groups use membership rules written against user attributes (for example, user.department, user.jobTitle, user.country, user.usageLocation). The SC-300 materials show operators such as -eq, -contains, -startsWith, and logical -and/-or to build precise targeting. In this scenario, the provided rule syntax evaluates users in the Sales department whose jobTitle contains “Sales” (for example, “SalesRep”). From the data: User1 has job title Associate (does not contain “Sales”); User2 has job title SalesRep (contains “Sales”); User3 has job title Manager (does not contain “Sales”). Because department for all three is Sales, the discriminating condition is the job title match. Therefore, only User2 satisfies the rule and will be added to the dynamic group. The SC-300 guide emphasizes validating rules with the “Preview membership results” tool to confirm which users are included before enforcing at scale.

Azure Key Vault uses soft delete with a configurable retention period (7–90 days). During this window, deleted objects can be recovered, and if purge protection is enabled, they cannot be purged until the retention period expires. The SC-300 materials describe: “Soft-delete retains keys, secrets, and certificates for the configured retention days. When purge protection is enabled, even users with purge permission cannot permanently delete objects before the retention period ends; objects remain recoverable until expiry.” The Key Vault RBAC data-plane roles further clarify capabilities. The guide states: “Key Vault Administrator has full data actions, including recover and purge across keys, secrets, and certificates. Key Vault Contributor manages the vault resource and settings but does not have data-plane permissions to read, delete, purge, or recover objects. Certificates Officer can manage and recover certificates but is not granted purge.”

Applying this:

Secret1 was deleted on June 1 from KeyVault2 (retention 10 days, purge protection Disabled). If it hasn’t been purged, it is recoverable any time through June 11. Admin1 (Key Vault Administrator) therefore can recover on June 7.

Certificate1 was deleted on June 1 from KeyVault1 (retention 15 days, purge protection Enabled). Purge is blocked until June 16 regardless of role. Additionally, Admin2 (Key Vault Contributor) lacks data-plane purge rights. Hence cannot purge on June 12.

Admin3 (Key Vault Certificates Officer) also lacks purge permission; with purge protection still in effect, cannot purge on June 14.

This scenario is based on how Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) statuses transition between Disabled, Enabled, and Enforced states, as documented in the Microsoft SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn – Configure and deploy MFA in Azure Active Directory.

Let’s analyze the details step-by-step using the exhibits:

Initial MFA Configuration (February 1, 2021)

User1: Disabled

User2: Enabled

User3: Enforced

MFA Policy Setting

“Allow users to remember multi-factor authentication on devices they trust” is enabled.

“Number of days users can trust devices for” is 20 days.This means that once a user completes MFA on a trusted device, they won’t be prompted again for 20 days on that same device.

User Sign-in Activity:

User1: Signs in on Feb 2 and again on Feb 21

User2: Signs in on Feb 5

User3: Already in Enforced state (so continuous MFA enforcement applies)

State Transitions per Microsoft Documentation:

Disabled: User cannot register or use MFA.

Enabled: User is registered for MFA but not yet required at every sign-in. Once they complete registration, they remain Enabled until admin enforces it.

Enforced: User must use MFA at every sign-in.

Timeline Evaluation:

User1 was initially Disabled, so even though they sign in multiple times (Feb 2 and Feb 21), MFA remains disabled unless the admin manually changes the setting — therefore, User1 = Disabled.

User2 was Enabled on Feb 1, and signed in on Feb 5 — this allows them to register for MFA (move from Enabled → Enforced) once registration completes. By Feb 26, they would be in Enforced state.

User3 was already Enforced from the start, and their state remains unchanged.

Thus, by February 26, 2021, the MFA status should be:

User1: Disabled

User2: Enforced

User3: Enforced

This matches Option B exactly.

Microsoft references (Azure AD MFA Overview):

“Enabled users move to Enforced when they complete MFA registration. Enforced users must use MFA every time they sign in.”

To create a group named “Audit” and ensure that its members can activate the Security Reader role, follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in with an account that has the Security Administrator or Global Administrator role.

Navigate to Groups:

Go toTeams & groups>Active teams and groups1.

Create the security group:

Select Add a security group.

On the Set up the basics page, enter “Audit” as the group name.

Add a description if necessary and chooseNext1.

Edit settings:

On theEdit settingspage, select whether you want Microsoft Entra roles to be assignable to this group and selectNext1.

Assign roles:

After creating the group, go to Roles > All roles.

Find and select the Security Reader role.

Under Assignments, choose Assign.

Select the “Audit” group to assign the role to its members2.

Review and finish:

Review the settings to ensure the “Audit” group is created with the ability for its members to activate the Security Reader role.

Finish the setup and save the changes.

By following these steps, you will have created the “Audit” group and enabled its members to activate the Security Reader role, which allows them to view security-related information without having permissions to change it. Remember to communicate the new group and role assignment to the relevant stakeholders in your organization.

To configure the account lockout settings so that accounts are locked out for five minutes after 10 failed sign-in attempts, you can follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in with an account that has the Security Administrator or Global Administrator role.

Navigate to the lockout settings:

Go to Security > Authentication methods > Password protection.

Adjust the Smart Lockout settings:

Set the Lockout threshold to 10 failed sign-in attempts.

Set the Lockout duration (in minutes) to 5.

Please note that by default, smart lockout locks an account from sign-in after 10 failed attempts in Azure Public and Microsoft Azure operated by 21Vianet tenants1. The lockout period is one minute at first, and longer in subsequent attempts.However, you can customize these settings tomeet your organization’s requirements if you have Microsoft Entra ID P1 or higher licenses for your users1.

To deploy Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for only the members of the Sg-Finance group, excluding Debra Berger, and without using a Conditional Access policy, you can follow these steps:

Open the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Sign in as a Security Administrator or Global Administrator.

Navigate to MFA settings:

Go to Users > Active users.

On the Active users page, select Multi-factor authentication.

Manage user settings:

Find and select the Sg-Finance group.

Enable MFA for this group by setting the requirement status to Enabled.

Exclude a user from MFA:

In the Multi-factor authentication page, search for Debra Berger.

Set her MFA status to Disabled to exclude her from MFA registration.

Verify the configuration:

Ensure that all members of the Sg-Finance group have MFA enabled except for Debra Berger.

Communicate the change:

Inform the Sg-Finance group members about the MFA requirement and provide instructions on how to register for MFA.

Monitor the setup:

Check the sign-in logs to confirm that MFA is being prompted for the Sg-Finance group members and not for Debra Berger.

To add the LinkedIn application as a resource to the Sales and Marketing access package without removing any other resources, you can follow these steps:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Identity Governance Administrator.

Navigate to Entitlement Management:

Go to Identity governance > Entitlement management > Access packages1.

Select the Sales and Marketing access package:

Find and select the Sales and Marketing access package to modify it.

Add a new resource:

Within the access package details, select Resources.

Click on + Add resource.

Search for and select the LinkedIn application from the list of available resources.

Configure the resource role:

Assign the appropriate role for the LinkedIn application that users in the Sales and Marketing access package will have.

Review and update the access package:

Ensure that the LinkedIn application has been added as a resource.

Confirm that no other resources have been removed from the access package.

Save the changes:

After reviewing, save the changes to the access package.

Communicate the update:

Notify the relevant users about the addition of the LinkedIn application to their access package.

By following these steps, you will successfully add the LinkedIn application to the Sales and Marketing access package without affecting the other resources.

To assign a Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license to the Sg-Retail group, you can follow these steps:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Make sure you have the role of Global Administrator or License Administrator.

Navigate to the licensing page:

Go toBilling>Licenses1.

Find the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license:

Look for the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 license in the list of available products.

Assign licenses to the group:

Select the license and then choose Assign licenses.

Search for and select the Sg-Retail group.

Confirm the assignment and make sure that the correct number of licenses is available for the group.

Review and confirm the assignment:

Ensure that the licenses have been properly assigned to the Sg-Retail group without affecting other groups or users.

Monitor the license status:

Check the license usage and status to ensure that the Sg-Retail group members can utilize the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 features.

By following these steps, the Sg-Retail group should now have the Windows 10/11 Enterprise E3 licenses assigned to them.

To implement additional security checks for the Sg-Executive group members before they canaccess any company apps, you can use Conditional Access policies in Microsoft Entra. Here’s a step-by-step guide:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Security Administrator.

Navigate to Conditional Access:

Go to Security > Conditional Access.

Create a new policy:

Select + New policy.

Name the policy appropriately, such as “Sg-Executive Security Checks”.

Assign the policy to the Sg-Executive group:

Under Assignments, select Users and groups.

Choose Select users and groups and then Groups.

Search for and select the Sg-Executive group.

Define the application control conditions:

Under Cloud apps or actions, select All cloud apps to apply the policy to any company app.

Set the device compliance requirement:

Under Conditions > Device state, configure the policy to include devices marked as compliant by Microsoft Intune.

Set the app protection policy requirement:

Under Conditions > Client apps, configure the policy to include client apps that are protected by app protection policies.

Configure the access controls:

Under Access controls > Grant, select Grant access.

Choose Require device to be marked as compliant and Require approved client app.

Ensure that the option Require one of the selected controls is enabled.

Enable the policy:

Set Enable policy to On.

Review and save the policy:

Review all settings to ensure they meet the requirements.

Click Create to save and implement the policy.

By following these steps, you will ensure that the Sg-Executive group members can only access company apps if they meet one of the specified conditions, either by using a compliant device or a protected client app. This enhances the security posture of your organization by enforcing stricter access controls for executive-level users.

To ensure that users in the Sg-Operations group see a tab named “Operations” containing only LinkedIn and Box applications in the My Apps portal, you can create a collection with these specific applications. Here’s how to do it:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Make sure you have one of the following roles: Global Administrator, Cloud Application Administrator, Application Administrator, or owner of the service principal.

Navigate to App launchers:

Go to Identity > Applications > Enterprise applications.

Under Manage, select App launchers.

Create a new collection:

Click on New collection.

Enter “Operations” as the Name for the collection.

Provide a Description if necessary.

Add applications to the collection:

Select the Applications tab within the new collection.

Click on + Add application.

Search for and select LinkedIn and Box applications.

Click Add to include them in the collection.

Assign the collection to the Sg-Operations group:

Select the Users and groups tab.

Click on + Add users and groups.

Search for and select the Sg-Operations group.

Click Select to assign the collection to the group.

Review and create the collection:

Select Review + Create to check the configuration.

If everything is correct, click Create to finalize the collection.

By following these steps, when users in the Sg-Operations group visit the My Apps portal, they will see a new tab named “Operations” that contains only the LinkedIn and Box applications1.

Please note that to create collections on the My Apps portal, you need a Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2 license1.

To ensure that all users can consent to apps that require permission to read their user profile and prevent them from consenting to apps that require any other permissions, you can configure the user consent settings in the Microsoft Entra admin center. Here’s how you can do it:

Sign in as a Global Administrator:

Access the Microsoft Entra admin center with Global Administrator privileges.

Navigate to user consent settings:

Go toIdentity>Applications>Enterprise applications>Consent and permissions>User consent settings1.

Configure the consent settings:

Under User consent for applications, select the option that allows users to consent to apps that only require permission to read their user profile.

Ensure that all other permissions are set to require administrator consent, thus preventing users from consenting to apps that require additional permissions1.

Save the settings:

After configuring the consent settings, select Save to apply the changes.

By following these steps, you will have configured the system to allow user consent for apps that need to read the user profile while blocking consent for apps that require additional permissions. This setup helps maintain user autonomy where appropriate while safeguarding against unauthorized access to broader permissions.

To prevent all users from using legacy authentication protocols when authenticating to Microsoft Entra ID, you can create a Conditional Access policy that blocks legacy authentication. Here’s how to do it:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center:

Ensure you have the role of Global Administrator or Conditional Access Administrator.

Navigate to Conditional Access:

Go to Security > Conditional Access.

Create a new policy:

Select + New policy.

Give your policy a name that reflects its purpose, like “Block Legacy Auth”.

Set users and groups:

Under Assignments, select Users or workload identities.

Under Include, select All users.

Under Exclude, select Users and groups and choose any accounts that must maintain the ability to use legacy authentication.It’s recommended to exclude at least one account to prevent lockout1.

Target resources:

Under Cloud apps or actions, select All cloud apps.

Set conditions:

Under Conditions > Client apps, set Configure to Yes.

Check only the boxes for Exchange ActiveSync clients and Other clients.

Configure access controls:

Under Access controls > Grant, select Block access.

Enable policy:

Confirm your settings and set Enable policy to Report-only initially to understand the impact.

After confirming the settings using report-only mode, you can move theEnable policytoggle fromReport-onlytoOn2.

By following these steps, you will block legacy authentication protocols for all users, enhancing the security posture of your organization by requiring modern authentication methods. Remember to monitor the impact of this policy and adjust as necessary to ensure business continuity.

To implement a process for reviewing guest users’ access to the Salesforce app with the specified requirements, you can use Microsoft Entra’s Identity Governance access reviews feature. Here’s a step-by-step guide:

Assign the appropriate role:

Ensure you have one of the following roles: Global Administrator, User Administrator, or Identity Governance Administrator1.

Navigate to Identity Governance:

Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center.

Go toIdentity governance>Access reviews1.

Create a new access review:

Select New access review.

Choose the Salesforce app to review guest user access1.

Configure the review settings:

Set the frequency of the review to monthly.

Define thedurationof the review period to5 days1.

Determine the reviewers:

Assign the manager of each guest user as the reviewer.

If a guest user does not have a manager, assignMegan Bowenas the reviewer1.

Automate the removal process:

Configure settings toautomatically remove accessif the review is not completed within the specified time frame1.

Monitor and enforce compliance:

Regularly check the access review results to ensure compliance with the review policy1.

Communicate the process:

Inform all stakeholders about the new review process and provide guidance on how to complete the reviews.

By following these steps, you can ensure that guest users’ access to the Salesforce app is reviewed monthly, with managers being responsible for the review, and access is removed if the review is not completed in time.

In Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), the per-user device cap is controlled in Devices > Device settings. The SC-300 materials describe that administrators can configure “Users may join devices to Azure AD” and the “Maximum number of devices per user”. The guide notes that this limit defaults to five and is used to “control how many devices a user can join or register in Azure AD”; when users reach the limit, “they cannot add additional devices until the limit is increased or an existing device is removed.” For scenarios like field or sales staff who use multiple devices, the study content recommends adjusting this value to meet business needs. Because A. Datum’s sales users hit the current cap and a requirement states “Increase the maximum number of devices that can be joined or registered to Azure AD to 10,” the fix is to change the tenant’s Device settings—not User settings, Access reviews, or Security defaults. This aligns with the exam objective to configure device settings for Azure AD join and registration and addresses the precise symptom reported by users.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study guide and the Microsoft Learn “Implement and manage Azure AD Identity Protection” module, Azure AD Identity Protection detects two primary categories of risks: user risks and sign-in risks.

User Risk Policy:A user risk represents the probability that a user's identity (credentials) has been compromised. Examples of user risk signals include leaked credentials, unusual sign-ins from different geographies, or sign-ins from infected devices. The Exam Ref SC-300 specifically lists “leaked credentials detected on the dark web or other compromised repositories” as the main trigger for a user risk policy. Such a policy can automatically force password change or enforce MFA to remediate the threat.

Sign-in Risk Policy:A sign-in risk reflects the likelihood that a specific authentication attempt is not performed by the legitimate user. Sign-in risk is based on context, such as sign-ins from suspicious browsers, anonymous IP addresses (like TOR networks), or impossible travel scenarios. The SC-300 documentation highlights these examples as conditions best handled with a sign-in risk policy, where conditional access can block or require MFA for the risky sign-in attempt.

Therefore:

Leaked credentials are addressed through a User Risk Policy, since the account itself is compromised.

Sign-ins from suspicious browsers and access from anonymous IP addresses are handled through Sign-in Risk Policies, as they relate to risky sessions rather than compromised identities.

Assigning built-in directory roles (like Device Administrators) to a group requires a role-assignable group. The SC-300 documentation explains: “You can assign Azure AD roles to a cloud security group by creating the group with the setting ‘Azure AD roles can be assigned to the group.’” It further emphasizes: “This attribute is immutable; you must decide at creation time. You cannot convert an existing group to be role-assignable later.” When a standard security group is not created as role-assignable, it will not appear in the picker when attempting to assign a directory role—exactly the behavior observed: “groups that aren’t role-assignable cannot be selected for Azure AD role assignments.” Therefore, the first step is to recreate IT_Group1 as a role-assignable security group (often called an “eligible for role assignment” group) and then assign the Device Administrators role to that group. Changing membership types (Dynamic User or Dynamic Device) or adding owners does not convert an existing group into a role-assignable one and thus would not resolve the issue.

In Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM), the SC-300 materials explain that role assignment type determines how a user obtains permissions. An eligible assignment means the user requests activation when needed; an active assignment grants continuous permissions. As the guide states, “Eligible assignments require the user to activate the role for just-in-time access, while active assignments grant standing access.” To allow users of the User administrator role to request the role when needed, you must set assignments to Eligible rather than active.

The same objective also calls for ensuring this capability is available “for up to one year.” In PIM role configuration, the duration of an eligibility is controlled by the Expire eligible assignments after policy. The documentation describes that administrators can “configure the maximum duration for eligible assignments by setting ‘Expire eligible assignments after’ to a specific period (for example, months up to one year).” Therefore, you must modify the “Expire eligible assignments after” setting to the required period.

No requirement mentions activation justification or ticket metadata; those are optional controls used to add context to activations. Consequently, the two actions that directly satisfy the stated technical requirement are: set all assignments to Eligible (C) and configure “Expire eligible assignments after” (D).

For Identity Governance (Entitlement Management), the materials clarify who can create and manage access reviews of access packages: “To create or manage access reviews for access packages, you must be a Global administrator, an Identity Governance administrator, a catalog owner for the catalog that contains the access package, or an access package manager.” The exam text also states: “User administrator does not grant the ability to manage entitlement management access reviews unless the user is delegated as a catalog owner or access package manager.” Given the scenario’s user roles, User3 (Identity Governance administrator) and User5 (Global administrator) satisfy these permissions and therefore can create and manage the access review for Package1. By contrast, User4 (User administrator) cannot perform this task by role alone. This selection follows the least-privilege guidance emphasized in SC-300: use specialized governance roles (Identity Governance admin or delegated catalog roles) rather than broad directory roles when possible.

Answer is

This question asks you to apply the stated Technical Requirements for Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) to complete the form. The specific scenario about "User3" is a distraction, as the configuration applies to all users.

The relevant technical requirements are:

"Users must provide one authentication method to reset their password by using SSPR."

This directly dictates the value for the Number of authentication methods required, which is 1.

"Available methods must include: Email, Phone, Security questions, The Microsoft Authenticator app"

This lists all the options that are configured to be available for SSPR, which determines the value for Authentication methods that can be used: Email,Phone,Security questions,The Microsoft Authenticator app.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Implement and manage synchronization for Azure AD”, Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync is the preferred solution when you need to synchronize objects from multiple Active Directory (AD DS) forests without establishing forest trusts.

The scenario specifies that trust relationships must NOT be established between adatum.com and litware.com, but A. Datum must still sync the AD DS users and groups of litware.com to their existing Azure AD tenant (adatum.com).

The SC-300 training materials clarify:

“Azure AD Connect cloud sync enables syncing from multiple AD forests to a single Azure AD tenant without the need for forest trusts or a full Azure AD Connect installation in each forest.”

Unlike staging mode (which provides a standby sync server for failover) or extending the same Azure AD Connect instance to another domain (which requires trust relationships and network connectivity between forests), Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync uses lightweight agents and does not depend on forest trust.

Therefore, to meet the requirement of syncing Litware’s AD DS to A. Datum’s Azure AD tenant without creating a trust, the correct choice is to configure Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync between the Azure AD tenant and the litware.com domain.

The requirement is:

“Require admin approval for application access to organizational data.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300 exam guide and Microsoft documentation on “Configure consent settings for applications”, Azure AD provides User consent settings under Enterprise applications → Consent and permissions to control how applications can request permissions to access organizational data.

By default, users can consent to allow apps to access organizational data on their behalf, which can create security risks. To ensure tighter control, administrators can:

Disable user consent entirely, or

Require admin consent workflow so that when users try to grant an app access, it must first be approved by an administrator.

The SC-300 study materials explicitly describe:

“To require administrator approval before an app can access organizational data, configure the User consent settings to use the admin consent workflow.”

This aligns perfectly with the stated requirement — to ensure admin approval is required before apps gain access to organizational data.

Other options are incorrect:

Authentication methods manage MFA and SSPR, not app consent.

Access packages are part of Identity Governance for resource access, not app consent.

Application Proxy publishes on-premises apps, not related to app consent permissions.

Azure AD External collaboration settings govern who can bring guests into the tenant. The SC-300 content specifies: “External collaboration settings let you control who can invite guests (Anyone, Members, Guests, or Only admins and users in the Guest Inviter role) and whether guests can invite.” It also highlights: “To restrict guest invitations to administrators or designated inviters, configure External collaboration to ‘Only admins and users in the Guest Inviter role’ and disable guest-to-guest invitations if required.” Because the problem states that “Anyone in the organization can invite guest users, including other guests and non-administrators,” the remediation is to tighten External collaboration settings so only approved roles (e.g., Global admins, Guest Inviter, or specific administrators) can invite. Access reviews address periodic entitlement verification, Conditional Access enforces sign-in/session policies, and Continuous Access Evaluation relates to token lifetime/signal-based revocation; none of these change who can send guest invitations. Adjusting External collaboration settings directly resolves the issue and aligns with the requirement that “only users that are assigned specific admin roles can invite guest users.”

In Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for Azure AD roles, the exam materials describe that you tailor how a role (for example, User administrator) is used by editing its Role settings. These settings control activation behavior, including require multi-factor authentication, justification, approval, assignment/activation durations, and notifications. The guide states that administrators can “configure activation requirements and time-bound eligibility on a per-role basis” and “enforce approval workflows and MFA at activation.” Access reviews are used to periodically verify who still needs a role, but they do not implement the operational changes to how the role is activated. Active assignments simply shows and changes who currently holds active/eligible assignments; it does not set policy for the role’s activation behavior. Administrative units scope certain directory tasks, but they are not how you change PIM activation/approval/MFA requirements. Therefore, to meet planned changes for the User administrator role (such as least privilege activation with approval, justification, and MFA), you update PIM → Azure AD roles → User administrator → Role settings. This aligns with the SC-300 objective to “configure PIM settings and policies for Azure AD roles,” ensuring governance by policy rather than ad-hoc assignment.

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) official study guide and Microsoft Learn module “Implement and manage user risk policies”, the scenario where “users must be forced to change their password if there is a probability that their identity was compromised” directly maps to the Azure AD Identity Protection “User risk policy.”

In Azure AD Identity Protection, user risk represents the likelihood that an account’s credentials have been compromised. When Azure AD detects a high user risk (for example, leaked credentials, atypical sign-in behavior, or sign-ins from unfamiliar locations), the User Risk Policy can be configured to automatically block access or require the user to reset their password upon the next sign-in.

Before a user can reset their password or complete remediation, they must have a registered authentication method (for password reset and MFA). Therefore, users must first register for multi-factor authentication (MFA) — this registration enables the authentication methods (like phone number or authenticator app) that are also used during password reset verification.

The SC-300 documentation specifically highlights:

“To enforce a password change when a user’s identity risk is high, the user must be registered for MFA, and a user risk policy must be configured to require password change.”

Thus, the correct configuration is:

Users must first register for MFA — to ensure they have verified methods available.

Configure a user risk policy — to automatically trigger password reset upon detection of compromised credentials.

Correct Answers:

Users must first: Register for multi-factor authentication (MFA).

You must configure: A user risk policy.

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Exam Ref and the Azure AD Dynamic Membership Rules documentation, when you create a dynamic group in Azure Active Directory (now Entra ID), you define rules that automatically add or remove users based on their attributes.

The scenario requires a group named LWGroup1 that contains all Azure AD user accounts for Litware but excludes all guest accounts. In Azure AD, internal users created within the tenant are designated with the attribute user.userType = "Member", while external or guest accounts from partner organizations have user.userType = "Guest".

To ensure only internal (Litware) users are included, the membership rule must:

Ensure the user object exists — by checking (user.objectId -ne null) which confirms that the rule only applies to valid user objects.

Include only members, excluding guests — by filtering with (user.userType -eq "Member").

Hence, the dynamic rule that satisfies these conditions is:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

This rule guarantees that LWGroup1 dynamically includes all internal users from litware.com and excludes all external users or guest accounts (such as Fabrikam users).

This logic aligns precisely with the Microsoft Learn module “Manage groups in Azure Active Directory” and SC-300 study guide section “Implement and manage dynamic membership rules”, which states:

“Use user.userType to distinguish between internal members and external guests when configuring membership rules for dynamic groups.”

✅ Correct Answer:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

SC-300 materials stress that to enforce modern controls (like MFA) on on-premises apps, you must front them with Azure AD so Conditional Access can evaluate sign-ins. The documentation states that Azure AD Application Proxy “provides secure remote access to on-premises applications” and that apps published through it can have “Conditional Access policies, including multifactor authentication” applied at sign-in. In other words, once the legacy app is published by Application Proxy, Azure AD sits in the path, enabling you to meet the requirement to enforce MFA when accessing on-premises applications and to combine it with your location-based exemptions.

For SharePoint Online restrictions, SC-300 points to Microsoft Cloud App Security (Defender for Cloud Apps) for real-time governance: you can create session policies that “control and limit activities in real time” and, for SharePoint Online and other Microsoft 365 apps, “monitor user sessions and block download, cut, copy, and print” when conditions (device state, risk, or location) warrant it. Since the scenario already has anomaly detections enabled, configuring Cloud App Security policies aligns directly with the requirement to place access restrictions on SharePoint Online without altering tenant-wide consent settings. Thus, publish on-prem apps with Application Proxy to bring them under Conditional Access (for MFA), and use Cloud App Security policies to enforce SharePoint Online session and download controls.

In SC-300, Azure AD Identity Protection is the prescribed control to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials.” That specific user risk—Leaked credentials—relies on Microsoft comparing known breached username/password pairs with what Azure AD can evaluate. The study materials explain that Identity Protection “detects leaked credentials when Microsoft finds a match with the user’s current credentials,” and also note that password hash synchronization (PHS) can be enabled even if your sign-in method is Pass-through Authentication or federation. A common exam call-out is that without PHS, Azure AD has no hash to compare, so the leaked-credential signal is unavailable. Enabling PHS (you can keep PTA as the active sign-in method) allows Identity Protection to raise user risk and enforce policy actions such as require password change or block access. By contrast, Azure AD Password Protection addresses banned/weak passwords at change time, not breached-credential telemetry; federation choices (e.g., PingFederate) don’t deliver the leaked-credential signal; and authentication method policy controls how users perform MFA (e.g., methods) rather than whether leaked credentials are detected. Therefore, to meet the requirement to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials,” the minimum correct step is to enable password hash synchronization while retaining PTA—exactly as recommended in SC-300 guidance.

In Azure AD Identity Governance, application access granted through Entitlement management is organized around catalogs and access packages. The SC-300 study materials explain that “a catalog is a container for resources and access packages” and that you must add your enterprise applications (or the groups tied to those apps) to a catalog before you can build access packages that users can request. Creating the catalog first enables you to place only the required resources in scope and to delegate day-to-day ownership: “catalog owners can manage the resources and access packages within their catalog without being tenant-wide admins,” satisfying the delegation requirement to use custom catalogs and least privilege. After the catalog exists, you create one or more access packages that include the application (or groups) and policies that control who can request, how they are approved, and for how long. Identity Governance then lets you track access package assignments and review who has the app over time. By contrast, programs are used to group and report on governance initiatives (for example, collections of access reviews) rather than to onboard application resources; and modifying user/admin consent settings affects app consent behavior, not the lifecycle tracking of assignments. Therefore, the correct first step to track application access assignments while meeting the delegation requirements is to create a catalog.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn modules “Implement and manage Azure AD roles” and “Implement Privileged Identity Management (PIM)”, there is a clear distinction between Azure AD built-in roles and Azure (resource-based) built-in roles.

Azure AD built-in roles govern directory-level access — such as managing users, groups, enterprise apps, or security settings in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID).The Privileged Role Administrator role allows the user to manage role assignments for directory roles in Azure AD, including activating roles through PIM.The Global Administrator also has this capability, but the Privileged Role Administrator is the least privilege role that meets the delegation requirement — aligning with the principle of least privilege stated in the scenario.As the documentation notes:

“Privileged Role Administrator manages role assignments in Azure AD, including the ability to activate and assign roles through Azure AD Privileged Identity Management.”

Azure built-in roles, on the other hand, are used to control access at the Azure resource level — for subscriptions, resource groups, and individual resources.The role responsible for managing these assignments is the User Access Administrator.This role can grant or revoke access to Azure resources by managing role assignments within Azure RBAC (Role-Based Access Control).The Microsoft documentation states:

“User Access Administrator allows management of user access to Azure resources. It can assign roles in Azure RBAC for resources, subscriptions, and management groups.”

Therefore:

✅ To manage Azure AD built-in role assignments → Privileged role administrator

✅ To manage Azure built-in role assignments → User access administrator

This approach satisfies the delegation requirement mentioned in the scenario by assigning the least-privileged roles necessary for each type of role management task.

In the SC-300 coverage of Azure AD Connect and Identity Governance, Microsoft explains that to surface a custom on-premises attribute in Azure AD you must enable Directory extensions in Azure AD Connect. The guide states that “Directory extensions lets you synchronize additional attributes from on-premises Active Directory to Azure AD so they are available in the cloud directory for apps and policy.” This is the supported way to bring a custom attribute (here, LWLicenses) from the litware.com forest into Azure AD so it can be referenced by cloud features such as dynamic group rules. Domain filtering or optional features do not expose a new attribute to Azure AD; directory extensions does.

For license automation, the SC-300 materials on group-based licensing and dynamic groups emphasize that “licenses can be assigned to Azure AD groups; group members then inherit the licenses, and when membership changes, licenses are added or removed automatically.” They further note that “dynamic user groups evaluate rules against user attributes to add or remove users without manual effort,” and that “nested groups are not supported for license inheritance—only direct members receive licenses.” Using the synced LWLicenses attribute in a Dynamic User group rule (for example, user.extensionAttribute… -eq "E5") ensures users are automatically added to the correct group and therefore receive the specified licenses without administrative intervention, fully meeting Litware’s requirement to “manage the assignment of Azure AD licenses by modifying the value of the LWLicenses attribute.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Monitor and respond to Azure AD events with Azure Sentinel”, multi-staged attacks are advanced threat scenarios that require correlation of multiple events — for example, a suspicious sign-in followed by abnormal Office 365 activity.

The scenario in the question states:

“Litware wants to use the Fusion rule in Azure Sentinel to detect multi-staged attacks that include a combination of suspicious Azure AD sign-ins followed by anomalous Microsoft Office 365 activity.”

Azure Sentinel’s Fusion rule is a built-in, machine-learning–driven correlation rule that automatically detects multi-stage attacks by analyzing anomalies across multiple data sources such as Azure AD sign-in logs, Office 365 activity, and security alerts.

However, to fine-tune detection or meet specific organizational monitoring requirements, administrators can customize the rule logic in Sentinel analytics. This allows you to define how different signals and events are correlated, what thresholds trigger an alert, and how Sentinel interprets combined anomalies.

Microsoft documentation states:

“Fusion uses correlation logic in analytics rules to detect complex multi-stage attacks. Administrators can customize rule logic to meet specific detection requirements and fine-tune alert sensitivity.”

The other options do not meet the requirement:

B. Create a workbook → Used for visualization and reporting, not detection.

C. Add data connectors → Used to ingest data sources; this is already configured.

D. Add a playbook → Used for automated response, not for detection logic configuration.

✅ Correct Answer: A. Customize the Azure Sentinel rule logic

SC-300 emphasizes using Conditional Access with named locations to scope MFA—especially to exclude trusted corporate egress IPs. The materials state that administrators can define named locations by public IP ranges and “mark them as trusted” for policy exceptions. This aligns with the requirement: enforce MFA for all users, but exempt users authenticating from the Boston office. Because Azure AD evaluates the client’s public egress address, private RFC1918 ranges are never seen by Azure AD on the internet, so defining private IP ranges would not work. Likewise, the legacy “Trusted IPs” setting belongs to the old per-user MFA service settings; SC-300 guidance prefers Conditional Access named locations for modern MFA deployments and for combining with other conditions (apps, platforms, user risk, locations). Implementing the Boston office as a named location using its public egress IP range(s), and marking it trusted, lets you exclude that location from the tenant-wide MFA policy while still meeting the broader requirement to enforce MFA for everyone else and for on-prem apps published via Azure AD Application Proxy. In short: define Boston’s public IP as a named location and use it in your Conditional Access policy exclusion to satisfy the exemption precisely and securely.

Server1

On DC1

Azure AD Password Protection has two components: the DC agent (installed on domain controllers) and the proxy service (installed on one or more member servers). The SC-300 materials and Microsoft Identity Governance guidance explain that the proxy service is required when domain controllers do not have direct internet access. The proxy retrieves the password protection policy and custom banned password list from Azure AD over outbound HTTPS and makes it available to DC agents. The documentation further states that you should deploy at least one proxy per forest and two for high availability, and that domain controllers do not need internet connectivity when a proxy is deployed. In this scenario, DCs are explicitly blocked from internet access, so the proxy must be placed on member servers. Both SERVER1 (Application Proxy connector) and SERVER2 (Azure AD Connect) are domain-joined member servers with internet connectivity and are appropriate locations for the AzureADPasswordProtectionProxy service; selecting both provides the recommended redundancy. The custom banned password list is configured in Azure AD at the tenant level (as part of Azure AD Password Protection settings), not on individual servers. Once configured, the policy and list are downloaded by the proxy and enforced by the DC agent during password set or change operations, satisfying the requirement to implement a banned password list for the litware.com forest.