HPE7-A07 Aruba Certified Campus Access Mobility Expert Written Exam Question and Answers

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation (Verified Extract from HPE Aruba Networking Switching Documentation)

When implementing AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) on Aruba CX switches, there are mechanisms to ensure that end-user devices maintain basic network connectivity even if authentication fails due to server unreachability or configuration errors.

Two key mechanisms address this concern:

1. Critical Role

The critical role defines the local role that is automatically applied to a port or user session when:

The authentication server is unreachable, or

The authentication process cannot be completed due to network errors.

This ensures that endpoints (clients) can still obtain limited or temporary access to the network (for example, DHCP and DNS access) even when RADIUS is unavailable.

ArubaOS-CX Extract:

“When AAA authentication fails due to the RADIUS server being unreachable, the switch assigns the critical-role to the client, allowing limited access to the network until connectivity to the server is restored.”

2. Fallback Role

The fallback-role defines a default role that the switch applies to any device that fails authentication or does not match any configured authentication method (e.g., device profiling, MAC-auth, or 802.1X).

In lab or early deployment scenarios, this role provides baseline network access for devices that fail authentication but should not be entirely blocked.

ArubaOS-CX Extract:

“The fallback role allows clients that do not match any authentication or profiling method to obtain a defined level of access instead of being denied network connectivity.”

Option Analysis:

A. Configure onboarding-method concurrent → Used to enable multiple onboarding methods (802.1X, MAC-auth, device profiling) concurrently; does not prevent network denial.

B. Configure the critical role → Correct. Ensures connectivity when AAA servers are unreachable.

C. Configure auth-mode multi-device → Controls how multiple clients share a port; unrelated to AAA fallback behavior.

D. Configure the fallback role → Correct. Provides network access to unauthenticated or failed-auth clients.

E. Configure port-access radius-override → Allows RADIUS to override local roles or VLANs; does not address reachability or failure handling.

Final Verified Answers: B, D

Reference Sources (HPE Aruba Official Materials):

Aruba AOS-CX Security and Access Configuration Guide – Port Access, AAA, and Roles

Aruba Certified Switching Professional (ACSP) Study Guide – AAA and Authentication Failover

ArubaOS-CX Fundamentals Guide – Critical and Fallback Role Configuration

Applying the 'acmethreshold' profile as shown in the exhibit would set a minimum and maximum threshold for queue 0, which affects the drop probability for traffic that exceeds these thresholds. The yellow marking indicates a medium drop precedence, so yellow-flagged traffic would be more likely to be dropped when congestion occurs, and the uplink is over-utilized. This action is intended to protect higher-priority traffic, such as VoIP, by giving it a lower probability of being dropped.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation (Verified Extract from HPE Aruba Networking Switching Documentation)

In Aruba AOS-CX switching environments, Quality of Service (QoS) allows the switch to prioritize certain types of traffic such as voice, video, or real-time applications.

When a connected endpoint (such as a VoIP phone or wireless handset) marks packets with DSCP = 46 (Expedited Forwarding for voice), the switch must trust these markings to maintain end-to-end traffic prioritization.

Key Concept: Trust Boundary

By default, Aruba switches do not trust incoming DSCP or 802.1p markings from end devices for security reasons.

To allow the switch to accept and act on these values, the QoS trust DSCP feature must be explicitly enabled on the relevant interface or globally.

Official Aruba AOS-CX Extract:

“The qos trust dscp command enables the switch port to honor the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) markings received from connected devices. When trusted, packets maintain their QoS priority as they traverse the switch fabric.”

When wireless handsets connect to a bridged SSID, their traffic is bridged locally at the access switch — meaning the switch sees the traffic directly from the AP. If the handset marks the packet with DSCP 46, enabling QoS trust DSCP ensures that the switch preserves that marking and applies the appropriate voice priority queue treatment.

This configuration ensures end-to-end QoS consistency between the wireless AP, mobility gateway, and wired switch.

Option Analysis:

A. Incorrect – “Voice Wi-Fi Multimedia Share” is not a valid Aruba configuration feature; WMM shares QoS mapping but not DSCP trust.

B. Incorrect – UCC (Unified Communications and Collaboration) enhances call visibility and diagnostics, not DSCP trust or QoS marking.

C. ✅ Correct – Enables the switch to trust and honor DSCP markings (such as DSCP 46) received from endpoints or bridged SSIDs.

D. Incorrect – WMM (Wi-Fi Multimedia) is required for prioritization over wireless links, but since this is a bridged SSID, the DSCP markings must be honored at the switch, not just the AP.

✅ Final Verified Answer: C

📘 Reference Sources (HPE Aruba Official Materials):

Aruba AOS-CX Quality of Service (QoS) Configuration Guide

ArubaOS 10 WLAN and Mobility Configuration Guide – QoS and WMM for Voice SSIDs

Aruba Certified Switching Professional (ACSP) Study Guide – QoS Trust and Traffic Classification

The issue indicated by the output is an invalid pre-shared key (PSK). The logs show multiple failures during the WPA2 key exchange process, which points to a mismatch between the PSK configured on the client device and the PSK expected by the AOS 10 mobility gateway.

MU-MIMO (Multi-User, Multiple Input, Multiple Output) provides the most efficient use of airtime for VoIP traffic among the options listed. MU-MIMO allows multiple users to receive multiple data streams simultaneously, improving the overall efficiency of the network, especially in dense environments where VoIP applications need consistent and reliable connectivity.

In WLANs, multicast frames are transmitted at the lowest basic rate, so a single multicast stream can consume significant airtime and slow the entire BSS, impacting clients that did not even join the group.

Dynamic Multicast Optimization (DMO) converts multicast streams to per-client unicast, allowing the AP to use the highest supported unicast data rate and reliable retransmission—this prevents the low-rate multicast airtime penalty.

Multicast Transmission Optimization (MTO) raises the transmit rate for any remaining multicast/broadcast that must still be sent as multicast, further reducing airtime.

The captures show multicast sent as 802.11 data at a low rate; enabling DMO + MTO addresses exactly this symptom in Aruba deployments.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of HPE Aruba Networking Switching:

The VSX synchronization feature provides per-feature synchronization from the primary to the secondary VSX peer. For multi-chassis LAGs (MC-LAGs), the command that ensures both VSX peers maintain consistent LAG interface associations and attributes is entered under the VSX configuration context:

• Command syntax: vsx-sync mclag-interfaces

• Command context: config-vsx

Description (extract): Enables VSX synchronization of VSX LAG interface associations and attributes from the primary VSX switch to the secondary peer switch.

In a campus design with two aggregation switches in a VSX pair and access switches dual-homed using MC-LAG, enabling vsx-sync mclag-interfaces under the VSX context ensures consistent LAG membership, attributes, and behavior across the pair—avoiding configuration drift and aggregation inconsistencies.

Scenario

Correct Role

This role is applied when a re-authentication attempt times out to ClearPass.

Critical role

This role is applied when ClearPass replies with the deny access enforcement profile.

Reject role

This role is applied when ClearPass replies with the allow access enforcement profile.

Auth-role

This role is applied when there is no match for a device profile.

Fallback role

In Aruba CX switching, when integrating ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) for 802.1X, MAC Authentication, or Downloadable Role-based Access, the system assigns specific roles based on AAA enforcement outcomes or network events (timeouts, mismatches, or unknown devices).

These special roles ensure network survivability and consistent zero-trust policy enforcement even if ClearPass or RADIUS communication fails.

1. Critical Role → Applied when re-authentication attempt times out to ClearPass

“When the switch cannot reach the RADIUS server during re-authentication (for example, a timeout), the switch assigns the critical-role to the authenticated client, ensuring continued network connectivity with a restricted policy.”

“This role is used to maintain limited access when the RADIUS server is unreachable or times out.”

This ensures that devices remain minimally operational while preventing full network access — crucial for survivable network designs.

2. Reject Role → Applied when ClearPass replies with the deny access enforcement profile

“If the RADIUS response includes an Access-Reject, the switch applies the configured reject-role. This typically results in isolation or complete denial of access.”

“The reject-role allows enforcement of a restrictive VLAN or ACL after authentication failure.”

Therefore, when ClearPass denies access, the reject role provides an explicit enforcement action.

3. Auth-Role → Applied when ClearPass replies with the allow access enforcement profile

“When the authentication succeeds and the RADIUS server returns an Access-Accept with an Aruba-User-Role attribute, the switch applies the auth-role.”

“This is the default operational role for authenticated clients.”

This role represents the authorized state, where the user receives full or role-based access according to ClearPass policies.

4. Fallback Role → Applied when there is no match for a device profile

“If the client fails device profiling or no match is found in the endpoint database, the switch applies the fallback-role configured for unknown devices.”

“The fallback-role provides a baseline policy for unrecognized or unclassified endpoints.”

This ensures unknown or new devices can be placed in a limited-access posture pending classification.

References of HPE Aruba Networking Switching Documents or Study Guide:

ArubaOS-CX Access Security Guide (AOS-CX 10.12 and later) – “Role mapping and special roles (auth-role, reject-role, fallback-role, critical-role).”

Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager Deployment Guide – “Integration with Aruba Switch Roles and Enforcement Profile Mapping.”

Aruba Zero Trust Wired Access Design Guide – “Survivability roles for authentication failure or unreachable ClearPass.”

Aruba CX 6300 Configuration Guide – “AAA, Downloadable Roles, and Fallback/Critical Role Configuration.”

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of HPE Aruba Networking Switching:

In Aruba gateway/AP tunnel state reporting, the following tunnel state semantics apply:

• SM_STATE_CONNECTING — indicates the AP has received tunnel configuration/keys and is attempting to bring up the tunnel; the tunnel is not yet available for client traffic.

• SM_STATE_SURVIVING — indicates the AP is in a survival/fallback condition (for example, it did not receive a fresh tunnel key and is attempting resolution via IKE); this state reflects a problem condition that can prevent successful client connectivity.

By contrast:

• SM_STATE_CONNECTED — indicates the IPsec tunnel to the endpoint is established and available.

• SM_STATE_REKEYING — indicates a rekey operation is in progress; the session is being updated, not necessarily failed.

• SM_STATE_SURVIVED — indicates the AP completed survival procedures and the IPsec tunnel is available.

Because end-users cannot connect, the problematic states are those where the tunnel is not up in normal service: SM_STATE_CONNECTING and SM_STATE_SURVIVING.

AOS-CX BGP community advertisement control:

“For each BGP neighbor and address-family you can control the advertisement of community attributes using the send-community command. The options are standard, extended, and both. When both is configured, the neighbor is sent both the standard and extended community attributes with the NLRI updates.”

“BGP accepts community attributes received from a neighbor by default; the send-community setting governs outbound advertisement. The configuration does not require resetting the peering session.”

These extracts establish that adding send-community both under the IPv4 unicast address-family for neighbor 10.2.0.3 makes R1 include community attributes with its UPDATEs and that the choice both covers standard and extended communities. Because BGP already accepts communities on receive, this effectively enables the exchange of communities in both directions when the peer is similarly capable. This matches B (exchange with NLRI in and out) and D (standard and extended communities are included).

Why A is incorrect:

“The term type-1/type-2 is used in EVPN route types and is not the nomenclature for BGP communities. The send-community command does not reference EVPN route types; it controls standard/extended community attributes.”

Thus, A references the wrong concept.

Why C is incorrect:

“Changing send-community for a neighbor is applied dynamically in the address-family context and does not require tearing down the BGP session.”

Therefore, enabling send-community both will not “bounce” the peering.

References of HPE Aruba Networking Switching documents or Study Guide:

AOS-CX BGP Configuration Guide — “Neighbor policy controls per address-family: send-community {standard | extended | both}; communities accepted on receive by default; change does not reset the session.”

AOS-CX Route Policy and Attributes Reference — “Community attributes (standard and extended) and how they are attached to NLRI in UPDATE messages.”

For Downloadable User Roles (DUR) to function correctly with ClearPass, the Network Access Devices (NADs) need to be correctly defined in ClearPass under the "Devices" tab. This ensures that ClearPass can identify and communicate with the NADs to deliver the appropriate user roles. If the NADs are not correctly defined, ClearPass will not be able to provide the DURs to the access points for enforcement. This is a common configuration step that is required to integrate ClearPass with network devices for advanced role-based access control.

In 802.11ax (Wi-Fi 6), OFDMA (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access) subdivides a channel into resource units, enabling simultaneous uplink and downlink transmissions for multiple clients. This is specifically optimized for many small packets (typical of IoT), reducing contention and improving efficiency. MU-MIMO (UL/DL) helps with multiple spatial streams for larger frames and strong SNR clients, while HE TXBF improves range/data rate for individual links; neither addresses small-packet concurrency as directly as OFDMA.

Based on the criteria provided for wireless guest users, the correct user role configuration must allow internet access, only allow access to public DNS servers, deny access to all internal networks except for any DHCP server, and place the Wi-Fi guests on VLAN 555. The ACLs must permit services necessary for basic internet access (such as DNS and DHCP) and block access to internal networks.

Option A satisfies these criteria with the following configurations:

user-role "WiFi-guest": This defines the role for Wi-Fi guests.

access-list session dhcp-acl: This applies the access list that likely permits DHCP, which is necessary for guests to obtain an IP address.

access-list session dns-acl: This applies the DNS access list, which likely restricts guests to using public DNS servers.

access-list session internal-networks: This applies the internal networks access list, which denies access to internal networks.

vlan 555: This sets the VLAN for Wi-Fi guests to 555.

Options B, C, and D are incorrect because they include access-list session allowall which would permit all traffic, contradicting the requirement to deny access to all internal networks.

In this scenario:

All hosts are in VLAN 100

Group-Based Policy (GBP) is applied

H1 belongs to the Marketing role

Policy table for Marketing:

Source

Destination

Action

Marketing

HR

Deny

Marketing

Sales

Permit

Marketing

Finance

Deny

Role Mapping:

Sales: H2, H4

Finance: H3, H5

HR: H6

📌 Key Aruba GBP Behavior for ARP

Aruba AOS-CX GBP enforces policy at L3 and L2, and ARP is not treated as unconditional broadcast when GBP roles restrict communication.

Aruba documentation states:

“ARP requests are only forwarded to ports associated with permitted roles.

ARP behavior follows the GBP access-policy rules.”

Since Marketing is only permitted to communicate with Sales, ARP from H1 must only be forwarded toward:

✅ H2 (Sales)

✅ H4 (Sales)

Interfaces:

H2 → port 1/1/1

H4 → port 1/1/3

Therefore, the ARP request is NOT flooded to Finance (H3/H5) or HR (H6), where communication is denied.

❌ Why Other Options Are Incorrect

Option

Why Wrong

B

Would ignore GBP enforcement; too wide of a flood

C

Not dropped — allowed paths exist to Sales

D

ARP is not broadcasted when GBP denies connectivity

When configuring Virtual Switching Extension (VSX) in a campus topology for link aggregation across two aggregation switches, it is important to synchronize Multi-Chassis Link Aggregation Group (MC-LAG) interfaces. The command "vsx-sync mclag-interfaces" ensures that the state and configuration of MC-LAG interfaces are synchronized between the two VSX-linked switches, providing consistent link aggregation and preventing any loops or mismatched configurations that might occur if the interfaces were not in sync.

In OSPF, when a router learns about an external network through both E1 and E2 advertisements, and if both have the same path cost, the router will prefer the E1 path. This is because E1 routes consider both the external cost to reach the external network and the internal cost to reach the ASBR, providing a more comprehensive metric. E2 routes only consider the external cost and ignore the internal cost to the ASBR, which could potentially lead to suboptimal routing. Therefore, the router will choose the E1 path due to its more accurate representation of the total path cost.

When configuring an 802.1X supplicant for wireless network access with Microsoft Windows 10, enabling server certificate validation is a critical step to ensure the security of the authentication process. Server certificate validation helps prevent man-in-the-middle attacks by ensuring the RADIUS server presenting the certificate is the correct server that the client expects to communicate with.

The exhibit shows that the SSID supports 802.11ax clients, which is indicated by the presence of HT (High Throughput) information, VHT (Very High Throughput) capabilities, and HE (High-Efficiency) operation, which are all features associated with 802.11ax, also known as Wi-Fi 6.

In Aruba gateways/switches, LLDP decodes and displays standard LLDP TLVs by default. LLDP-MED inventory TLVs (including Asset ID) are shown only when LLDP-MED is enabled.

When LLDP-MED is not enabled, received MED TLVs are counted as Unknown TLVs and are not decoded in the neighbor detail output.

In the exhibit, show lldp statistics shows “Unknown TLVs: 2” and show lldp neighbor ... detail displays only basic LLDP fields (Chassis ID, Mgmt Address, Port Description, MTU), with no MED inventory fields such as Asset ID. This is the expected symptom of LLDP-MED being disabled.

LLDP TX is not required to receive and display neighbor TLVs; the missing Asset ID is unrelated to transmit state. MTU is also not relevant to TLV decoding.

References (HPE Aruba official materials): Aruba AOS-CX LLDP/LLDP-MED configuration—MED must be enabled to advertise/parse MED inventory TLVs (Asset ID, Serial, HW/FW/SW, etc.).

The event log showing PMK (Pairwise Master Key) and OKC (Opportunistic Key Caching) key add/update and delete operations is indicative of normal client behavior in a WLAN environment. These events are part of the standard process for maintaining client session security and do not necessarily indicate any issue.

It is a common practice to separate successful and failed test results into different files for ease of troubleshooting. If the "datagrams.pcap" file shows no issues, it's likely because it only contains successful test data, and the failed tests that could explain the poor user experience would be in a different file, such as "datagrams-failed.pcap."

To ensure that ClearPass can initiate a Change of Authorization (CoA) consistently, it's important to enable dynamic authorization to allow RADIUS CoA messages to be processed. This setting typically falls under the high-availability cluster configuration to ensure that it persists across gateway failovers. Additionally, the NAS IP address must be configured under RADIUS client settings to ensure that the correct IP address is used for RADIUS communications, which is necessary for CoA to function correctly.

The exhibit shows a series of 802.1X authentication steps with multiple "Deauthentication" frames, which indicate that the client is not successfully completing the authentication process. Since the frames show repeated attempts at authentication followed by deauthentication, this suggests that the client is failing the 802.1X authentication process, which is required for network access in a WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise security environment.

In a multi-site deployment with a mix of bridged and tunneled SSIDs, if there are session sync errors between different areas, it could be due to connectivity issues with the central management platform, which in the case of Aruba, is likely HPE Aruba Networking Central. This interruption could cause inconsistencies in session states across the network.

default GBP role = GBP role ID = 0

infrastructure GBP role = GBP role ID = 2

user-defined GBP role = GBP role ID = <100-8191>

USB dongles often require additional power, which may exceed the power delivery capabilities of Class 4 PoE switches. Aruba AP-615 and AP-635 are designed to work with USB dongles that require additional power for proper operation. Since the Cat 6A cable can support higher power levels, replacing the Class 4 PoE switches with Class 6 PoE switches, which can deliver higher power, should resolve the issue with the dongles not powering up.

In the United States, the operation in the 6GHz band for Wi-Fi devices such as the AP-634 and AP-635 is regulated by the Automated Frequency Coordination (AFC) system, which determines the channels that can be used based on the location. Since the Proof of Concept (POC) was conducted in a different location using AP-635 APs, the allowable channels identified by the AFC service for that location would be different than the channels allowed for the actual deployment location of the AP-634 APs. This would result in a different set of broadcasting channels being available for use in the new warehouse deployment.

In HPE Aruba Networking (AOS-CX and AOS-Switch) OSPF implementation, the routing behavior for external routes (Type 5 LSAs) distinguishes between two types of external advertisements:

E1 (Type-1 external) — The total path cost is calculated as the sum of the internal cost to reach the ASBR (Autonomous System Boundary Router) plus the external cost as advertised in the LSA.

E2 (Type-2 external) — The external cost is considered independent of the internal OSPF path cost to reach the ASBR. Thus, the metric used is only the external cost from the LSA.

When both an E1 and an E2 route exist to the same external destination, OSPF gives preference to the E1 route, regardless of metric values, because the E1 route represents a more accurate total cost to the destination (including internal OSPF cost).

Extract (as per HPE Aruba OSPF Technical Overview and AOS-CX Routing Guide):

“When both Type-1 (E1) and Type-2 (E2) external LSAs for the same destination are present, the router always prefers the Type-1 route. Type-1 routes include both internal and external costs in the total metric, while Type-2 routes use only the external cost. The E1 path is therefore considered more precise and is selected as the preferred route.”

This is consistent across Aruba’s OSPF implementation and follows standard OSPF behavior as defined by the protocol (RFC 2328).

Therefore, when both E1 and E2 routes are available and have the same overall cost, the router will always prefer the E1 path.

The CLI output displays EVPN routes and their corresponding next hops. The "Route Distinguisher" entries followed by IP addresses in the 172.21.11.x range indicate these are loopback addresses used by the underlay network. The underlay network provides the basic routing and forwarding plane for the overlay network that EVPN is part of. These loopback addresses are crucial for the proper functioning of the EVPN control plane.

The correct address for the ClearPass Guest should match the FQDN of the HTTPS certificate installed on the device, which is often the FQDN of the vendor's product. This ensures secure and proper redirection to the captive portal during the authentication process. The FQDN should be entered in the Address field for ClearPass Guest configuration.

Adding an additional IP subnet to the same VLAN means that devices configured with either subnet can communicate at Layer 2 without the need for routing. This is because they are on the same VLAN and thus in the same broadcast domain. However, to communicate between subnets, an L3 device or inter-VLAN routing would be required.

The provided event logs from Aruba Central show multiple entries of:

Client PMK/OKC Key Add/Update

Client PMK/OKC Key Delete

Operation ADD/UPDATE for key cache entry for client ...

Operation DEL for key cache entry for client ...

These log entries refer to Pairwise Master Key (PMK) and Opportunistic Key Caching (OKC) updates in the Aruba gateway or access point for wireless clients.

When a client roams between APs or the system refreshes key entries for active clients, Aruba’s infrastructure updates or deletes PMK cache entries dynamically. This process ensures secure key continuity across APs and controllers for tunneled SSIDs.

Exact Extracts from Aruba WLAN and AOS-10 Documentation:

“PMK/OKC cache updates and deletions are part of normal operation. When clients connect, disconnect, or roam, the system adds or removes their PMK cache entries. These log messages are informational and indicate expected WPA2-Enterprise behavior.”

“In a tunneled SSID, PMK and OKC entries are managed at the gateway level. When a client roams or rekeys, the gateway logs PMK/OKC Key Add/Update and Key Delete messages. These are not error conditions.”

“Frequent ADD/DEL entries for a client MAC address reflect normal WPA2 key lifecycle events—such as reauthentication, idle timeout, or client-driven disassociation.”

Thus, these messages indicate normal background key management (PMK caching and rekeying) and not any fault or attack scenario.

Why the Other Options Are Incorrect:

A. Denial-of-Service attack:False. These events correspond to key management, not excessive connection requests. Aruba security logs for DoS attacks show messages like “Association flood” or “Authentication flood,” not PMK/OKC operations.

B. Roaming issue:While OKC relates to roaming optimizations, these log messages do not indicate a failure or issue — they show successful key caching updates.

“OKC Key Add/Update events confirm successful key caching, not roaming failure.”

C. Client WLAN driver issue:No error messages (timeouts, EAP failures, or deauths) are logged. The presence of PMK updates and deletes alone does not imply a driver issue.

“Client driver problems typically manifest as association failures or 4-way handshake errors, not PMK cache logs.”

Conclusion:

The repeated “PMK/OKC Key Add/Update” and “Key Delete” events represent routine client key caching and refresh behavior in Aruba’s tunneled WLAN design.

No misconfiguration, client issue, or attack is implied.

Therefore, the correct answer is:

✅ D. This is normal, expected behavior. No further actions are needed.

References of HPE Aruba Networking Switching Documents or Study Guide:

ArubaOS 10 Wireless and Gateway Configuration Guide – “PMK caching and OKC operation.”

Aruba WLAN Troubleshooting and Operations Guide – “Understanding PMK/OKC key lifecycle and expected log events.”

Aruba Campus WLAN Best Practices Guide – “Tunneled SSID key management (PMK, OKC, and 802.11r Fast Roaming).”

Aruba Central Monitoring and Event Logs Reference – “Client PMK/OKC Key Add/Delete informational messages.”

In a VXLAN environment, unknown unicast traffic, such as ARP requests from H1, which does not have a specific destination MAC address learned by the switch A2, will be flooded out of all interfaces. This flooding behavior is necessary because A2 needs to ensure that the ARP request reaches its intended destination, which might be on any of the interfaces. It's a part of the standard behavior of switches to handle ARP traffic when the destination hardware address is unknown.

The capture shows messages related to WPA key management, indicating WPA2-PSK is being used. Also, the capture includes a DHCP request from the client but no corresponding DHCP ACK, suggesting the client is not receiving an IP address, which could explain the connectivity failure.