CAMS Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) Question and Answers

Here is the exact information from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Trust and Company Service Providers:

"Understanding the management and ownership structure of a trust is crucial in assessing the ML/TF risk it poses. This includes the identity of all settlors, trustees and beneficiaries, and their respective roles and responsibilities, as well as the nature and purpose of the trust."

"TCSPs should obtain and maintain up-to-date information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, the source of funds and wealth, and where relevant, the source of funds or wealth of the settlor and beneficiaries."

Based on this information, the correct answers are A and D. Trust and Company Service Providers must understand the responsibility and authority in the structure, as well as the general purpose behind the structure in order to assess the overall risk of the trust and ensure that any transactions with the trust are legitimate.

The principles of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FILLs) aimed at maximizing cooperation between FILLs to more effectively combat money laundering are[1]:

B. Information exchange should take place informally, without too many formal prerequisites. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 55)

E. It is within an FlU's authority to sign Memorandums of Understanding independently. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 56)

Cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency that uses cryptography to secure and verify transactions. Cryptocurrencies are decentralized and operate outside the control of any central authority, such as a government or a bank. This makes them attractive for money launderers, who can use them to transfer funds anonymously, quickly, and globally, without leaving a trace or being subject to regulation. Cryptocurrencies pose more risk of money laundering than other sources of money, such as wire transfers, credit cards, or money service businesses, which are subject to more oversight, verification, and reporting requirements.

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 1, Section 1.9, page 37

CAMS eLearning Course, Module 1, Lesson 9

ACAMS Crypto Hub

A National Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) has three primary functions: receiving, analyzing, and disseminating information related to suspicious financial activities. The FIU's main focus is to identify and investigate suspicious activities, such as money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes. The FIU also works with other organizations and agencies to develop effective and efficient financial crime prevention strategies. The FIU is tasked with developing an effective system for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating information related to suspicious financial activities. The information collected is then used to identify, investigate, and prosecute financial crimes.

Money laundering can have serious consequences for financial institutions. They may face increased investigation costs and fines from regulators and law enforcement agencies for failing to detect or prevent money laundering activities. Additionally, money laundering can result in a loss of profitable business as customers and counterparties may no longer want to do business with the institution due to its reputation for being associated with illicit activity.

 The account officer has violated the principle of confidentiality by informing the customer about the legal request from law enforcement. This could amount to tipping off, which is a criminal offense in many jurisdictions. Tipping off could jeopardize the investigation, compromise evidence, and alert other potential suspects. The account officer should not discuss any details of the investigation with the customer, nor should he meet with the customer to do so. He should also report his actions to his manager and compliance department, and cooperate with law enforcement as required.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, Module 4: Conducting or Supporting the Investigation, Lesson 4.3: Confidentiality and Information Sharing

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide2, Chapter 4: Conducting or Supporting the Investigation, Section 4.3: Confidentiality and Information Sharing, pp. 135-136

ACAMS CAMS Certification Exam Outline3, Domain 4: Conducting or Supporting the Investigation, Task 4.3: Maintain confidentiality of the investigation, p. 18

Layering is the second stage of the money laundering process, in which the launderer moves the funds around to create distance and confusion between the source and the destination of the illicit proceeds. Layering often involves multiple transactions, such as wire transfers, shell companies, trusts, and offshore accounts, that make it difficult to trace the origin and ownership of the funds. Layering is intended to disguise the audit trail and provide anonymity for the launderer12.

Placement is the first stage of the money laundering process, in which the launderer introduces the illicit proceeds into the financial system, often by breaking them into smaller amounts or using cash-intensive businesses12.

Structuring is a technique used in the placement stage, in which the launderer deposits or withdraws cash in amounts below the reporting threshold to avoid detection or suspicion12.

Integration is the third and final stage of the money laundering process, in which the launderer reintroduces the funds into the legitimate economy, often by purchasing assets, investing in businesses, or mixing them with legal income12.

 1: ACAMS (2020), Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, ACAMS, Miami, FL, USA, www.acams.org/en/cams-certification-package-6th-edition, pp. 12-14. 2: ACAMS (2020), CAMS Examination Preparation Video, 6th Edition, ACAMS, Miami, FL, USA, www.acams.org/en/cams-certification-package-6th-edition, Module 1.

According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), substantial growth in wealth during a short period of time is a red flag for money laundering or terrorist financing. Additionally, when a client is a family member of a politically exposed person (PEP) from a country known for corruption, it raises concerns about the potential for corruption, bribery, or influence peddling. In this case, the client's father became the president of Country B, which makes him a PEP.

The first valid step in the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) international cooperation process is for the central authority of the requesting country to send a letter of request to the central authority of the other country. The letter of request should provide a summary of the facts and information required,the reasons for the request, and any specific legal or procedural requirements that need to be met. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 233).

The most important risk factor in this scenario is the proposed offshore jurisdiction that is known for its strong privacy laws limiting access to customer information by law enforcement. This indicates that the customer may be trying to evade tax, hide the source or destination of funds, or engage in other illicit activities that could expose the bank to money laundering or terrorist financing risks. Offshore jurisdictions are often used by criminals to create complex corporate structures that obscure the beneficial ownership and control of the entities involved. The bank should conduct enhanced due diligence on the customer, the offshore company, and the nature and purpose of the transactions.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, page 35-36, 38-39

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 2, Lesson 2.3, Offshore Financial Centers

1, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Offshore Financial Centers and Money Laundering

2, CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS, CAMS Exam Outline, Domain 2, Task 2.3

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, one of the main challenges of providing on-line services to customers is the verification of theiridentity and the authentication of their transactions1. The lack of face-to-face contact and the use of electronic documents increase the risk of identity fraud, impersonation, and account takeover2. Therefore, financial institutions offering on-line services need to implement robust customer due diligence (CDD) measures, such as using multiple sources of information, verifying biometric data, and applying risk-based monitoring3.

1: CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, Section 4.1, page 103

2: CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, Section 4.2, page 104

3: CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, Section 4.3, page 105

The best course of action for the FI in this scenario is to consider retaining qualified, experienced legal counsel. This is because the investigation request from the local law enforcement agency may involve complex legal issues, such as confidentiality, privacy, data protection, and cooperation obligations. The FI may need to balance the interests of the customer, the law enforcement agency, and the FI itself, and ensure that it complies with the applicable laws and regulations in responding to the request. The legal counsel can advise the FI on the scope, validity, and implications of the request, and help the FI to prepare and submit the required information in a timely and appropriate manner. The legal counsel can also protect the FI from any potential liability or litigation arising from the investigation.

1: Requests by Law Enforcement for Financial Institutions to Maintain Accounts and/or Conduct Transactions1

2: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Suspicious Activity Reporting and Other Anti-Money Laundering Considerations2

3: ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination3

The key factor that would result in the decision for a financial institution (FI) to exit a client relationship is when the level of residual client risk exceeds the FI’s risk appetite. Residual client risk is the remaining risk after applying the FI’s risk mitigation measures, such as customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, and suspicious activity reporting. Risk appetite is the level and type of risk that the FI is willing and able to accept inpursuit of its business objectives. If the residual client risk is higher than the risk appetite, the FI may decide to terminate the relationship to avoid potential regulatory, reputational, or operational consequences.

The other options are not necessarily key factors for exiting a client relationship, because:

The client is a registered charity known to remit funds to high risk geographies where there is limited due diligence information available. This option may indicate a higher level of inherent client risk, but it does not necessarily mean that the FI should exit the relationship. The FI may be able to apply enhanced due diligence, ongoing monitoring, and risk-based controls to mitigate the risk and comply with the regulatory requirements. The FI may also consider the nature and purpose of the client’s activities, the source and destination of the funds, and the potential impact on the client’s beneficiaries.

Closing the client accounts will help reduce the number of transaction monitoring alerts. This option may suggest a possible benefit of exiting the relationship, but it is not a key factor for making the decision. The FI should not base its decision solely on the volume of transaction monitoring alerts, but rather on the quality and relevance of the alerts, the results of the investigation, and the risk assessment of the client. The FI should also ensure that its transaction monitoring system is properly calibrated and validated to avoid generating excessive or false alerts.

Client transactions generate ongoing transaction monitoring alerts that did not result in any SAR/STR filings. This option may indicate a need for reviewing and improving the transaction monitoring system or the investigation process, but it does not necessarily imply that the FI should exit the relationship. The FI should not assume that the absence of SAR/STR filings means that the client is low risk or that the alerts are irrelevant. The FI should conduct a thorough and timely investigation of the alerts and document the rationale for filing or not filing a SAR/STR. The FI should also consider the overall risk profile of the client and the nature and frequency of the transactions.

ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination - 6th Edition, Chapter 3: AML Programs, Section 3.2: AML Program Components, Subsection 3.2.2: Risk Assessment, pp. 77-79

FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Section: Assessing Compliance with BSA Regulatory Requirements, Subsection: Suspicious Activity Reporting, pp. 4-5

Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Suspicious Activity Reporting and Other Anti-Money Laundering Considerations, Question 2, pp. 2-3

Trade finance transactions involve the financing of the movement of goods and services across borders. Trade finance products include letters of credit, guarantees, documentary collections, open account, and supply chain finance. Trade finance transactions are exposed to various risks, such as credit risk, operational risk, fraud risk, and money laundering risk. Money laundering risk refers to the possibility that trade finance transactions are used to conceal the origin, ownership, or destination of illicit funds, or to evade taxes, sanctions, or exchange controls. Trade-based money laundering (TBML) is a form of money laundering that involves the manipulation of trade transactions, such as mispricing, misinvoicing, over- or under-shipping, or falsifying documents, to transfer value or obscure the true nature of the funds12.

An analyst reviewing trade finance transactions should be alert to any red flags or indicators of potential TBML, such as significant discrepancies between the value or quantity of the goods and the invoice, payment, or contract; unusual or complex shipment routes or methods; involvement of high-risk jurisdictions, entities, or commodities; or lack of transparency or documentation of the trade transaction12. If the analyst notices an increase in price of 25% over 12 months for commodities with the same specification and quantity, this could be a sign of mispricing, which is a common technique of TBML. Mispricing involves inflating or deflating the price of the goods to transfer value or evade taxes or duties. For example, an exporter may overprice the goods to move funds out of a country with exchange controls, or an importer may underprice the goods to reduce the customs duty payable12.

However, an increase in price of 25% over 12 months for commodities with the same specification and quantity does not necessarily indicate TBML, as there could be other legitimate factors that may have affected the transaction cost, such as market fluctuations, supply and demand, quality, transportation, insurance, or other fees. Therefore, the analyst should not jump to the conclusion that TBML is occurring, but rather conduct a thorough investigation to verify the validity and rationale of the price change. The analyst should produce an investigation report that considers the client activity and factors that may have legitimately affected the transaction cost, such as:

The nature and purpose of the client’s business and trade activities

The client’s profile, risk rating, and transaction history

The source and destination of the funds and the goods

The market price and trends of the commodities involved

The contractual terms and conditions of the trade transaction

The supporting documents, such as invoices, bills of lading, certificates of origin, inspection reports, etc.

The due diligence and verification procedures performed by the bank or the third parties

The compliance with the relevant laws, regulations, and standards of the jurisdictions involved

The investigation report should document the findings, analysis, and conclusions of the analyst, and provide evidence and references to support the assessment. The investigation report should also include any recommendations or actions to be taken by the bank or the authorities, such as:

Requesting additional information or clarification from the client or the counterparties

Conducting enhanced due diligence or monitoring of the client or the transaction

Escalating the case to the senior management or the compliance department

Reporting the case to the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) or the relevant regulator

Filing a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) or a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) if there are reasonable grounds to suspect TBML or other criminal activity

Therefore, the best action for the analyst to take is to produce an investigation report that considers the client activity and factors that may have legitimately affected the transaction cost, as this would allow the analyst to determine whether the price increase is justified or indicative of TBML, and to take appropriate measures accordingly.

Trade Finance and Trade-Based Money Laundering

Trade-Based Money Laundering: Red Flag Indicators

An employee who witnesses suspicious activity from a coworker should not confront the coworker or discuss the activity with their supervisor. Instead, they should report the activity to their employer's conflict line or compliance department, who can investigate the matter and take the appropriate action. It is important to remember that employees are legally obligated to report any suspicious activity they witness.

 The internal review would most likely recommend that the institution provide product-specific anti-money laundering training to all relevant employees, not just actuaries. This is because life insurance products can be used for money laundering purposes, such as purchasing policies with illicit funds, surrendering policies for cash value, or using policies as collateral for loans. Therefore, all employees who are involved in selling, servicing, or processing life insurance products should be aware of the money laundering risks and red flags associated with these products, and how to report any suspicious activity. The institution should also ensure that the training is timely, effective, and tailored to the specific roles and responsibilities of the employees.

The other options are not as relevant or appropriate as the correct answer. Option A is too broad, as not all staff need to be trained on anti-money laundering, only those who are relevant to the institution’s business activities and exposure to money laundering risks. Option C is too narrow, as it only focuses on actuaries and does not address the need for training other employees who may deal with life insurance products. Option D is not sufficient, as e-learning alone may not be effective in ensuring that employees understand and retain the anti-money laundering content, and the institution should also conduct follow-up assessments to measure the impact and outcomes of the training.

ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination - 6th Edition, Chapter 3: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), page 57.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 3: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Lesson 3.5: Training and Testing.

Best Practices for Anti-Money Laundering Compliance - DIRO Original, Section 3: Adequate Training.

The Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) Study Guide states that financial institutions should address all requests from law enforcement agencies completely and in a timely manner (Page 83). Disregarding requests when there is a justifiable reason for doing so is not recommended, as this could impede the investigation. Sharing information about theinvestigation with analysts is not recommended, as this could compromise the investigation. Delaying responses by informing senior management of requests is also not recommended, as this could result in a delay in the investigation.

 The customer activity that should trigger a suspicious transaction report is purchasing travelers checks (cheques) for trips to a Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs). This could indicate an attempt to evade currency reporting requirements, avoid sanctions or embargoes, or facilitate money laundering or terrorist financingthrough high-risk jurisdictions12. NCCTs are countries or territories that have been identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as having serious deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes, and that pose a threat to the international financial system3.

The other options are not necessarily grounds for a suspicious transaction report, although they may require further due diligence or monitoring depending on the customer profile and the nature of the transaction. For example:

The increased activity is due to money order deposits. This could be a legitimate source of income for the customer’s export business, or it could be a way of disguising the origin or destination of the funds. The anti-money laundering specialist should verify the identity and background of the customer and the issuers of the money orders, and check for any red flags or suspicious indicators4.

Wire transfers are coming from a Financial Action Task Force member country. This could be a normal business practice, or it could be a sign of involvement in trade-based money laundering or other illicit activities. The anti-money laundering specialist should assess the customer’s source of funds, business rationale, and market conditions, and monitor for any changes or inconsistencies.

The client changed his address without advising the institution. This could be a simple oversight, or it could be a way of concealing the customer’s true location or identity. The anti-money laundering specialist should update the customer’s information, verify the new address, and check for any adverse media or sanctions.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs3

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)4

ACAMS Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 1, page 11: https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ACAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-1.pdf

ACAMS Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, page 29: https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ACAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-2.pdf

ACAMS Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 77: https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ACAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-4.pdf

ACAMS Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, page 97: https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ACAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-5.pdf

this activity is unusual and inconsistent with the expected behavior of an accounting firm’s operational account. The account should normally receive fees from clients that are proportional to the services rendered and reflect the market rates. Receiving international payments that are substantially higher than other fees could indicate that the account is being used to launder money or finance terrorism by disguising illicit funds as legitimate income. This could trigger a red flag for the bank and prompt a comprehensive review of the account.

ACAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, Chapter 1, Section 1.6, page 24: “Methods to launder money used in banks and other deposit taking institutions”.

ExamTopics, Question 446: “An accounting firm opened an account at a bank that is intended to be used as the operational account for the business. After a few months, a comprehensive review of the account was triggered due to unusual activity on the account. Which most likely triggered the review?”

This is an emerging risk associated with cyber-enabled fraud because the use of false identities and documents can allow criminals to disguise their activities and evade detection. In such cases, the name and address provided on the account may not match the name and address on the government-issued documentation. This discrepancy can be difficult to detect, making it a potential risk for financial institutions.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision identified four risks to banking institutions as a result of an inadequate KYC program: legal, reputational, operational, and concentration. Legal risks include the potential for fines or sanctions for non-compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Reputational risks include the loss of customer confidence due to the institution's involvement in illicit activities. Operational risks include the potential for fraudulent or suspicious activity to go undetected. Finally, concentration risks involve the potential for a single customer or group of related customers to dominate the institution's operations.

Conducting anonymous transactions is the most likely activity to facilitate money laundering through online banking systems with inadequate controls. Anonymous transactions allow money launderers to hide their identity, source and destination of funds, and the purpose of their transactions from the authorities and the financial institutions. Online banking systems that do not have proper KYC, customer due diligence, and transaction monitoring controls are vulnerable to being exploited by money launderers who can use various techniques, such as encryption, proxy servers, virtual currencies, prepaid cards, and online gambling, to conduct anonymous transactions123.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, page 40-41, 43-44

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 2, Lesson 2.4, Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods

1, Fighting money laundering in the age of online banking, virtual currencies and internet gambling | ERA Forum

2, Financial crime risk management in digital payments | McKinsey

3, The Relationship Between Digital Banking and Financial Crime

 Antiques are a potential tool for money laundering because they can be used to conceal, move, and convert illicit funds. Antiques can be of high value and often easily transported across borders, making them attractive for criminals who want to evade detection and reporting. Antiques can also be difficult to value and authenticate, creating a lack of transparency and accountability in the market. Criminals can exploit this to inflate or deflate the prices of antiques, or to use them as collateral for loans or other transactions. Antiques can also be used to layer or integrate illicit funds into the legitimate economy, by selling them through auction houses, dealers, or online platforms.

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4: Conducting and Supporting the Investigation Process, pp. 97-98.

Anti-money laundering and the art and antiquities market - a US and UK perspective, Mishcon de Reya LLP, 2022.

Antiques: an unconventional money laundering tool, The Express Tribune, 2023.

Art and Antiquities an Attractive Market for Money Laundering, FATF Argues, OCCRP, 2021.

A lack of information about beneficial owners is a red flag for potential money laundering or terrorist financing. It is important to identify who the actual owners of the company are to understand their potential risk exposure.

Confusing details about the proposed business activity and lack of knowledge about the proposed business are also red flags for potential money laundering or terrorist financing. This could indicate that the proposed business activity is not legitimate and is being used to conceal illegal activities.

Therefore, these two observations should be escalated to the compliance officer for further investigation.

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) Sixth Edition manual, the AML compliance officer should inform senior leadership and the board of the investigation (page 124) and monitor the progress of the investigation by keeping clear records (page 127). Additionally, the AML compliance officer should provide all information to the FIU as soon as possible to avoid delays (page 126).

According to the CAMS Manual, when a financial institution is being investigated by the financial intelligence unit (FIU), the AML compliance officer should inform senior leadership and the board of the investigation and monitor the progress of the investigation by keeping clear records. The manual states:

"The AML compliance officer should inform senior leadership and the board of any investigations and then monitor the progress of the investigation by keeping clear records of what has been requested and submitted, deadlines and extensions granted, and any findings or reports received. This will allow the financial institution to respond effectively and efficiently to the investigation and take appropriate action if necessary." (CAMS Manual, Section 7.4.1 - Financial Intelligence Units, p. 366)

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) Sixth Edition manual, elements that can trigger a review of the existing relationship during the opening of a new account include recent adverse media on the client (page 60) and incoming transfers from high-risk jurisdictions (page 61). The other elements listed, such as regular checks on the flow of funds, a false positive result for name screening, and an estimated total income decrease, are not triggers for a review.

 According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a financial institution must take certain steps to fulfill its customer due diligence (CDD) obligations [1][2]. These steps include verifying the customer's identity, understanding the customer's business, and assessing the customer's risk profile. Additionally, the financial institution must verify that the customer is not on any sanction lists, such as the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals list. This step is important to ensure that the financial institution is not doing business with any individuals or entities that are subject to economic sanctions. Other steps include obtaining information on the intended nature of the banking relationship, securing a written declaration from the customer confirming the source of the funds, and identifying shareholders listed on the stock exchange of corporate entities holding fifty percent of the shares.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions are extraterritorial in nature, meaning that they apply beyond the national borders of the United States. OFAC sanctions are intended to restrict transactions and the movement of assets between the U.S. and designated persons and organizations. These sanctions are imposed to disrupt the economic and financial relations between foreign countries and designated persons, organizations, or countries. These sanctionsinclude prohibiting transactions, requiring the blocking of assets, and implementing targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, and financial or commodity restrictions.

The most suspicious transaction indicators related to casino activities are:

A client requests a winnings check (cheque) in a third party’s name. This could indicate an attempt to conceal the source or ownership of the funds, or to evade reporting requirements.

Acquaintances bet against each other in even-money games and it appears they are intentionally losing to one of the parties. This could indicate a scheme to launder money through the casino by transferring funds from one party to another without attracting attention.

A client requests the transfer of winnings to the bank account of a third party in a country without an effective anti-money laundering regime. This could indicate an attempt to move funds to a high-risk jurisdiction or to a person or entity that is involved in illicit activities.

The option that is not suspicious is:

A new client who is a large volume player asks the casino operator about the ability to transfer the funds to other locations in the same country. This could be a legitimate inquiry from a high-net-worth individual who travels frequently and wants to access their funds conveniently.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs1

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)2

ACAMS Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 8, page 173

https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ACAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-8.pdf

According to the CAMS Study Guide, EDD is a higher level of scrutiny applied to customers who pose a greater risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. EDD may include obtaining additional information on the customer’s identity, source of funds, businessactivities, beneficial owners, and expected transactions. Details on individuals with control over the account are relevant for EDD, as they may indicate the involvement of politically exposed persons (PEPs), sanctioned individuals, or other high-risk entities. Therefore, this information should be gathered as part of EDD for a high-risk customer.

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 121.

A customer who is the brother of a prominent member of a foreign judiciary is considered a politically exposed person (PEP) or a family member of a PEP. PEPs are individuals who hold or have held positions of public trust or influence in a foreign country, such as heads of state, senior politicians, high-ranking military officers, judges, or executives of state-owned enterprises. PEPs pose a higher risk of money laundering, corruption, or bribery due to their access to public funds, influence over policy decisions, or connections to other powerful individuals. Therefore, financial institutions are required to perform enhanced due diligence (EDD) on PEPs and their family members, as well as monitor their transactions and activities more closely. EDD is a set of additional measures that go beyond the standard customer due diligence (CDD) to obtain more information about the customer, such as their source of wealth, source of funds, expected account activity, business relationships, and reputation. EDD also involves conducting ongoing reviews and updating the customer risk profile regularly. EDD helps the financial institution to mitigate the risks associated with PEPs and detect any signs of money laundering or other illicit activities.

ACAMS Study Guide1, Chapter 2: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), pages 51-52

FATF Guidance on Politically Exposed Persons2, pages 9-10, 13-14, 17-18

Wolfsberg Group Guidance on Politically Exposed Persons3, pages 2-3, 6-7

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, ongoing training is a key element of an effective anti-money laundering compliance program, as it ensures that the staff are aware of their roles and responsibilities, the latest regulatory developments, and the emerging risks and trends in money laundering and terrorist financing1. Ongoing training also helps to foster a culture of compliance within the institution, where the staff are committed to adhering to the policies and procedures, detecting and reporting suspicious activities, and protecting the institution from reputational and legal damages2.

1: CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, Section 2.5, page 53

2: CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, Section 2.6, page 54

Failure to report suspected fraud activity is a serious breach of the anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-fraud obligations of a financial institution (FI). It could expose the FI to legal risks, such as civil lawsuits, criminal prosecutions, regulatory sanctions, and reputational damage. One possible legal risk is that the FI could be held liable for the losses suffered by the victims of the fraudster, either by the victims themselves or by a third party acting on their behalf, such as a government agency or a class action representative. This could result in significant financial costs and damages for the FI, as well as loss of trust and confidence from its customers and stakeholders.

1: This web article explains what a suspicious activity report (SAR) is, who regulates it, when it is required, and what are the consequences of failing to file it.

2: This guide provides information on how to make a SAR, what to include, how to request a defence against money laundering (DAML), and what happens if you fail to report suspicious activity.

3: This blog post discusses the legal implications of not reporting an alleged crime, such as fraud, and gives examples of cases where individuals or entities were prosecuted or sued for their failure to report.

Under the Wolfsberg Correspondent Banking Principles, conducting enhanced due diligence (EDD) is an obligation for correspondent banking clients that present greater risks. This may include conducting additional research and analysis of the client's background, ownership structure, and transactions. EDD may also involve obtaining additional documentation, verifying the client's identity, and conducting periodic reviews to ensure ongoing compliance. The level of EDD required should be commensurate with the level of risk posed by the correspondent banking relationship. Therefore, option B and D are incorrect. Option A is not specific enough to address the question. Option C is the correct answer as it highlights the importance of senior management approval for high-risk relationships, which is a key component of EDD.

The individual responsible for setting the anti-money laundering software parameters should recommend ensuring that the alert parameters are based on risk, rather than on default software rules. This means that the software should be configured to generate alerts only when transactions or customers exhibit a high level of risk, based on factors such as the source and destination of funds, the amount and frequency of transactions, the type and purpose of the account, the customer profile and behavior, and the presence of any red flags or indicators of money laundering or terrorist financing. By aligning the alert parameters with the risk assessment of the financial institution, the software can reduce the number of false positives and focus on the most relevant and suspicious cases, thus improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the anti-money laundering staff.

Setting AML Transaction Monitoring Thresholds 1, ComplyAdvantage, 2020.

Machine learning techniques for anti-money laundering (AML) analysis: a survey 2, Springer, 2018.

Anti Money Laundering (AML) Definition: Its History and How It Works 3, Investopedia, 2021.

These options involve transferring funds to another country, which could indicate cross-border movement of illicit funds, and cashing out winnings in checks under 10,000 USD, which could indicate structuring to avoid reporting thresholds. The other options do not seem as suspicious or relevant to money laundering.

The FATF is an inter-governmental body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the internationalfinancial system. The FATF conducts mutual evaluations of its members and other jurisdictions to assess their compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the effectiveness of their AML/CFT regimes1.

The FATF defines effectiveness as "the extent to which a country’s AML/CFT regime is achieving the defined outcomes of an effective regime that allows them to mitigate their risks and threats of ML/TF"2. The FATF assesses effectiveness based on 11 immediate outcomes, which are grouped into three thematic goals: financial system integrity, legal system and operational issues, and international cooperation2.

One of the immediate outcomes under the financial system integrity goal is that “FIs adequately apply preventive measures commensurate with their risks, and report suspicious transactions” (IO.4)2. This outcome measures how well FIs implement the FATF Recommendations on customer due diligence, record-keeping, internal controls, risk assessment, and suspicious transaction reporting. These preventive measures are essential for FIs to identify and mitigate the risks of being misused for money laundering or terrorist financing, and to provide useful information to the authorities for investigation and prosecution2.

Therefore, the correct answer is D. FIs adequately apply preventive measures, as this is one of the FATF characteristics used to assess a country’s effectiveness of its AML regime.

FATF Methodology for assessing compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems

An effective system to combat money laundering and terrorist financing

B. An internal auditor with the requisite knowledge and expertise of AML: An internal auditor with sufficient knowledge and expertise in AML regulations and compliance requirements can perform the AML audit.

D. Qualified bank staff if not involved in the AML function being tested: Qualified bank staff who are not involved in the AML function being audited can perform the AML audit.

 Submitting the concern anonymously to the bank’s internal Compliance Hotline is the most appropriate action that a bank CEO’s assistant should take when the bank CEO expenses large sums of money to a charitable organization run by the bank CEO’s direct family member. This is because this action would allow the assistant to report a potential case of fraud, conflict of interest, or misuse of funds without fear of retaliation or reprisal from the bank CEO. The Compliance Hotline is a confidential and secure channel for employees to raise any concerns or suspicions about unethical or illegal activities within the bank. The Compliance Hotline would then forward the concern to the relevant authorities or departments for further investigation and action.

= The main references for this question are the following sources:

The document titled “Anti-Fraud Policy” published by the World Bank Group. You can access it by clicking here. This document states that "The World Bank Group has established a Compliance Hotline to receive reports of suspected fraud or corruption in World Bank Group-financed projects or activities, or in the World Bank Group’s corporate procurement or administrative activities. The Compliance Hotline is available to all staff and external parties, such ascontractors, consultants, beneficiaries of World Bank Group-financed projects, and the general public.

Company ownership is held in bearer share form. Bearer share ownership can make it difficult to identify the actual owners of a company and is therefore considered a high risk for money laundering or terrorist financing. Enhanced due diligence measures may include obtaining additional identification and ownership information, conducting more frequent reviews of the account, and monitoring transactions more closely.

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Section 2.2.2 The EU Fourth AML Directive, the release of the EU’s Fourth AML Directive resulted in the threshold for reporting suspicious transactions decreasing from 15,000 EUR to 10,000 EUR (Answer A) and all financial institutions were required to identify and verify the beneficial owner of legal entities (Answer B). The directive also defined money laundering and terrorist financing as separate crimes, which expanded the directive's measures (Answer C). Answer D is incorrect as the scope of obliged entities was not enlarged from casinos to all providers of gambling services, but rather to all providers of payment services. Answer E is also incorrect as the directive does not provide that knowledge of criminal conduct can be inferred from objective factual circumstances. Reference: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Section 2.2.2 The EU Fourth AML Directive, p. 12.

 Money laundering has severe social and economic impacts, including increased crime rates, corruption and erosion of public trust. Money laundering fuels criminal activities by providing the necessary financial resources for criminals to continue their operations. As illicit funds circulate within the financial system, they enable the growth of criminal organizations and contribute to an increase in crime rates, including organized crime1. Money laundering also facilitates corruption and undermines public trust in financial institutions and the wider economy. This erosion of public trust is exacerbated by trade-based money laundering, which involves the manipulation of international trade transactions to disguise the origins of illicit funds2. Money laundering also weakens financial institutions by exposing them to reputational, operational, legal and regulatory risks. Money launderers exploit the vulnerabilities of financial systems and compromisetheir integrity and stability. Money laundering can also distort the allocation of resources, create inflationary pressures, and undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy3.

1: Consequences Of Money Laundering Are: Understanding The Social, Economic, and Penalties Impacts1

2: Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime2

3: Money laundering, its impact and consequences3

The anti-money laundering specialist should recommend a financial institution to investigate the source of funds, identify people and companies that are clearly related, and identify a person fully, including their political history, when dealing with individuals holding important public positions. These are essential steps to conduct enhanced due diligence based on public information, as they can help to assess the risk profile, the legitimacy, and the transparency of the customer relationship. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s list of public officials is not a reliable source of public information, as it is not comprehensive, updated, or verified. Therefore, it is not a sufficient criterion to check the background of potential customers.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 971

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 4, Lesson 32

ACAMS CAMS Certification Exam Outline, Domain 4, Task 23

This includes civil monetary penalties, criminal prosecution, and other enforcement actions. These penalties can be enforced against foreign individuals, regardless of whether the individual is located within the US or abroad. Additionally, OFAC has the authority to impose sanctions on foreign countries and foreign individuals, including individuals and entities located outside of the US.

Arms and related materials embargo is a type of sanction that prohibits the supply, sale, transfer, or export of arms and related materials to a targeted country, entity, or individual. This type of sanction is most likely to be used in order to avoid escalating violent conflicts and/or proliferation of weapons, as it aims to reduce the availability and access of weapons and ammunition that could fuel violence and instability. Arms and related materials embargo can also prevent the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to non-state actors or rogue states. According to the UN, arms and related materials embargo is one of the most common and effective forms of sanctions that the Security Council imposes to address threats to international peace and security12.

1: Different types of sanctions - Consilium1

2: UN Sanctions and the Prevention of Conflict - United Nations University2

While this behavior may warrant scrutiny in certain circumstances, it is not inherently suspicious or indicative of money laundering. In contrast, the other behaviors listed (living beyond one's means, excessive unresolved exceptions, and using company resources for personal gain) may suggest that an employee is engaging in or facilitating money laundering activity.

According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Customer Due Diligence for Banks1, banks should have policies and procedures to identify and manage high-risk customers, such as those who provide false or incomplete information, have complex oropaque beneficial ownership structures, or are involved in large or unusual transactions. In such cases, banks should apply enhanced due diligence measures, such as obtaining additional information or documentation, verifying the source and purpose of funds, conducting more frequent and intensive monitoring of account activity, and reporting any suspicious transactions to the relevant authorities. Therefore, the best course of action for the bank in this scenario is to implement enhanced due diligence procedures to monitor the account for suspicious activity, as option B suggests. Option A is not recommended, as it would imply that the bank accepts the customer without verifying his identity and background, which would expose the bank to money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Option C is not advisable, as it would terminate the relationship without investigating the origin and destination of the funds, which could hinder the efforts of law enforcement agencies to trace and recover illicit assets. Option D is also not appropriate, as it would involve sending a check to a customer whose address and identity are not confirmed, which could facilitate money laundering and fraud.

5: Customer due diligence for banks - Bank for International Settlements, October 2001, pages 8-9, 13-14.

 This is a red flag of money laundering or terrorist financing that involves the use of non-profit organizations (NPOs) as conduits for illicit funds. NPOs may be vulnerable to abuse by criminals who exploit their legitimate activities, reputation, and access to funds and resources. A transaction monitoring process that would alert a bank for this red flag activity is to analyze the source, destination, frequency, and purpose of the funds transferred to and from the charity account, and to compare them with the expected profile and activity of the NPO. If the bank detects any inconsistency, discrepancy, or deviation from the norm, it should raise an alert and conduct further investigation.

FATF Report: Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-Profit Organisations, page 9

Transaction Monitoring Processes for Red Flag Activity in Banking

AML Red Flags – What are the Top 10 Indicators? - ComplyAdvantage, section “Red flags related to the nature of transactions”

According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards for suspicious activity reports (SARs) information sharing within a financial group, "Financial institutions should establish adequate procedures to ensure that confidentiality of information is maintained and that information is only used for purposes permitted under national law. Where the parent institution is located in a country that does not permit such sharing, financial institutions should take measures to address this limitation" (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, page 476). Therefore, financial institutions must establish sufficient safeguards concerning the confidentiality of information shared for AML purposes.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations are the international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, and they apply to all countries and financial institutions. The Customer Due Diligence for Banks issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides guidance on how banks should conduct CDD and KYC procedures, and how they should manage the risks of correspondent banking and wire transfers. The Egmont Group Statement of Purpose outlines the objectives and functions of the Egmont Group, which is an international network of financial intelligence units (FIUs) that exchange information and cooperate in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. These three materials are relevant and useful for the bank’s expansion plans, as they cover the main aspects of AML/CFT compliance in different jurisdictions and sectors.

The USA PATRIOT Act is a US-specific legislation that enhances the powers and obligations of US authorities and financial institutions in relation to AML/CFT, but it may not be applicable or appropriate for other countries where the bank intends to operate. Therefore, it is not a necessary reference material for the bank’s international department.

FATF 40 Recommendations

Customer Due Diligence for Banks

Egmont Group Statement of Purpose

The customer activity that poses the highest risk of money laundering is making multiple cash deposits slightly below a required reporting limit. This could indicate a practice known as structuring or smurfing, which is a method of breaking down large amounts of cash into smaller transactions to avoid detection or reporting by financial institutions12. Structuring is a common technique used by money launderers to conceal the source, ownership, or destination of illicit funds3.

The other options are not necessarily indicative of money laundering, although they may require further due diligence or monitoring depending on the customer profile and the nature of the transaction. For example:

Transferring funds to pay for flight training lessons could be a legitimate educational expense, or it could be related to terrorist financing or other criminal activities. The financial institution should verify the identity and background of the customer and the recipient, and check for any red flags or suspicious indicators4.

Paying a supplier of precious metals at regular quarterly intervals could be a normal business practice, or it could be a way of moving or storing value in an alternative asset class. The financial institution should assess the customer’s source of funds, business rationale, and market conditions, and monitor for any changes or inconsistencies.

Conducting business in a country that represents a high risk of money laundering could be a legitimate commercial opportunity, or it could be a sign of involvement in illicit activities or tax evasion. The financial institution should apply enhanced due diligence measures, such as verifying the identity and reputation of the customer and the counterparties, obtaining information on the purpose and nature of the business relationship, and screening for any sanctions or adverse media.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs3

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)4

ACAMS Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, page 29: https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ACAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-2.pdf

ACAMS Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 6, page 121: https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ACAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-6.pdf

ACAMS Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 7, page 139: https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ACAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-7.pdf

ACAMS Study Guide for the Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 77: https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ACAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-4.pdf

The characteristic of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 recommendations is that they comprise global standards for countering money laundering, recognized by government bodies across the world. The FATF 40 recommendations provide a comprehensive framework of measures that countries should implement to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The recommendations are not mandatory, but are widely recognized and followed by countries across the globe. The recommendations cover a range of areas, including customer due diligence, record-keeping, suspicious activity reporting, and international cooperation.

free of payment asset transfer is a trading pattern that may be indicative of money laundering in capital markets. Free of payment asset transfer is a method of transferring securities without any corresponding payment, which can be used to avoid detection of the origin or destination of the funds. This can facilitate the layering or integration stages of money laundering, as the launderer can move the assets across different accounts, jurisdictions, or institutions without leaving a clear audit trail. Free of payment asset transfer can also be used to evade taxes, sanctions, or other regulatory requirements.

ACAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, Chapter 1, Section 1.8, page 28: “Methods to launder money using broker-dealers, investment advisors, and the capital markets (e.g., securities, futures)”.

ExamTopics, Question 476: “Which trading pattern may be indicative of money laundering in capital markets?”

According to the ACAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, Chapter 2, page 37, one of the red flags of money laundering or terrorist financing is the use of nominees, trusts, or third parties to hide the identity, ownership, or control of the funds or assets involved in the transaction. Nominees are individuals or entities that act on behalf of the actual or beneficial owners of a company, trust, or account, and may be used to conceal the source, destination, or purpose of the funds or assets. Nominees may also be used to evade taxes, sanctions, or regulatory requirements.

In this case, the compliance officer is unable to verify the identity of the beneficial owners of the company, and only information on the nominee owners was provided. This raises the suspicion that the company may be involved in money laundering or terrorist financing activities, and that the nominee owners may be acting as fronts or intermediaries for the actual or beneficial owners. The compliance officer should conduct further due diligence on the company, the nominee owners, and the beneficial owners, and report any suspicious or unusual activity to the relevant authorities.

ACAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, Chapter 2, page 37

Beneficial Ownership Meaning and Regulation - Investopedia

What is a nomineeshareholder? | LawBite

According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the training elements that should be delivered to new tellers during employee orientation is “large cash transaction reporting procedures” (p. 224). This is because tellers are often the first line of defense against money laundering and have the responsibility to identify and report any transactions that exceed the threshold of $10,000 or are otherwise suspicious. The other options are not relevant for tellers, as they are more suitable for higher-level or specialized staff.

ACAMS. (2020). Study Guide for the Certification Examination for Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (6th ed.). Miami, FL: ACAMS.

AML Requirements for Tellers 1

Deposit Compliance Training Courses 2

As the compliance officer is providing overview of the "bank's anti-money laundering program to a group of new tellers during employee orientation"

 A politically exposed person (PEP) is a customer who requires the most enhanced due diligence (EDD). This is because PEPs are individuals who hold or have held prominent public positions, such as heads of state, senior politicians, judges, military officers, ordirectors of state-owned enterprises, and who may pose a higher risk of money laundering, corruption, or bribery due to their influence and access to public funds1. EDD measures for PEPs may include obtaining senior management approval, establishing the source of wealth and funds, and conducting enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship2.

The other customers listed do not necessarily require the most EDD, although they may still present a higher risk of money laundering depending on the circumstances. A resident of a non-cooperative jurisdiction is a customer who lives in a country or territorythat has been identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or other international bodies as having weak or deficient anti-money laundering (AML) standards or posing a threat to the international financial system3. EDD measures for such customers may include obtaining additional information or documentation, applying extra scrutiny to transactions, or refusing to establish or continue the business relationship4. An international business corporation is a customer who operates in multiple jurisdictions and may have complex or opaque ownership structures that can conceal the identity or activity of the beneficial owners or controllers. EDD measures for such customers may include verifying the legal existence and structure of the entity, identifying the beneficial owners and controllers, and understanding the nature and purpose of the business relationship. An established customer is a customer who has a long-standing and regular business relationship with the financial institution and who may have a lower risk of money laundering due to the familiarity and trust that has been built over time. EDD measures for such customers may not be required unless there are changes in the customer’s profile, behavior, or risk level.

1: Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 and 22) - FATF1 2: High-risk customers, including politically exposed persons | FCA2 3: High-Risk and Other Monitored Jurisdictions - FATF3 4: Your responsibilities under money laundering supervision | GOV.UK4 : International Business Corporations - ACAMS : Anti-Money Laundering Customer Due Diligence | Veriff.com : Customer Due Diligence - ACAMS : Anti-money laundering – a guide to customer due diligence

 This involves breaking down large amounts of cash into smaller transactions that are below the reporting threshold of $10,000 in the United States, in order to avoid detection and reporting by the financial institution. Structuring is a red flag for money laundering and should be reported to the authorities as a suspicious activity. The other options are not necessarily indicative of money laundering, as they could have legitimate explanations. For example, the customers may have a family or business connection to the same recipient in Country B, or they may have a regular need to send money three times a week.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Section 2.2: Common Money Laundering Techniques

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Question 91

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Study Guide, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Page 38

The FATF communicates its findings regardingjurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies by issuing two formal documents three times per year, namely the FATF Public Statement and the Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process document1. These documents identify the jurisdictions that have serious and/or systemic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes and the progress they have made in addressing them. The FATF also calls on its members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures or enhanced due diligence measures to protect the international financial system from the risks emanating from these jurisdictions1.

=

1: High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions - Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) is a trade-based money laundering technique commonly used by narcotics traffickers in Colombia and Mexico. The central feature uses a money trader to ensure that US drug sales revenue doesn’t cross any borders. Instead, those dollars are used to purchase any number of legitimate commodities from unsuspecting businesses on behalf of legitimate South American businesspersons, whose legitimate imports are used to obtain pesos for the drug cartels. This method is closely associated with international trade because it involves the exchange of goods and currencies across different countries, and it exploits the discrepancies between the official and unofficial exchange rates.

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, page 35

Black Market Peso Exchange in Money Laundering - Financial Crime Academy

What is BMPE ? - Sanction Scanner

Overview - FinCEN.gov

it describes the action that the anti-money laundering specialist should take next, which is to consult with senior management and the legal advisor. This is because the specialist needs to seek guidance and approval from the higher authorities and the legal experts on how to handle the situation without compromising the ongoing criminal investigation or violating the anti-money laundering laws and regulations. The specialist also needs to ensure that the institution’s internal policies and procedures are followed andthat the appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risks and protect the reputation of the institution.

The other options are not necessarily actions that the anti-money laundering specialist should take next, although they may be considered or implemented later depending on the outcome of the consultation and the investigation. Option A describes a possible consequence for the employee, which is to recommend the immediate termination of the employee, but this may not be the best course of action at this stage, as it may alert the employee or the dealer of the investigation, or it may be premature or disproportionate without sufficient evidence or due process. Option B describes a possible measure for the dealer, which is to advise that the dealer’s accounts should be closed, but this may not be feasible or advisable at this stage, as it may also tip off the dealer or the employee of the investigation, or it may interfere with the collection of evidence or the prosecution of the case. Option D describes a possible reporting obligation for the institution, which is to inform the institution’s regulatory agency of the situation, but this may not be required or appropriate at this stage, as it may conflict with the instructions of the competent authority or the confidentiality of the investigation, or it may expose the institution to legal or regulatory liabilities or sanctions.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - 6th Edition1

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)2

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 6, pages 132-133

https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ACAMS-CAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-6.pdf

According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the best practices for dealing with law enforcement inquiries is to verify the identity and authority of the law enforcement officer before providing any information (p. 224). This is to ensure that the inquiry is legitimate and not a phishing attempt or a breach of confidentiality. The compliance officer should also document the inquiry and the information provided, and consult with legal counsel if necessary. The other options are not appropriate, as they may either violate the law, compromise the investigation, or create unnecessary work.

ACAMS. (2020). Study Guide for the Certification Examination for Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (6th ed.). Miami, FL: ACAMS.

What Is An AML Officer1

A customer’s account appears to function as a funnel account whereby cash deposits occur in cities/states where the customer does not reside or conduct business. Frequently, in the case of funnel accounts, the funds are quickly withdrawn (same day) after the deposits are made

Dealers in antiques, precious metals, precious stones, jewelry, and art are advised to follow these practices to reduce the element of money laundering risk:

Verify the identities of all new vendors and customers and conduct due diligence on them. This is to ensure that the dealers know who they are dealing with and can assess the risk level of each customer or vendor. Due diligence may include obtaining and verifying identification documents, checking against sanctions lists or watchlists, obtaining information on the source and purpose of funds, and applying a risk-based approach to the level and frequency of due diligence.

Avoid accepting cash payment from the buyers. This is to prevent the dealers from being used as a conduit for laundering illicit cash or facilitating cash smuggling. Cash transactions are more difficult to trace and may indicate attempts to evade reporting or record-keeping requirements. Dealers should encourage the use of non-cash payment methods, such as bank transfers, cheques, or credit cards, and keep records of all payment transactions.

Insist all vendors submit an appropriate license issued by enforcement agencies authorizing the sale. This is to ensure that the dealers are not involved in the trade of stolen, smuggled, or counterfeit goods, which may be linked to money laundering or other criminal activities. Dealers should verify the authenticity and validity of the licenses and keep copies of them for record-keeping purposes.

FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones, pages 9-10, 13-14, 17-18, 21-22

AML-CFT Handbook for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones, pages 25-26, 37-38, 52-53

The anti-money laundering framework for precious stones and metals dealers in Singapore, pages 7-8, 11-12, 15-16

Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones or Jewels Required to Establish Anti-Money Laundering Programs, pages 2-3, 6-7, 10-11

According to the ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide (6th edition), one of the challenges of information sharing within a financial group is the compliance with privacy and data protection rules that may vary across jurisdictions. Therefore, before sharing information about a customer with an affiliate, a bank should consider whether such sharing is permitted by the applicable laws and regulations, and whether the customer has consented to it. The other options are not relevant factors for information sharing in the case of an investigation.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide (6th edition), page 971; ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 4, Lesson 22

 Before disclosing any supporting documentation for a suspicious transaction report (STR) to a law enforcement agency, the financial institution should confirm thatthe request is legitimate and authorized by verifying the identity and credentials of the requester1. This is to prevent unauthorized access or misuse of the confidential information by impostors or fraudsters. The other options are not true, as they may either compromise the security, integrity, or timeliness of the disclosure, or violate the confidentiality or privacy rights of the customer.

ACAMS, CAMS Examination Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, p. 117

FATF Guidance: The Role of Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, October 20132, p. 20

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism, June 20173, p. 11

 The best option for the compliance officer is to follow the financial institution’s established STR reporting policy, which should include procedures for reporting suspicious activity involving senior management or board members. This would ensure that the compliance officer acts in accordance with the bank’s internal controls and governance, and avoids any potential conflicts of interest or breaches of confidentiality. The other options are not advisable because they could either compromise the integrity of the STR filing, expose the compliance officer to legal or reputational risks, or alert the subject of the investigation.

ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 1401

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 4, Lesson 22

ACAMS CAMS Certification Practice Exam, Question 843

The inherent level of anti-money laundering risk across the entire organization depends on various factors, such as the nature, size, complexity, and structure of the business, the customers, the products and services, and the countries or jurisdictions involved. Among the four options given, the transaction monitoring program and the customer due diligence program are not factors that determine the inherent risk, but rather measures that mitigate the risk. Therefore, they are not relevant for the compliance officer’s purpose. The countries that the bank operates in and the products and services offered by the bank are important factors that affect the inherent risk, as they may expose the bank to different levels of money laundering threats, vulnerabilities, and regulatory requirements. For example, some countries or jurisdictions have high levels of corruption, unstable governments, or are known as money laundering havens1. They could also have inadequate AML/CFT regulatory and judicial frameworks, or be subject to economic sanctions2. Similarly, some products and services may pose higher risks thanothers, such as those that involve cash transactions, cross-border transfers, anonymous or non-face-to-face customers, or complex or innovative features34.

=

1: AML risk-rating models | McKinsey

2: Money laundering and terrorist financing risks - Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

4: AML Red Flags – What are the Top 10 Indicators? - ComplyAdvantage

5: Anti Money Laundering Risk Assessment - Financial Crime Academy

U.S. law requires that assets and accounts of an OFAC-specified country, entity, or individual be blocked when such property is located in the United States, is held by U.S. individuals or entities, or comes into the possession or control of U.S. individuals or entities.

For example, if a funds transfer comes from offshore and is being routed through a U.S. bank to an offshore bank, and there is an OFAC-designated party to the transaction, it must be blocked. The definition of assets and property is broad and is specifically defined within each sanction program. Assets and property includes anything of direct, indirect, present, future, or contingent value (including all types of bank transactions). Banks must block transactions that:

• Are by or on behalf of a blocked individual or entity;

• Are to or go through a blocked entity; or

• Are in connection with a transaction in which a blocked individual or entity has an interest.

Q Law enforcement may be given access to a financial institution customer’s financial records if they serve a legal summons or subpoena, or if they have circumstantial evidence to suspect money laundering. These are two of the exceptions to the general rule that financial institutions must protect the privacy of their customers’ financial information under the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) of 19781. The RFPA alsoallows access to customer records in other situations, such as with the customer’s consent, in response to judicial orders, or for certain intelligence or counterintelligence purposes1.

Option A is incorrect because a suspicious transaction report (STR) does not automatically grant law enforcement access to the customer’s financial records. The STR is a confidential document that is filed by the financial institution to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the country, and the FIU may decide to share the information with law enforcement if it deems appropriate2. However, law enforcement still needs to follow the RFPA procedures to obtain the customer’s records from the financial institution.

Option C is incorrect because the investigation of a customer being made public in the media does not give law enforcement the right to access the customer’s financial records. The media exposure may raise the public interest or the urgency of the investigation, but it does not override the RFPA requirements. Law enforcement still needs to obtain a legal summons, subpoena, or other valid authorization to access the customer’s records from the financial institution.

Structuring is the intentional evasion of a reporting or recordkeeping requirement by breaking down a large transaction into smaller ones, or by using multiple accounts, institutions, or persons to avoid triggering the threshold for reporting or recordkeeping. Structuring is also known as smurfing, and it is a common technique used by money launderers to conceal the source, ownership, or control of illicit funds.

=

ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1, page 511

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 2, Lesson 2.1, video time 7:00-8:002

ACAMS CAMS Certification Practice Exam, Question 134, page 2853

The method of purchasing chips with cash and redeeming them for a check is used to launder money in casinos. This is because the check can be deposited into a bank account or cashed at another location, creating a paper trail that appears to be legitimate. The check can also be used to conceal the source and amount of the cash, as well as the identity of the person who obtained it. This method is also known as “chip washing” or “chip dumping” and is one of the common ways that money launderers exploit casinos12.

1: CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, p. 32-33 2: FATF Report: Money Laundering through the Physical Transportation of Cash, October 2015, p. 28-29, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/money-laundering-through-transportation-cash.pdf

Designating a country as being of “prime money laundering concern” allows the U.S. government to impose one or more of five special measures under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act12. These special measures are intended to protect the U.S. financial system from the risks posed by the designated country, such as money laundering, terrorist financing, or other illicit activities. The fifth special measure, which is the most severe, authorizes the Treasury Department to prohibit U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts for foreign financial institutions that involve the designated country12. Correspondent accounts are accounts that enable foreign banks to access the U.S. financial system and provide services to their customers, while payable-through accounts are accounts that allow foreign banks to offer their customers direct access to the U.S. financial system3. Closing these accounts effectively cuts off the designated country from the U.S. financial system and imposes significant costs and burdens on its financial sector.

1: 311 Actions | U.S. Department of the Treasury

2: Press Releases - U.S. Department of the Treasury

3: Anti-Money Laundering Laws and Regulations USA 2023-2024

According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the best practices for dealing with law enforcement inquiries is to verify the identity and authority of the law enforcement officer before providing any information (p. 224). This is to ensure that the inquiry is legitimate and not a phishing attempt or a breach of confidentiality. The compliance officer should also document the inquiry and the information provided, and consult with legal counsel if necessary. The other options are not appropriate, as they may either violate the law, compromise the investigation, or create unnecessary work.

ACAMS. (2020). Study Guide for the Certification Examination for Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (6th ed.). Miami, FL: ACAMS.

What Is An AML Officer1

Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering: Requests by Law Enforcement for Financial Institutions to Maintain Accounts 2

 The investigator should escalate these concerns to the bank anti-money laundering officer, who is responsible for overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of the bank’s AML/CFT policies and procedures, as well as ensuring compliance with relevant laws and regulations. The bank anti-money laundering officer can then decide on the appropriate course of action, such as conducting further investigation, reporting to the regulators, or terminating the relationship with the customer. The other options are not suitable for escalating these concerns, as they may not have the authority, expertise, or responsibility to handle such matters.

ACAMS, CAMS Examination Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4, pp. 113-114

FATF Guidance: The Role of Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, October 20131, p. 19

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism, June 20172, p. 10

On-line banking offers a significant money laundering risk to a financial institution because:

The nature of on-line banking can make it difficult to establish who is controlling the account. On-line banking allows customers to access their accounts remotely, without face-to-face contact with the financial institution. This can pose challenges for verifying the identity and legitimacy of the account holder, especially if the account is opened on-line or through a third-party intermediary. On-line banking can also facilitate the use of anonymous or fictitious identities, or the use of proxies or nominees to hide the true beneficial owner of the account.

The ease of access through the internet enables cross border movement of funds. On-line banking allows customers to transfer funds quickly and easily across different jurisdictions, without physical movement of cash or other instruments. This can increase the risk of money laundering, as funds can be moved to or from high-risk countries or regions, or through multiple accounts or financial institutions, to obscure the origin, destination, or purpose of the funds. On-line banking can also enable customers to access or use alternative payment systems or virtual currencies, which may have lower regulatory oversight or transparency standards than traditional banking systems.

The speed of electronic transaction enables execution of multiple complex transactions within short time frame. On-line banking allows customers to conduct transactions in real time, with minimal or no human intervention or verification. This can increase the risk of money laundering, as customers can execute multiple transactions in a short period of time, or use complex transaction structures or patterns, to avoid detection or reporting thresholds, or to conceal the source, nature, or ownership of the funds. On-line banking can also enable customers to use automated or algorithmic trading systems, which may generate large volumes of transactions that are difficult to monitor or analyze.

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 5, pages 139-140

CAMS Certification Exam Outline, Domain 2, Task 2.1, Skill 2.1.1

Online Banking and Money Laundering, ACAMS Today, September 2012

The correct next course of action is to request that the new product approval committee include the compliance officer. This is because the compliance officer has the responsibility to ensure that the new financial service complies with the applicable laws, regulations, and standards, and does not pose any undue risks to the institution or its customers. The compliance officer should be involved in the new product development process from the beginning, and provide guidance and feedback on the potential compliance implications and requirements of the new service12.

1: CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 6: Developing an Effective Anti-Money Laundering Program, p. 121-122 2: FATF Guidance: The Role of Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, October 2013, p. 28, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Role-of-hawala-and-similar-in-ml-tf.pdf

 The Fourth European Union Directive on money laundering (AMLD4) requires member countries to maintain registries of the beneficial owners of legal entities, such as companies, trusts, foundations, etc. This is to ensure that the true identity and ownership of the customers and the natural persons on whose behalf transactions are conducted are known to the obliged entities, such as banks, lawyers, accountants, etc., and to the competent authorities, such as regulators, supervisors, or law enforcement12. This requirement aims to prevent the misuse of legal entities for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes, and to enhance transparency andaccess to beneficial ownership information34.

 1: AMLD4, Article 30, 5; 2: AMLD4, Recital 25, 5; 3: AMLD4, Recital 26, 5; 4: AMLD4, Recital 27, 5.

According to the ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide (6th edition), senior management and the Board of Directors have the ultimate responsibility for the effectiveness of the AML program and the compliance with the relevant laws and regulations. Therefore, they should be informed of all significant STRs and the numbers and trends of the filings, as this would help them to assess the level of risk exposure and the adequacy of the controls and resources. The other options are either too restrictive or too burdensome for senior management and the Board of Directors, and may interfere with the timely and confidential filing of STRs.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide (6th edition), page 361; ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 2, Lesson 12

This is when a customer or a transaction does not provide sufficient or credible information about their identity, source of funds, business activity, or purpose of the transaction. Lack of transparency can indicate that the customer or the transaction is trying to conceal the origin, ownership, or destination of illicit funds, or to evade regulatory scrutiny or reporting obligations. Lack of transparency is a common risk factor for money laundering and terrorist financing, especially in high-risk jurisdictions or sectors.

The other options are not necessarily red flags, although they may increase the risk or require further due diligence depending on the circumstances and the risk profile of the customers and countries involved. Option A describes a referral by a longtime friend of the dealer, which may be a legitimate source of trust or business relationship, but it does not substitute the need for proper customer identification and verification. Option B describes the location of the precious metals dealer, which may be a high-risk jurisdiction due to factors such as weak governance, corruption, crime, or sanctions, but it does not imply that the dealer or the customer is involved in money laundering. Option C describes the amount and nature of the transaction, which may be unusual or large, but it does not necessarily indicate money laundering, as long as the customer can provide a reasonable explanation and evidence for the source and use of funds.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - 6th Edition1

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)2

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 3, pages 64-65

https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ACAMS-CAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-3.pdf

According to the FATF typology report 2000-20011, lawyers can provide a range of functions that can be useful to a potential money launderer, such as:

Creating complex legal arrangements, such as trusts, foundations, or corporations, that can obscure the identity and ownership of the beneficial owners or the origin and destination of the funds.

Buying and selling property, such as real estate, art, or jewelry, that can be used to transfer or store illicit proceeds or to provide a legitimate cover for the source of funds.

Performing financial transactions on behalf of a client, such as opening bank accounts, transferring funds, issuing checks, or exchanging currencies, that can facilitate the movement or concealment of illicit funds.

Providing legal advice, on the other hand, is not a function that can be directly exploited by a money launderer, unless the advice is related to the above functions or to the avoidance or evasion of anti-money laundering laws and regulations.

1: FATF Terrorist Financing Typologies Report - Financial Action Task Force2

Evaluating the risk scoring model and conducting the risk assessment itself may need to be performed annually, every eighteen to twenty-four months, before the launch of a new product, or when an acquisition of another financial institution occurs.

a vehicle that is historically most often used to hide beneficial ownership, which is an offshore company. An offshore company is a legal entity that is incorporated or registered in a foreign jurisdiction, usually with low or no taxes, high confidentiality, and lax regulation. Offshore companies can be used by money launderers and other criminals to conceal the true identity and ownership of the funds or assets that they control, andto evade taxes, reporting, or legal obligations in their home jurisdictions. Offshore companies can also be layered with other vehicles, such as trusts, foundations, or nominees, to create complex and opaque structures that make it difficult for authorities to trace the source and destination of illicit funds.

The other options are not necessarily vehicles that are most often used to hide beneficial ownership, although they may pose some risks or challenges depending on the circumstances and the risk profile of the customers and countries involved. Option A describes a professional association, which is a group of individuals or entities that share a common profession or interest, such as lawyers, accountants, or doctors. Professional associations may be involved in money laundering or terrorist financing as facilitators, intermediaries, or advisors, but they are not typically used to hide beneficial ownership. Option C describes a limited liability partnership, which is a legal entity that combines the features of a partnership and a corporation, and limits the liability of its partners. Limited liability partnerships may be used by money launderers or terrorist financiers to obscure the ownership or control of funds or assets, but they are not as common or as secretive as offshore companies. Option D describes a charitable organization, which is a non-profit entity that is established for a charitable, religious, educational, or other public benefit purpose. Charitable organizations may be abused by money launderers or terrorist financiers to divert funds or assets for illicit purposes, but they are not usually used to hide beneficial ownership.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - 6th Edition1

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)2

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, pages 86-87

https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ACAMS-CAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-4.pdf

These designated nonfinancial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) include — casinos when customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above a designated threshold………. — real estate agents when they are involved in transactions for clients concerning buying and selling properties; — dealers in precious metals and stones when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer at or above a designated threshold; — lawyers, notaries and independent legal professionals and accountants when they prepare or carry out transactions for clients concerning buying and selling real estate; …….; and — trust and company service providers when they prepare or carry out transactions for a client concerning certain activities ….

The correct answer is C, as mapping scenarios are helpful in mitigating the weakness of not generating alerts when activity is consistently abnormal over a long period of time. Mapping scenarios are used to compare a customer’s activity with their expected activity based on their profile, risk rating, or historical behavior1. By using mapping scenarios, the organization can identify customers whose activity deviates significantly from their normal or expected patterns, and flag them for further investigation. Mappingscenarios can also help detect changes in customer behavior over time, and alert the organization of any potential money laundering or terrorist financing risks.

 1: AML Scenarios: Transaction Monitoring Challenges - Unit21, page 1.

 A financial institution can verify the nature and purpose of a business and its legitimacy by using an independent information verification process, such as by accessing public and private databases. This method can help the financial institution to check the names of businesses against anti-money laundering (AML) watchlists, parse and analyze ownership information to determine beneficial ownership structure, and run the beneficial owners themselves through identity verification and AML watchlist checks1. This can also help the financial institution to comply with the regulatory requirements for customer due diligence (CDD), which include obtaining and analyzing sufficient customer information to understand the nature and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a customer risk profile2. Other methods, such as reviewing a copy of the corporation’s latest audited reports and accounts, undertaking a company search or other commercial inquiries, or reviewing the company’s website, may not provide sufficient or reliable information to verify the nature and purpose of a business and its legitimacy.

Customer due diligence for banks by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, October 2001.

How to Verify Legitimate Businesses and Merchants by Trulioo, March 2021.

According to the Wolfsberg Principles on Private Banking, the bank should apply additional diligence to customers who present a higher risk of money laundering or other financial crimes. Some of the indicators for defining such customers are:

Persons residing in or having funds from countries with inadequate AML standards, sanctions, embargoes, or other measures that indicate a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing12.

Persons engaged in business activities known to be susceptible to money laundering, such as cash-intensive businesses, gambling, arms trade, precious metals and stones, art and antiquities, etc13.

Persons determined to be Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs), who are individuals who hold or have held positions of public trust or influence, or their family members or close associates, and who may pose a higher risk of corruption, bribery, or abuse of power14.

Persons who receive funds from a correspondent banking relationship are not necessarily required additional diligence, unless they fall under any of the above categories or other risk factors. Correspondent banking is a service provided by one bank to another bank to facilitate cross-border transactions, and it is subject to its own set of AML standards and due diligence measures5.

Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking (2012) 1

FATF High-Risk and Other Monitored Jurisdictions

FATF Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals

FATF Guidance on Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 and 22)

FATF Guidance on Correspondent Banking Services

This represents the highest risk factor for terrorist financing because it may indicate that the charity is diverting funds to support terrorist organizations or activities, or that it is acting as a front or conduit for terrorist financing. Disbursement of funds to entities unrelated to the purpose of the charity may also violate the donor’s intentions, the charity’s mission, or the applicable laws and regulations. A charity with unaudited accounts may have weak internal controls, governance, or transparency, which may increase the risk of misappropriation, diversion, or misuse of funds.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, Module 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Lesson 2.3: Money Laundering Risks and Methods by Sector

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition2, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Section 2.3: Money Laundering Risks and Methods by Sector, pp. 40-41

ACAMS CAMS Examination Preparation Seminar, 6th Edition3, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Section 2.3: Money Laundering Risks and Methods by Sector, Slide 18

An anti-money laundering officer should coordinate with human resources when implementing a new hire screening program, because human resources is responsible for managing the recruitment, hiring, and training of employees, as well as ensuring compliance with labor laws and regulations. A new hire screening program is a key component of an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program, as it helps to prevent the hiring of individuals who may pose a risk of facilitating money laundering, terrorist financing, or other financial crimes, or who may have a criminal or disciplinary history that could compromise the integrity of the institution. A new hire screening program should include background checks, verification of credentials and references, and assessment of skills and competencies relevant to the AML function. An anti-money laundering officer should work closely with human resources to establish the criteria, procedures, and documentation for the screening program, as well as to monitor its implementation and effectiveness.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, Module 4: Developing an AML Program, Lesson 4.2: Developing an AML Program

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition2, Chapter 4: Developing an AML Program, Section 4.2: Developing an AML Program, pp. 81-82

ACAMS CAMS Examination Preparation Seminar, 6th Edition3, Chapter 4: Developing an AML Program, Section 4.2: Developing an AML Program, Slide 20

 The next course of action for the anti-money laundering officer to take is to determine if there is a readily identifiable cause for the increase in compliance deficiencies. This could involve analyzing the data, interviewing the staff, reviewing the procedures, or conducting a root cause analysis. The anti-money laundering officer should try to find out if the deficiencies are due to human error, system failure, policy ambiguity, training gap, external factors, or any other reason. By identifying the cause, the anti-money laundering officer can then take appropriate corrective or preventive measures to address the issue and improve the compliance performance.

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 6, pages 171-172

CAMS Certification Exam Outline, Domain 3, Task 3.1, Skill 3.1.2

Anti-Money Laundering & Know Your Customer eBook, Chapter 5, pages 63-64

Summary of the Global Anti-Money Laundering Know Your Customer Policy, page 3

 According to the BSA/AML Manual1, once a financial institution files a SAR, it should maintain a copy of the SAR and the original or business record equivalent of any supporting documentation for a period of five years from the date of filing the SAR. The supporting documentation should be identified and maintained by the financial institution as such, and be deemed to have been filed with the SAR. The financial institution should make all supporting documentation available to FinCEN or any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency, or any federal regulatory authority that examines the financial institution for compliance with the BSA, upon request. Therefore, the best action to take regarding a particular account once suspicious activity is reported by the institution is to secure all supporting documentation, as it may be needed for further investigation or examination.

BSA/AML Manual1

Suspicious Activity Reporting - Overview2

Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Basics3

 these are the essential components of an effective anti-money laundering program for any financial institution, especially an offshore one. According to the CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, an anti-money laundering program should include the following elements1:

A risk assessment that identifies and evaluates the money laundering and terrorist financing risks faced by the institution, and the measures taken to mitigate them.

A compliance program that establishes policies, procedures, and controls to prevent, detect, and report money laundering and terrorist financing activities, and to comply with the applicable laws and regulations of the host and chartering countries.

A designated compliance officer who is responsible for overseeing the implementation and maintenance of the compliance program, and for liaising with the relevant authorities and stakeholders.

A training program that provides regular and appropriate education and awareness to senior management and staff on their roles and responsibilities in relation to anti-money laundering and terrorist financing, and on the latest trends and typologies in these areas.

An independent audit function that reviews and tests the adequacy and effectiveness of the compliance program, and reports the findings and recommendations to senior management and the board of directors.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s capital adequacy requirements for the host country (answer A) are not directly related to anti-money laundering, but rather tothe prudential regulation and supervision of banks. They are important for ensuring the financial soundness and stability of banks, but they are not sufficient to prevent or combat money laundering and terrorist financing2.

1: CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), page 139-140. 2: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements.

Accountants can be involved in money laundering schemes in various ways, either knowingly or unknowingly. Some of the common methods that accountants can use to launder money are:

Overstating income to hide excess cash: This method involves inflating the revenues or profits of a business to conceal the origin of illicit funds. For example, an accountant can create fake invoices or receipts to justify the deposit of cash from illegal sources into the business account. This can make the cash appear as legitimate income from the business operations.

Acting as a conduit for transferring cash between accounts: This method involves using the accountant’s own account or a third-party account to move funds around and obscure the audit trail. For example, an accountant can receive cash from a client and deposit it into their own account, then transfer it to another account or withdraw it in a different location. This can make it difficult to trace the source and destination of the funds.

Acting as a designee for someone who wishes to hide their identity: This method involves using the accountant’s name or credentials to open accounts or conduct transactions on behalf of a client who wants to remain anonymous. For example, an accountant can act as a nominee director or shareholder for a shell company that is used to launder money. This can make it appear as if the accountant is the owner or beneficiary of the funds, while the actual owner or beneficiary is hidden.

Money Laundering: What It Is and How to Prevent It - Investopedia, The Process of Laundering Money

Revealed: accountants aiding money laundering - Accountancy Age, Accountants’ methods

Accountants in the anti-money laundering front line, Accountants’ obligations

https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/119840NCJRS.pdf

A compliance officer should communicate with regulatory and law enforcement authorities in line with applicable local laws during an ongoing investigation into a client’s activities by a competent authority. This is because the compliance officer has a duty to cooperate with the authorities and provide relevant information and documents as requested, while also protecting the confidentiality and privacy of the client and the institution. The compliance officer should not restrict the communication to senior management only, as this could hinder the investigation or create a perception of obstruction. The compliance officer should not communicate only in writing, as this could limit the effectiveness and timeliness of the communication. The compliance officer should not limit the communication to the absolute minimum, as this could imply a lack of cooperation or transparency.

=

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS1

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS2

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs3

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)4

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, the employee should report the conversation to the compliance officer because the colleague is engaging in tipping off, which is a serious violation of anti-money laundering laws and regulations. Tipping off is the act of informing a person or entity that they are the subject of a suspicious transaction report or an investigation, or providing any information that may compromise or impede the investigation. Tipping off can result in criminal penalties, civil liabilities, and disciplinary actions for the individual and the institution. Therefore, the employee has a duty to report the colleague’s misconduct to the compliance officer, who is responsible for ensuring compliance with the anti-money laundering policies and procedures, and taking appropriate corrective actions.

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 3: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), page 97

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS, CAMS Examination Preparation, page 8

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs, Module 3: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, video 3.4: Tipping Off and Confidentiality

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Question 8, Answer B

The purchaser being a nominee is a red flag that indicates high potential for money laundering in a real estate purchase. A nominee is a person or entity that acts on behalf of another person or entity, usually to conceal the identity or beneficial ownership of the real owner. Money launderers may use nominees to purchase real estate with illicit funds, and then transfer the property to the real owner or sell it for a profit. This way, they can obscure the source and ownership of the funds, and integrate them into the legitimate economy12.

ACAMS, CAMS Examination Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 3, pp. 77-78

FATF, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing through the Real Estate Sector, June 20073, pp. 19-20

Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional bodies (FSRBs) are organizations that associate countries from the same region or that face similar challenges to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. FSRBs have the same objectives as the FATF, which are to set international standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist financing. One of the main functions of FSRBs is to provide technical assistance and training to their members in implementing the FATF recommendations, which are the global standards for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. FSRBs also conduct mutual evaluations of their members to assess their level of compliance with the FATF recommendations and provide follow-up reports and actions.

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2, Section 2.11

Certification Candidate Handbook, Section 3.22

FATF website, About Us, FATF-StyleRegional Bodies3

The FATF 40 Recommendations are the international standards for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. They provide a comprehensive and consistent framework of measures that countries should implement in their national systems. Recommendation 5 of the FATF 40 Recommendations states that countries should criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations. This means that countries should adopt laws that make it an offence to provide or collect funds or other assets with the intention or knowledge that they will be used to carry out terrorist acts or support terrorist organizations. Countries should also ensure that such offences are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. Furthermore, countries should ensure that terrorist financing offences extend to any person who wilfully provides or collects funds or other assets by any means, directly or indirectly, with the unlawful intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out terrorist acts or support terrorist organizations. Therefore, the correct answer is D. Criminalize, as this is the action that countries should take related to the financing of terrorist acts in accordance with the FATF 40 Recommendations.

FATF website

FATF 40 Recommendations - February 2012

FATF Recommendation 5 - Criminalisation of Terrorist Financing

 The correct answer is B, as a customer acceptance policy is an essential element of KYC standards according to the Basel Committee’s Customer Due Diligence for Bankspaper1. A customer acceptance policy defines the types of customers that the bank is willing to accept, and the conditions and limitations that apply to such relationships. A customer acceptance policy helps the bank to avoid customers who are likely to pose a higher than average risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, or who are not willing to provide sufficient information for identification and verification purposes1.

 1: Customer due diligence for banks - Bank for International Settlements, page 9.

A money remittance business will most likely attract money launderers because it deals primarily in cash transactions, engages in international transactions, and conducts transactions for walk-in customers. These factors make money remittance businesses vulnerable to money laundering risks, such as:

Cash transactions: Cash is the preferred medium of exchange for money launderers, as it is anonymous, untraceable, and easily convertible. Money remittance businesses often deal with large amounts of cash, which can be used to place, layer, or integrate illicit funds into the financial system. Cash transactions also pose challenges for customer identification, record keeping, and transaction monitoring.

International transactions: Money remittance businesses facilitate cross-border transfers of funds, which can be used to move illicit funds from one jurisdiction to another, or to obscure the origin, destination, or purpose of the funds. International transactions also involve exposure to different legal, regulatory, and cultural environments, which may create inconsistencies or gaps in anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) standards and practices.

Walk-in customers: Money remittance businesses often serve walk-in customers, who may not have an established relationship with the business, or who may use false or incomplete identification documents. Walk-in customers also increase the volume and complexity of transactions, which may make it difficult to detect suspicious or unusual activity, or to apply risk-based due diligence measures.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, Module 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Lesson 2.3: Money Laundering Risks and Methods by Sector

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition2, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Section 2.3: Money Laundering Risks and Methods by Sector, pp. 37-38

ACAMS CAMS Examination Preparation Seminar, 6th Edition3, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Section 2.3: Money Laundering Risks and Methods by Sector, Slide 16

According to the USA PATRIOT Act, the four minimum elements required for an anti-money laundering program for a foreign bank with branches in the United States are:

An ongoing employee training program. This is to ensure that the employees are aware of the anti-money laundering policies and procedures, the legal and regulatory requirements, the red flags and indicators of suspicious activity, and their roles and responsibilities in detecting and reporting money laundering and terrorist financing.

The designation of a compliance officer. This is to ensure that there is a person responsible for overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of the anti-money laundering program, ensuring compliance with the applicable laws and regulations, and liaising with the regulators and law enforcement agencies.

An independent audit function to test the program. This is to ensure that the anti-money laundering program is periodically reviewed and evaluated by an independent and qualified auditor, who can assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the program, identify any weaknesses or deficiencies, and recommend corrective actions or improvements.

The development of internal policies, procedures, and controls. This is to ensure that the foreign bank has a written and documented anti-money laundering program that establishes the standards, guidelines, and processes for preventing, detecting, and reporting money laundering and terrorist financing, and that the program is consistent with the risk profile and business activities of the foreign bank.

The development of a Know Your Customer program is not a minimum element required under the USA PATRIOT Act, although it is a recommended best practice and may be required by other laws or regulations.

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 5, pages 141-142

CAMS Certification Exam Outline, Domain 2, Task 2.2, Skill 2.2.1

Anti-Money Laundering Initiatives Under the USA Patriot Act, FindLaw, March 2008

[The U.S. PATRIOT Act and AML: What You Need to Know], Dow Jones Risk & Compliance, June 2020

Institutions that violate anti-money laundering laws may face various risks and consequences, such as legal, regulatory, reputational, and operational risks. As demonstrated by the 2012 HSBC settlement with United States authorities, two of the most significant risks are:

Forfeiture of assets. This means that the institution may have to surrender some or all of its assets that are related to the money laundering activities or violations. For example, HSBC agreed to forfeit $1.256 billion as part of its deferred prosecution agreement with the US Department of Justice1.

Civil money penalties. This means that the institution may have to pay fines or penalties to the government or other regulatory agencies for violating the anti-money laundering laws or regulations. For example, HSBC agreed to pay $665 million in civil money penalties to various US regulators, including the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency1.

The other two options, C and D, are not as common or relevant to the 2012 HSBC settlement. Loss of bank charter/license may occur in extreme cases where the institution is deemed unfit to operate or poses a serious threat to the financial system. Imprisonment of bank employees may occur if the employees are found guilty of criminal charges, such as fraud, conspiracy, or wilful violation of anti-money laundering laws. However, these outcomes are usually reserved for individuals, not institutions, and depend on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

1: HSBC announces settlements with authorities, 2012, https://www.hsbc.com/-/files/hsbc/investors/stock-exchange-announcements/2012/december/2012-12-11-hsbc-announces-settlements-with-authorities.pdf

2: Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and HSBC Holdings plc, 2012, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20121211_33

3: HSBC settles on record US fee, 2012, https://www.dw.com/en/hsbc-settles-in-us-money-laundering-probe/a-16443391

4: HSBC pays record $1.9bn fine to settle US money-laundering accusations, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/dec/11/hsbc-bank-us-money-laundering

5: HSBC to pay $1.9bn in US money laundering penalties, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-20673466

One of the main challenges and risks for online banks is the verification of customer identity and the prevention of identity fraud. Online banks are more vulnerable to moneylaundering and terrorist financing because they do not have face-to-face contact with their customers and may rely on third-party sources or digital methods to verify customer information. Therefore, the most important recommendation for the anti-money laundering expert to make is that the online bank ensures that prospective new customers can be properly identified and that their identity documents and information are verified using reliable and independent sources. This is also in line with the international standards and best practices for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, such as the FATF Recommendations, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision principles, and the EU’s Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive123

The other options are less important or less effective than ensuring customer identification. Limiting the amount that can be processed per transaction may reduce the exposure to large-scale money laundering, but it does not prevent the use of multiple transactions or accounts to launder smaller amounts. Setting up automated programs to analyze transactions for money laundering activity may enhance the detection and reporting of suspicious transactions, but it does not address the root cause of money laundering, which is the concealment of the source and ownership of illicit funds. Ensuring that a firewall is set up to protect the transactions may improve the security and confidentiality of the online banking system, but it does not prevent the misuse of the system by money launderers who have legitimate access to the system123

1: Anti-Money Laundering Guide for Digital Banks by sanctions.io, 2022

2: The fight against money laundering: Machine learning is a game changer by McKinsey, 2021

3: FATF Guidance on Digital Identity, 2020

The Egmont Group’s 100 Cases1, the Financial Action Task Force Typologies2, and FinCEN’s SAR Activity Review3 are all sources of information related to money laundering trends, methods, and risks. They provide examples, analysis, and guidance on how to detect, prevent, and report money laundering and other financial crimes. The Wolfsberg Principles4, on the other hand, are a set of global standards for the prevention of moneylaundering in the correspondent banking and private banking sectors. They are not intended to provide information on money laundering trends, but rather to establish best practices and minimum requirements for financial institutions to comply with anti-money laundering regulations and expectations.

Egmont Group’s 100 Cases1

Financial Action Task Force Typologies2

FinCEN’s SAR Activity Review3

The Wolfsberg Principles4

 The most appropriate step for an AML compliance officer to take upon receiving notice of government update including the names of the latest terrorists sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council is to update the monitoring software containing sanctioned persons. This is because the AML compliance officer is responsible for ensuring that the financial institution does not engage in any transactions or business relationships with individuals or entities that are subject to sanctions, as this could expose the institution to legal, regulatory, and reputational risks. By updating the monitoring software, the AML compliance officer can ensure that the institution’s screening and filtering systems are up to date and can flag any potential matches or hits with the sanctioned persons. This would also enable the AML compliance officer to take appropriate actions, such as blocking or freezing funds, reporting to the relevant authorities, and conducting further due diligence, if necessary.

Anti-Money Laundering (AML) | FINRA.org, Overview.

AML Compliance Officer and Their Responsibilities - Tookitaki, Role and Responsibilities of an AML Compliance Officer.

What is an AML Compliance Officer? - Sanction Scanner, Communicate openly with the company’s internal management team.

Guidance on Existing AML Program Rule Compliance … - FinCEN.gov, Financial Institutions Toll-Free Hotline.

According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the red flags for money laundering in cash-intensive businesses is “the presence of privately-owned ATMs on the premises” (p. 222). This could indicate that the business is using the ATM to deposit or withdraw large amounts of cash from illicit sources, or to facilitate the movement of funds across borders. The other options are not necessarily indicative of money laundering risk, as they could be explained by legitimate factors such as the change in customer preferences, the economic situation, or the expansion of the business.

ACAMS. (2020). Study Guide for the Certification Examination for Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (6th ed.). Miami, FL: ACAMS.

CFI. (2023)Money Laundering - Overview, How It Works, Example 1. Retrieved from https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com

CALERT. (2016)How Do Criminals Launder Money Through a Restaurant? 2. Retrieved from https://calert.info

 The financial institution should perform further investigation to verify the legitimacy of the tour guide’s explanation and the source of funds. If the investigation reveals any suspicious or unusual activity, such as inconsistent cash flow patterns, involvement of high-risk customers or jurisdictions, or indications of money laundering or terrorist financing, the financial institution should report the activity to the authorities and consider terminating the relationship. The financial institution should also document the investigation and its findings, and update the customer’s risk profile accordingly.

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 112

CAMS Certification Exam Outline, Domain 1, Task 1.2, Skill 1.2.2

ACAMS MoneyLaundering.com, Article: “How to Conduct Effective Customer Due Diligence”

Suspicious transaction report (STR) information is confidential and should not be disclosed to anyone outside the compliance function or law enforcement authorities. Providing STR information to the credit department could compromise the integrity of the reporting process and expose the institution to legal risks. The compliance officer should decline to provide the STR information to the credit department and explain the reasons for doing so.

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 4: Conducting and Supporting the Investigation Process, page 136

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS, Candidate Handbook, page 16

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs, Video 4.3: Suspicious Transaction Reporting

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Practice Test 1,

The charity frequently withdrawing cash from the bank indicates possible terrorist financing, as cash transactions are often used to conceal the source, destination, and purpose of funds. Cash transactions also make it difficult to trace the flow of funds and identify the beneficiaries. Terrorist financiers may use charities as a cover to collect and distribute funds for their activities, and may exploit the cash-based nature of charitable donations to avoid detection12.

According to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), a financial institution or business must establish an anti-money laundering (AML) program that includes at least four elements: (a) a system of internal policies, procedures and controls to prevent, detect and report money laundering and other illicit activities; (b) a designated compliance officer who is responsible for overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of the AML program; © an ongoing employee training program that covers the legal and regulatory obligations, the risks and red flags of money laundering, and the roles and responsibilities of the staff in the AML program; and (d) an independent audit function that tests and evaluates the adequacy and compliance of the AML program12.

While the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a key agency that enforces economic and trade sanctions against targeted foreign countries, entities and individuals, it is not part of the BSA or the AML program requirements. However, financial institutions and businesses are expected to comply with OFAC regulations and screen their customers and transactions against the OFAC lists of sanctioned parties. Failure to do so may result in civil or criminal penalties34. Therefore, it is advisable for financial institutions and businesses to have an OFAC program that is integrated with their AML program, but it is not a mandatory element that they have to specifically address in their AML program.

1: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2020). Anti-Money Laundering Programs

2: ACAMS (2020). CAMS Certification Package (6th Edition)

3: Office of Foreign Assets Control (2023). Sanctions Programs and Country Information

4: Moses & Singer LLP (2023). Anti-Money Laundering, Bank Secrecy and OFAC Regulations

One of the most common methods of money laundering in the insurance industry is to purchase a policy with illicit funds and then request a refund of the premiums, either partially or fully, before the policy matures. This way, the money launderer can receive a legitimate payment from the insurance company, effectively washing the dirty money. This technique is also known as premium fraud or early surrender12

According to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the most significant money laundering and terrorist financing risks in the insurance industry are found in life insurance and annuity products, because such products allow a customer to place largeamounts of funds into the financial system and seamlessly transfer such funds to disguise their true origin34

Some indicators of potential money laundering through insurance products are: 12

The customer pays the premiums with cash, cashier’s checks, money orders, or other anonymous or unusual payment methods.

The customer overpays the premiums or makes multiple payments in excess of the required amount.

The customer cancels the policy during the free-look or grace period and requests a refund to a different account or a third party.

The customer purchases a policy that is inconsistent with their income, age, or risk profile.

The customer shows little interest in the benefits or terms of the policy, but is more concerned about the cancellation or surrender options.

1: AML in Insurance: How to Detect & Combat Money Laundering, ComplyAdvantage, 2022

2: Anti Money Laundering (AML) In Insurance Industry In 2021, Financial Crime Academy, 2023

3: Money laundering in the insurance industry, Insurance Commission, 2022

4: Money laundering in the insurance industry, Atty. Dennis B. Funa, Business Mirror, 2016

[5]: Anti-Money Laundering Requirements: FAQs for Insurance Companies, FinCEN, 2005

 According to the FATF Recommendation 12, financial institutions should take reasonable measures to determine whether the beneficiaries of a life insurance policy and/or, where required, the beneficial owner of the beneficiary are politically exposed persons. This should occur at the latest at the time of the payout1. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent the abuse of life insurance products for money laundering or terrorist financing by PEPs or their associates. Therefore, the best way to mitigate the risk of adding a beneficiary to a life insurance policy for a foreign PEP is to perform due diligence on the beneficiary, such as verifying their identity, relationship with the PEP, and source of funds2.

The other options are not correct because they either do not comply with the FATF standards, or do not adequately address the risk of adding a beneficiary to a life insurance policy for a foreign PEP. Determining the source of wealth and source of funds is a measure that should be applied to the PEP as the customer, not the beneficiary, as partof the enhanced due diligence process2. Declining the request if the beneficiary is a foreign PEP may not be feasible or proportional, as not all foreign PEPs are involved in money laundering or terrorist financing, and some may have legitimate reasons to add a beneficiary to their life insurance policy. Declining the request to add a beneficiary due to increased risk may also not be feasible or proportional, as it may violate the contractual rights of the PEP as the customer, and may not be necessary if the due diligence on the beneficiary does not reveal any red flags or suspicions.

 https://complyadvantage.com/insights/peps-life-insurance/

https://www.cfatf-gafic.org/index.php/documents/fatf-40r/378-fatf-recommendation-12-politically-exposed-persons

According to the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking, the beneficial owners of a private banking account are those who generally have ultimate control over the funds in the account and those who are the ultimate source of funds for the account and whose source of wealth should be subject to due diligence1. These two criteria are meant to ensure that the bank knows who is ultimately behind the account and where the funds come from, in order to prevent the use of the bank for money laundering or other criminal purposes. Authorized signers on the account or those who have legal title to a controlling share interest in the customer are not necessarily the beneficial owners, as they may act on behalf of others or have limited influence over the account.

 1: Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking (2012), Section 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, 1

Economic sanctions are penalties imposed by one or more countries against another country, group, or individual for violatinginternational norms or threatening national interests1. The ultimate goal of economic sanctions is to protect national security by changing the behavior or policies of the target, or by weakening its capabilities or resources2. Sanctions can be used to advance various foreignpolicy objectives, such as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, democracy promotion, human rights protection, conflict resolution, and cybersecurity1. Sanctions can take different forms, such as travel bans, asset freezes, trade embargoes, arms restrictions, and aid reductions1. Sanctions can be applied unilaterally by one country, or multilaterally by a coalition of countries or an international organization, such as the United Nations or the European Union1.

1: What Are Economic Sanctions? | Council on Foreign Relatio

2: How Economic Sanctions Work - Investopedia

According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations, simplified customer due diligence (CDD) or reduced measures could be acceptable for certain types of products or transactions that have a low risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, based on a reasonable assessment of the risk by countries or by financial institutions. These include:

Life insurance policies where the annual premium is no more than USD/EUR 1,000 or a single premium of no more than USD/EUR 2,500. This is because the amount of money involved is relatively small and the payout is usually contingent on a specific event, such as death or disability, which reduces the likelihood of abuse by criminals.

Insurance policies for pension schemes if there is no surrender clause and the policy cannot be used as collateral. This is because the beneficiaries of these policies are usually predetermined and the funds are locked in until retirement age, which limits the possibility of transferring or withdrawing the money for illicit purposes.

A pension, superannuation or similar scheme that provides retirement benefits to employees, where contributions are made by way of deduction from wages and the scheme rules do not permit the assignment of a member’s interest under the scheme. This is because the source of funds is known and verified by the employer and the scheme is regulated and supervised by competent authorities, which reduces the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

The other option, trusts where the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries are identified and the shares are in bearer form, is not eligible for simplified CDD or reduced measures, because the use of bearer shares poses a high risk of anonymity and concealment of beneficial ownership, which could facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing.

FATF 40 Recommendations, Recommendation 10 and Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10, paragraphs 17-18.

According to the risk-based approach, financial institutions should apply enhanced due diligence and ongoing monitoring to higher-risk clients, and take appropriate measures to mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. If the client exceeds the criteria of an acceptable risk model created by the institution, the institution shouldcommunicate the issues to the client and request remedial actions, such as providing additional information, documentation, or evidence of compliance. If the client does not cooperate or comply with the institution’s requirements, the institution should consider terminating the relationship with the client, as the risk may outweigh the benefits of continuing the business relationship.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 2: Risk Assessments, pp. 51-521

ACAMS CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4: Customer Due Diligence, pp. 97-981

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 2: Risk Assessments, Lesson 2.3: Risk-Based Approach2

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 4: Customer Due Diligence, Lesson 4.3: Enhanced Due Diligence

The Wolfsberg Group is an association of 13 global banks that aims to develop frameworks and guidance for the management of financial crime risks. The group started as a meeting of banks in 1999 to address anti-money laundering (AML) in private banking, which carries an increased degree of risk from a money laundering perspective. In the course of discussions, they articulated principles that reflected uniformly high standards for this client segment. These principles became the first guidance published by the group under the name Wolfsberg Principles.

The Wolfsberg Group - Institute on Governance

Wolfsberg Group - Wikipedia

The Group first came together in 2000 at the Wolfsberg castle in Switzerland, accompanied by representatives of Transparency International, to draft anti-money laundering guidelines for private banking

A commission rogatory, also known as a letter rogatory or a letter of request, is a formal request from a court in one country to a court in another country for some type of judicial assistance, such as service of process, taking of evidence, or enforcement of judgments1. A commission rogatory would be used in the context of a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) request, which is a bilateral or multilateral agreement that enables countries to cooperate and provide legal assistance to each other in criminal matters2. MLATs are one of the main gateways for obtaining information from another country, especially when the information is not available through other means, such as financial intelligence units (FIUs), supervisory authorities, or international organizations3. FIUs are national agencies that collect, analyze, and disseminate financial information related to money laundering and terrorist financing, and they can exchange information with their counterparts in other countries under the Egmont principles. Supervisory authorities are regulators that oversee the compliance of financial institutions and other entities with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) obligations, and they can share information with their peers in other jurisdictions through supervisory channels, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that sets standards and monitors the implementation of AML/CFT measures, and it can provide information and guidance to its members and other jurisdictions, but it does not have the authority to request or compel information from them.

1: Letters rogatory - Wikipedia

2: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters Rogatory: A Guide for Judges | Federal Judicial Center

3: How US Authorities Obtain Foreign Evidence in Cross-Border Investigations | Global Investigations Review

What is an FIU? | Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision | Bank for International Settlements

What is the FATF? | FATF

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) by ACAMS, an institution’s anti-money laundering program should be reassessed at least annually to ensure that it is current, effective, and compliant with the applicable laws and regulations. The reassessment should include a review of the institution’s risk assessment, policies and procedures, internal controls, training, and independent testing. The reassessment should also consider any changes in the institution’s products, services, customers, geographic locations, or business environment that may affect its exposure to money laundering and terrorist financing risks1.

The other options are not consistent with the best practices of maintaining an up-to-date anti-money laundering program. For example:

The program should be evaluated and updated at least every six months by the Board of Directors. While the Board of Directors has the ultimate responsibility for overseeing the institution’s anti-money laundering program, it is not required to evaluate and update the program every six months. This may be too frequent and impractical, especially for large and complex institutions. The Board of Directors should, however, approve the program and any significant changes, and ensure that senior management implements and enforces the program effectively1.

The program should be reviewed by a federal law enforcement officer for gaps in controls. While federal law enforcement agencies may conduct investigations or examinations of the institution’s anti-money laundering program, they are not responsible for reviewing the program for gaps in controls. This is the role of the institution’s internal audit function or an external independent party, who should conduct periodic testing of the program’s adequacy and effectiveness1.

The program should be sent to the institution’s government regulator on a periodic basis. While the institution’s government regulator may request or review the institution’s anti-money laundering program as part of its supervisory or enforcement activities, the institution is not obligated to send the program to the regulator on a periodic basis. The institution should, however, report any suspicious or unusual transactions or activities to the relevant authorities, such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) or the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)1.

Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) by ACAMS

A financial intelligence unit (FIU) is a national body or government agency that collects, analyzes, and disseminates financial information related to potential financial crimes, such as money laundering and terrorist financing. One of the core functions of an FIU is to receive disclosures filed by reporting entities, such as banks, money service businesses, casinos, and other obliged entities, that are required to report suspicious or unusual financial activity. These disclosures, also known as suspicious activity reports (SARs) or suspicious transaction reports (STRs), provide valuable intelligence for the FIU and other competent authorities to identify and investigate financial crimes and trace illicit funds. The other statements do not describe the duties of an FIU, but rather the roles of other agencies or bodies, such as the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in the US, which administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions, or the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which sets international standards for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) supervision and regulation.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 1: Risks and Methods of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Lesson 1: The Financial Intelligence Unit

The Financial Intelligence Unit: Role of the FIU and International Cooperation, Financial Crime Academy

What We Do, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)

having an outdated and incomplete risk assessment could expose the financial institution to significant money laundering and terrorist financing risks that are not identified, measured, or mitigated. The risk assessment is a key component of an effective anti-money laundering program, and it should be updated regularly to reflect the changes in the business environment, customer profile, product offerings, delivery channels, and regulatory requirements12. A risk assessment that is several years old and does not cover all current products and services could fail to capture the emerging threats and vulnerabilities that the financial institution faces, and could result in inadequate or inappropriate controls, policies, and procedures. This could lead to the highest potential for unmitigated risk, as the financial institution could be exploited by money launderers and terrorist financiers, and face regulatory sanctions, reputational damage, and financial losses.

Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Risk Assessment | ACAMS1

Risk assess your business for money laundering supervision - GOV.UK2

"Transaction Monitoring Systems and Ongoing Monitoring: Since the transactional monitoring system is key to mitigating ML risk within the bank, the Committee recognizes that AML risks require more than just appropriate policies and procedures; banks must have adequate and appropriate monitoring systems. For most banks, this will involve an IT monitoring system. If the bank does not believe it needs an IT monitoring system, it should document the rationale for why it does not need one.

A money laundering risk assessment is a crucial component of an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program. It involves identifying, assessing, and understanding the specific risks related to money laundering and terrorist financing that the institutionmay face. A risk assessment helps the institution to design and implement appropriate controls, policies, procedures, and training to mitigate the risks. A risk assessment should be updated regularly and whenever there are significant changes in the institution’s business activities, products, services, customers, or geographic locations. In this scenario, the financial institution has experienced significant deficiencies in its AML program during a recent regulatory examination. The deficiencies were primarily attributed to the lack of oversight by the institution’s leadership in implementing adequate controls over the new products and services that were added as part of the institution’s aggressive growth strategy. To correct these weaknesses in the AML program, the leadership should first address the area of international control known as “Money laundering risk assessment” (Option C). By conducting a new and comprehensive risk assessment, the leadership can identify the potential vulnerabilities and gaps in the AML program that may arise from the new products and services. The risk assessment can also help the leadership to prioritize the actions and resources needed to address the deficiencies and enhance the AML program. Once the risk assessment is completed, the leadership can then work on updating the AML policy, providing adequate training, and ensuring sufficient compliance staff to implement and monitor the controls.

1, Chapter 2: Risk Assessments

2, Section 2: Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program

3, Question 145

an employee who avoids taking periodic vacations despite having accrued vacation time may be trying to conceal fraudulent or illegal activities that would be exposed in their absence. This is a common red flag for internal fraud and money laundering, as it indicates a lack of segregation of duties, internal controls, and oversight. Employees who engage in such behavior may also exhibit other signs of stress, defensiveness, or secrecy.

Learn about red flags for internal fraud, section “An employee may be a higher internal fraud risk when a combination of the following red flags are present”, bullet point 1: “Unwilling to share duties or take leave.”

Money Laundering Red Flags | Key Behaviours and Indicators, section “Employee Red Flags”, bullet point 1: “Avoiding taking holidays or time off work.”

Top 10 AML Red Flags: Warning Signs and Financial Risks, section “AML Red Flags Categories”, sub-section “Employee Red Flags”, bullet point 1: “Avoiding taking vacations or sick leaves.”

Before sharing customer records within the same jurisdiction, an FI should consider the legal and regulatory framework that governs the protection of personal data and the disclosure of client information. Different jurisdictions may have different laws and rules regarding the privacy and confidentiality of customer data, the consent and notification requirements for data sharing, the purposes and scope of data sharing, and the safeguards and accountability measures for data protection. An FI should ensure that it complies with the applicable restrictions and obligations when sharing customer records within the same jurisdiction, and that it does not violate the rights and expectations of its customers.

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 3, Section 3.4, page 83

CAMS Dumps Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Question 352, page 8

CAMS Dumps Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Question 352, page 8

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a department of the U.S. Treasury that administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals1. OFAC regulations cover all persons and entities within the U.S., all U.S.-domiciled entities and their foreign branches, and all U.S. citizens, wherever located or employed2. These include U.S. banks, U.S. corporations, U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations, U.S. residents, and U.S. citizens living or traveling abroad3. OFAC regulations do not cover foreign-based entities that have U.S. customers, unless they are owned or controlled by U.S. persons or entities4.

 1: Home | Office of Foreign Assets Control 2: eCFR :: 31 CFR Chapter V – Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury 3: FFIEC BSA/AML Office of Foreign Assets Control - Office of Foreign Assets Control 4: Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC): Definition, Sanctions

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) by ACAMS, the independent testing of an institution’s anti-money laundering program should be conducted by a person who reports directly to the Board of Directors or a Board Committee. This ensures that the person conducting the testing has the necessary authority, independence, and objectivity to evaluate the program’s adequacy and effectiveness, and to report any findings or recommendations to the senior management1. The person conducting the testing should also have the appropriate knowledge, skills, and experience in the anti-money laundering field, and should be familiar with the institution’s products, services, customers, and risks2.

The other options are not necessarily suitable or qualified to perform the independent testing of an institution’s anti-money laundering program. For example:

A certified specialist in the anti-money laundering field may have the relevant expertise and credentials, but may not have the required independence or reporting line to conduct the testing. For instance, if the certified specialist is an employee of the institution who is involved in the implementation or operation of the anti-money laundering program, then there may be a conflict of interest or a lack of objectivity in the testing process1.

A former anti-money laundering officer from a similar institution may have the relevant experience and background, but may not have the current knowledge or familiarity with the institution’s anti-money laundering program, policies, procedures, or systems. Moreover, the formeranti-money laundering officer may have a personal or professional relationship with the institution or its staff, which may compromise the independence or integrity of the testing process1.

A retired government regulator or federal law enforcement officer may have the relevant authority and credibility, but may not have the specific skills or qualifications to conduct the testing. For instance, the retired regulator or law enforcement officer may not be well-versed in the latest anti-money laundering standards, regulations, or best practices, or may not be able to apply them to the institution’s unique risk profile, products, services, or customers1.

Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) by ACAMS

What Is An AML Compliance Program? | ComplyAdvantage

A qualified independent party/auditor is the most effective resource to evaluate the effectiveness of an anti-money laundering program. This is because an independent auditor can provide an objective and unbiased assessment of the program, identify any weaknesses or gaps, and make recommendations for improvement. An independent auditor can also verify the compliance of the program with the relevant regulations and best practices, and test the adequacy and functionality of the internal controls, customer due diligence processes, and transaction monitoring systems. An independent auditor can also help an organization prepare for regulatory examinations and audits, and avoid potential penalties or sanctions.

= The main references for this question are the following sources:

The document titled “Frequently Asked Questions Conducting Independent Reviews of Money Services Business Anti-Money Laundering Programs” published by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in July 2010. You can access it by clicking here.

The document titled “AML Audit: How to Effectively Assess Your Compliance Program” published by Alessa in May 2023. You can access it by clicking here.

The document titled “Mutual Evaluations” published by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). You can access it by clicking here.

According to the ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, one of the common methods of money laundering and terrorist financing is to structure transactions to avoid reporting or record keeping requirements. Structuring involves breaking down a large amount of cash into smaller transactions that fall below a specified threshold, or using different accounts, agents, locations, or days to conduct the transactions. Therefore, the fact that the two customers remit the same amount of funds, $2,500, each week to the samerecipient in a high-risk country is a red flag for possible money laundering or terrorist financing activity, as itsuggests that they are trying to evade the record keeping threshold of $3,000 for money transmitters in the United States12.

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, page 27

FFIEC BSA/AML Appendices - Appendix F – Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Red Flags1

AML Red Flags – What are the Top 10 Indicators? - ComplyAdvantage2

Wire stripping is the process of removing or altering the identifying information associated with a wire transfer to make it difficult to trace the origin or destination of the funds. This technique is commonly used in money laundering schemes to conceal the illicit source of funds and avoid detection by authorities or sanctions screening systems. In this case, the bank’s operations team deliberately removed the reference to the sanctioned company from the wire transfer message, thus violating the FinCEN “Travel Rule” and facilitating the evasion of sanctions.

Wire Stripping in Anti Money Laundering Parlance

Wire Transfer Red Flags: Understanding Money Laundering and Fraud Risks

Wire Stripping

According to the Basel Committee’s Customer Due Diligence for Banks paper, one of the essential elements of a sound KYC programme is customer identification. This includes obtaining sufficient information to understand the nature and purpose of thecustomer relationship, the source of funds, and the beneficial ownership and control structure of the customer1. For corporate business entities, this means that a bank needs to have an understanding of the structure of the company, such as its legal form, its ownership, its directors, its line of business, and its geographical locations2. This will help the bank to assess the risk profile of the customer, to verify its identity and legitimacy, and to monitor its transactions for any suspicious activities.

1: Customer due diligence for banks, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, October 2001, Section III.2 2: General Guide to Account Opening and Customer Identification, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, February 2003, Section 2.2.1

 According to the AML Directive of the EU, obliged entities, such as banks and other financial institutions, are required to apply enhanced vigilance in business relationships and transactions involving high-risk third countries, which are those identified by the Commission as having strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism regimes1. The types of enhanced vigilance requirements are basically extra checks and control measures which are defined in article 18a of the Directive1. However, these requirements are not exhaustive, and obliged entities should also implement additional mitigating measures that are complementary to the enhanced customer due diligence procedures, in accordance with a risk based approach1. This means that obliged entities should assess the level of risk posed by each customer, product, service, transaction, or delivery channel, and apply appropriate measures to mitigate those risks2. The additional mitigating measures may include, for example, obtaining additional information on the customer and the beneficial owner, applying additional elements of enhanced monitoring, increasing the frequency and intensity of transaction testing, or requiring the first payment to be carried out through an account in the customer’s name with a bank subject to similar customer due diligence standards1.

1: Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance)

2: Guidance on Risk Factors, EBA, 2021

A compliance officer should consider the following three factors as part of the approach to implement an enterprise-wide anti-money laundering program for a bank that operates in multiple countries:

The types of customers serviced by the bank: Different types of customers may pose different levels of money laundering risk, depending on their nature, source of funds, geographic location, transaction patterns, and other factors. A compliance officer should identify and assess the money laundering risk associated with each customer type and segment, and apply appropriate due diligence measures, monitoring systems, and risk mitigation strategies accordingly12.

The extent of anti-money laundering regulations in the various countries: A compliance officer should be aware of the legal and regulatory requirements and expectations for anti-money laundering compliance in each country where the bank operates, and ensure that the bank’s policies and procedures are consistent with them. A compliance officer should also monitor any changes or updates in the anti-money laundering laws and regulations in the various countries, and adjust the bank’s program accordingly34.

The anti-money laundering risk posed by the products and services offered by the bank: Different products and services may have different features and functionalities that could be exploited by money launderers, such as anonymity, cross-border transfers, cash transactions,complex structures, or new technologies. A compliance officer should evaluate the money laundering risk associated with each product and service offered by the bank, and implement appropriate controls, safeguards, and oversight mechanisms to prevent and detect money laundering activities5 .

1: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2: Risk Assessments

2: FATF, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: The Banking Sector

3: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 3: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)

4: Deloitte, AML Program Effectiveness Reform

5: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4: AML Program Design

[6]: OCC, Money Laundering: A Banker’s Guide to Avoiding Problems

 According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, when a financial institution receives a law enforcement inquiry, it should cooperate as much as possible and respond to all formal requests for information, unless there is a valid objection that can and should be made1. The institution should also file a suspicious transaction report (STR) if the inquiry or the customer’s activity triggers any red flags or indicators of money laundering or other financial crimes2. Additionally, the institution should monitor the account for suspicious activity and review the money laundering risk posed by the account, as these are part of the ongoing due diligence and risk assessment processes3. Closing the account immediately is not a recommended action, as it may alert the customer or interfere with the investigation4.

1: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 121

2: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 122

3: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 123

4: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 124

 Reciprocity is one of the high-level principles that govern the relationship between the FATF and the FSRBs. It means that both the FATF and the FSRBs should respect and acknowledge each other’s work, such as standard setting, mutual evaluations, and follow-up processes. Reciprocity also implies that the FATF and the FSRBs should have similar mechanisms or practices for ensuring effective participation of their members in their activities.

= The main reference for this question is the document titled “High-Level Principles and Objectives for FATF and FATF-style regional bodies” published by the FATF in February 2019. You can access it by clicking here. You can also find more information about the FSRBs and their roles on the FATF website and the Sygna blog.

Large and frequent credit balances on a credit card resulting in request for refunds is an indicator of suspicious activity because it may suggest that the cardholder is using the credit card to launder money or to conceal the source of funds. This is also known as credit card refund fraud or credit card laundering. The cardholder may make purchases with the credit card using illicit funds, then request refunds to another account or in cash, thus transferring the funds to a legitimate or less traceable channel. This activity may also be used to evade currency reporting requirements or to avoid detection by law enforcement or financial institutions.

ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, page 381

Suspicious Activity Reporting Indicators and Examples, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Indicator 14: Excess Purchases or Transactions2

Credit Card Laundering, Money Laundering Bulletin, Issue 245, October 2019

A customer visiting multiple branches of the MSB on the same day in order to transfer funds internationally is a potential indicator of structuring, which is a technique used by money launderers to avoid reporting thresholds or detection by authorities. A customer attempting to buy money orders under $3,000 USD in cash multiple times a day is also apossible sign of structuring, as well as an attempt to evade the identification and recordkeeping requirements for MSBs. Both scenarios should be included in the procedures for further review by the AML Officer.

BSA/AML Risk Assessment for Money Services Businesses (MSBs), section “Risk Factors”, sub-section “Structuring”: “Structuring is the practice of conducting financial transactions in a specific pattern calculated to avoid the creation of certain records and reports required by the BSA and/or 31 CFR Chapter X. Structuring is illegal and is often indicative of money laundering or other illicit activity.”

Money Services Business (MSB) — AML Compliance Guide, section “AML Compliance Requirements for MSBs”, sub-section “Identification and Recordkeeping”: “MSBs must verify the identity of any person who conducts a transaction of $3,000 or more. They must also keep records of the transaction, including the name, address, date of birth, and identification number of the customer, as well as the amount, date, and method of payment.”

A financial institution should examine the country or location where the customer is from or does business, the type and size of the business the customer runs, and the legal structure of the customer’s business, because these factors can indicate the level ofmoney laundering risk associated with the customer. For example, some countries or locations may have weak anti-money laundering laws or high levels of corruption, some types or sizes of businesses may be more prone to generating or concealing illicit funds, and some legal structures may be more complex or opaque than others, making it harder to identify the beneficial owners or controllers of the customer.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, Module 2: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Lesson 2: Know Your Customer (KYC) and Customer Due Diligence (CDD)

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide2, Chapter 2: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Section 2.2: Know Your Customer (KYC) and Customer Due Diligence (CDD), Pages 42-44

According to the CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition1, a financial institution that processes a wire transfer is required to file a suspicious transaction report (STR) in thejurisdiction where it is located, if it detects any red flags or indicators of money laundering, terrorism financing, or other financial crimes. The financial institution does not need to file an STR in the jurisdictions of the originator or the beneficiary of the wire transfer, unless it has a branch or a subsidiary there. Therefore, the correct answer is A. The transaction in Country A.

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition1, Chapter 4: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Section: Wire Transfers, pp. 161-162.

A suspicious transaction report (STR) is a document that financial institutions must file with the relevant authorities when they detect or suspect any activity that may be related to money laundering, terrorist financing, or other criminal offences. An STR should include the details of the customer, the transaction, the reason for suspicion, and any other relevant information.

One of the indicators of suspicious activity is the use of financial instruments, such as checks, money orders, or cashier’s checks, that are drawn on other institutions and deposited in amounts under the currency reporting thresholds. This may suggest that the customer is trying to avoid the detection and reporting of large cash transactions, which is a technique known as structuring or smurfing. Structuring is illegal and may indicate that the customer is laundering money from illicit sources or evading taxes.

Another indicator of suspicious activity is the use of financial instruments that are sequentially numbered, meaning that they have consecutive serial numbers. This may suggest that the customer has obtained the instruments from the same source or issuer, and that they are using them to launder money or finance illegal activities. Sequentially numbered instruments may also indicate that the customer is involved in fraud, such as check kiting or counterfeit checks.

Therefore, if a bank conducts a quarterly review on a retail customer’s account and finds that the customer has made a number of large deposits of financial instruments drawn on other institutions in amounts under the thresholds, and that the instruments were sequentially numbered, the bank will most likely file an STR. This is because this activity does not fit the customer’s historical profile, and it raises a high level of suspicion that the customer is engaged in money laundering or other criminal activities.

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, Section 4.2, page 108

Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Suspicious Activity Reporting and Other Anti-Money Laundering Considerations, Question 5, page 7

Anti-money laundering – handling suspicious activity, Section 6.3, page 3

Tell us about suspicious activity that may be linked to money laundering, Section 3, page 1

 The FATF is an inter-governmental body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system1. The FATF identifies jurisdictions with serious strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering / counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regimes and issues public statements to warn the international community of the risks emanating from these jurisdictions2. These jurisdictions are also known as high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action, or the “black list” in external sources2. The FATF urges its members and all other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect themselves from the money laundering and terrorist financing risks posed by these jurisdictions2. Counter-measures are enhanced due diligence or restrictive measures that go beyond the normal AML/CFT requirements, such as requiring additional information or documentation, rejecting transactions, restricting business relationships, or terminating correspondent banking relationships3. The FATF also provides guidance on the types and levels of counter-measures that may be appropriate, depending on the specific risks and circumstances of each jurisdiction3.

1: What is the FATF? | FATF

2: High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action | FATF

3: Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing - The Implementation of Financial Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction | FATF

According to the CAMS Study Guide, page 173, “If an independent investigation provides grounds to interview the employee, the employee can be interviewed and, if necessary, terminated, but not advised that he or she is under investigation by law enforcement.” This is because informing the employee of the law enforcement investigation could compromise the integrity of the case and potentially expose the institution to legal liability. Therefore, option B is the correct answer.

CAMS Study Guide, page 1731

CAMS Exam Questions and Free Practice Test, Question 2872

An enterprise-wide compliance culture is a centralized, coordinated approach to ethics and compliance program design and assessment that cuts across multiple business units within an organization1. One key aspect of promoting such a culture is that the relevant information should be shared throughout the organization, so that all employees are aware of the compliance risks, policies, procedures, and expectations, and can act accordingly2. Sharing information also facilitates collaboration, communication, and feedback among different functions and levels of the organization, and helps identify and address any gaps or issues in the compliance program3. By contrast, the other options are not conducive to an enterprise-wide compliance culture, as they either create silos, conflicts, or inefficiencies in the compliance function.

1: Enterprise Compliance Risk Management Services | Deloitte US

2: Enterprise Risk Management and Risk Culture - McKinsey & Company

3: FRB: Speech, Bies–Enterprise-wide Compliance Programs–February 4, 2004

According to Section 319(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, U.S. financial institutions that provide correspondent accounts to foreign banks must maintain records of the owners of the foreign banks and the name and address of a U.S. resident authorized to accept service of legal process for records regarding the correspondent accounts. This requirement is intended to prevent foreign shell banks from accessing the U.S. financial system and to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of money laundering and terrorist financing activities involving foreign banks.

US PATRIOT ACT | State Street

Foreign Correspondent Banking Fact Sheet - U.S. Department of the Treasury

FACT SHEET for Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act Final Regulation and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking | FinCEN.gov

the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has the authority to prohibit or reject any trade or financial transactions involving specified countries, entities, and individuals that are subject to U.S. economic sanctions, unless such transactions are authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC. This applies to transactions that occur within the U.S. territory, as well as transactions that involve U.S. persons, U.S. goods, or the U.S. financial system, regardless of where they take place. This is one of the key aspects of OFAC’s extraterritorial reach, which means that OFAC can enforce its sanctions programs beyond the U.S. borders.

Home | Office of Foreign Assets Control, section “Mission”: “The Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") of the US Department of the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.”

The Aggressive Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Economic Sanctions: Foreign Company Exposure to OFAC Enforcement, section “A. Bases for OFAC jurisdiction over foreign parties”, paragraph 1: “One key aspect of the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s extraterritorial reach includes the blocking of certain non-United States initiated transactions for or through the United States (U.S.) for benefit of a restricted person or entity.”

The global reach of OFAC sanctions, section “The global reach of OFAC sanctions”, paragraph 1: “OFAC sanctions are trade and economic sanctions administered by The U.S. Treasury Department’sOffice of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). They are often intended to have extra-territorial effect, meaning that they apply outside the U.S. territory. In some instances a connection with the U.S. territory is required.”

"Prohibit or reject unlicensed trade and financial transactions with specified countries,

entities, and individuals. "

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, an AML training program should include the requirement that new staff receive training during employee orientation or shortly thereafter on bank procedures. This is because new staff need to be aware of the bank’s policies and procedures for complying with the money laundering regulations, such as customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, record-keeping, and reporting of suspicious activities. Training new staff as soon as possible also helps to reduce the risk of human errors or oversights that could facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing.

ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 5, page 143

ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 5, page 144

Technical factsheet Anti-money laundering (AML) training: frequently asked questions, page 1

 According to the CAMS Study Guide, the most commonly used risk criteria for assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risks are country risk, customer risk, and product and service risk. These criteria are based on the FATF Recommendations and the Basel Committee’s guidance on sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism.

Country risk refers to the level of exposure to potential money laundering and terrorist financing activities in a specific jurisdiction, based on factors such as the quality of its AML/CFT regime, its level of corruption, its political and economic stability, its involvement in illicit activities, and its cooperation with international bodies.

Customer risk refers to the level of exposure to potential money laundering and terrorist financing activities associated with a specific customer or customer segment, based on factors such as the nature and purpose of the business relationship, the source and destination of funds, the type and volume of transactions, the customer’s profile and behavior, and the customer’s geographic location.

Product and service risk refers to the level of exposure to potential money laundering and terrorist financing activities associated with a specific product or service offered by a financial institution, based on factors such as the complexity, transparency, anonymity, and accessibility of the product or service, the delivery channels and payment methods used, and the degree of oversight and monitoring applied.

Reputation risk is not a risk criterion for assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risks, but rather a potential consequence of failing to manage those risks effectively. Reputation risk refers to the potential damage to the public trust and confidence in a financial institution due to its involvement or association with money laundering and terrorist financing activities, whether directly or indirectly.

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 2: Risk Assessments, pp. 41-461

FATF Recommendations, Recommendation 1: Assessing Risks and Applying a Risk-Based Approach2

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound management of risks related to money laundering and financing of terrorism, June 2017, pp. 9-143

 the specialist should inform the bank’s senior legal advisor of the situation and seek guidance on how to handle the legal request and the internal memos. The specialistshould not take any action that could compromise the integrity of the legal request, the bank’s anti-money laundering program, or the specialist’s own professional obligations. The specialist should not place the memos in his personal files, as this could be seen as hiding or tampering with evidence. The specialist should not ask the bank president to document his instructions, as this could create a conflict of interest or a perception of undue influence. The specialist should not call the law enforcement agent and suggest he modify the legal request, as this could be seen as interfering with the investigation or tipping off the account holder.

Legal Sector Affinity Group (LSAG) Anti-Money Laundering Guidance for the Legal Sector (January 2021) p. 1321

ACAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist | ACAMS2

Anti-Money Laundering – The Law Society of Singapore3

OFAC-issued regulations apply to all U.S. persons, including U.S. banks, bank holding companies, and non-bank subsidiaries, regardless of where they are located. This means that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks and U.S. branches of a foreign bank are also subject to OFAC compliance. However, intermediaries transacting with U.S. banks, foreign banks with U.S. customers, and foreign import-export companies are not necessarily subject to OFAC regulations, unless they are involved in transactions that involve U.S. jurisdiction or U.S. persons.

Basic Information on OFAC and Sanctions

OFAC Consolidated Frequently Asked Questions

Office of Foreign Assets Control — Overview

Based on the USA PATRIOT Act, one action that the US might take to demonstrate extraterritorial reach is to send requests for information to a non-US based financial institution (FI). The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the authority of the US government to issue subpoenas and other legal orders to foreign banks that maintain a correspondent account in the US, requiring them to produce records relating to such account or any account at the foreign bank, including records maintained outside the US12. This provision was intended to enhance the ability of the US to investigate and prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing activities that involve foreign FIs3.

1: USA PATRIOT Act, Section 319(b)

2: Britannica, USA PATRIOT Act, History & Society

3: Princeton Legal Journal, FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act: Reforms and Legal Implications

The USA PATRIOT Act is a comprehensive legislation that was enacted in 2001 to enhance the powers and tools of the US authorities to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other threats to the national security and the integrity of the financial system. The USA PATRIOT Act contains several provisions that affect the relationship between US banks and foreign banks that maintain correspondent accounts in the US.

One of these provisions is Section 319, which allows the US authorities to seize the funds of a foreign bank held with a US bank, if the foreign bank refuses to comply with a subpoena or a request for records related to the correspondent account. This provision is intended to prevent foreign banks from using their correspondent accounts in the US to facilitate transactions involving tainted funds, such as proceeds of crime, funds intended to support terrorism, or funds subject to sanctions or asset freezing orders. Section 319 also requires US banks to maintain records of the owners and agents of foreign banks that have correspondent accounts with them, and to terminate such accounts if requested by the US authorities.

Therefore, if a foreign bank maintains a correspondent account in the US, and the US authorities find out that the account has been used to facilitate a transaction involving tainted funds, the US authorities can seize the funds of the foreign bank held with the US bank, under the authority of the USA PATRIOT Act.

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 1, Section 1.2, page 10

USA PATRIOT Act, Section 319, page 55-57

The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis, Section III, page 9-10

[The USA PATRI

The company regularly understating the value of goods exported is an indicator of possible money laundering because it may suggest that the company is involved in trade-based money laundering (TBML), which is the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimise their illicit origins or finance their activities. One of the common TBML techniques is over-invoicing or under-invoicing, which involves manipulating the price, quantity or quality of goods or services in order to transfer value between the importer and exporter. By understating the value of goods exported, the company may be transferring funds to a foreign counterpart who is either a co-conspirator or a third-party money launderer, who will then pay the company the difference in cash or through other means. This way, the company can avoid currency reporting requirements, evade taxes, conceal the source and destination of funds, and integrate the illicit proceeds into the formal economy.

ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 2:Money Laundering Risks and Methods, page 381

Trade-Based Money Laundering: Trends and Developments, FATF-Egmont Group, December 2020, page 282

Trade-Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Global Investigations Review, September 20233

High-risk: The risks here are significant, but are not necessarily prohibited. To mitigate the heightened risk presented, the financial institution should apply more stringent controls to reduce the ML/FT risk, such as conducting enhanced due diligence and more rigorous transaction monitoring. Countries that maintain a reputation for corruption or drug trafficking are generally considered high-risk. High-risk customers may include politically exposed persons (PEPs) or certain types of money services businesses orcash-intensive businesses; high-risk products and services may include correspondent banking and private banking.

 A free-look provision is a period of time, typically 10 to 30 days, in which a new life insurance policy owner can terminate the policy and have their premium refunded1. This can help criminals to launder money by purchasing a policy with illicit funds and then cancelling it within the free-look period to receive a clean check from the insurance company2. This way, they can disguise the source and origin of their funds and avoid any penalties or charges that would otherwise apply to early termination of the policy.

1: Investopedia, What Is a Free Look Period and How Does It Work?

2: FinCEN, Anti-Money Laundering Program and Suspicious Activity Reporting Requirements for Insurance Companies

One of the key components of an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program is to implement adequate customer due diligence (CDD) measures for new accounts. This includes verifying the identity of the party opening the account, determining the beneficial owner(s) of the account, and seeking to determine the source of deposited funds. These measures help the financial institution (FI) to understand the nature and purpose of the customer relationship, assess the risk profile of the customer, and detect and report any suspicious or unusual activity. Documenting the identity of the party opening the account and the beneficial owner(s) of the account also helps the FI to comply with the record-keeping and reporting requirements of the AML laws and regulations, and to cooperate with the authorities in case of investigations or inquiries. Seeking to determine the source of deposited funds helps the FI to prevent the introduction of illicit funds into the financial system, and to identify any discrepancies or inconsistencies between the customer’s profile and activity.

1: FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for the Banking Sector1

2: OCC Bulletin 2020-10: Customer Due Diligence and Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Procedures2

3: ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination3

The three statements from the procedure that are in line with Wolfsberg are:

B. The responsible private banker must establish the identity of a holder of general powers over an account (e.g. a signatory for the account) and, as appropriate, verify that identity. This is consistent with the Wolfsberg Principle 1.2.1, which states that the bank will establish the identity of its clients and beneficial owners prior to establishing business relationships with such persons1.

D. The responsible private banker must obtain the necessary documentation establishing the authorized signer’s authority to act on behalf of the account holder or beneficial owner (e.g. a Power of Attorney). This is consistent with the Wolfsberg Principle 1.2.3, which states that the bank will obtain the necessary documentation establishing the authority of the authorized signatory to act on behalf of the client or beneficial owner1.

E. If an individual has signing authority over an account but does not act on a professional basis as a manager of funds, the responsible private banker must understand and document the relationship between that authorized signer, the account holder, and, if different, the beneficial owner of the account. This is consistent with the Wolfsberg Principle 1.2.4, which states that the bank will understand and document the relationship between the authorized signatory, the client and, if different, the beneficial owner of the account1.

1: Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking (2012)

Economic sanctions are a tool that governments and multi-national bodies can use to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by imposing restrictions on trade, financial transactions, travel, or other activities with targeted countries, entities, or individuals that are involved or suspected of being involved in WMD programs. Economic sanctions aim to disrupt the supply chains, funding sources, and incentives for developing or acquiring WMDs, as well as to deter and punish any violations of international norms and obligations regarding WMDs. Economic sanctions can be imposed unilaterally by a country or multilaterally by a group of countries or an international organization, such as the United Nations, the European Union, or the Financial Action Task Force.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course, Module 4: Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Lesson 4.2: Sanctions1

ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4: Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Section 4.2: Sanctions2

A financial institution (FI) should exit a relationship when the suspicious conduct of the account holder or the FI’s stated policies and procedures for closing an account warrant such action. A FI has the right and responsibility to terminate a customer relationship that poses an unacceptable level of risk to the FI or violates its AML/CFT program. A FI should have clear and consistent criteria for exiting a relationship, such as the number and severity of SARs filed, the nature and extent of due diligence conducted, the availability and effectiveness of mitigating controls, and the alignment of the customer profile with the FI’s risk appetite. A FI should also document the rationale and process for exiting a relationship, communicate the decision to the customer and relevant stakeholders, and monitor the account until closure.

The reputational risk to the FI posed by closing the account or the request from law enforcement to close the account are not valid reasons for exiting a relationship by themselves. A FI should consider the potential reputational impact of closing an account, but it should not outweigh the legal and regulatory obligations of the FI to prevent and detect money laundering and terrorist financing. A FI should also cooperate with law enforcement requests, but it should not automatically close an account based on such requests, as they may interfere with ongoing investigations or intelligence gathering. A FI should exercise its own judgment and discretion in deciding whether to exit a relationship, based on its own policies and procedures and the facts and circumstances of each case.

Exiting Relationships: Ten Steps to a Successful Client Exit Strategy

De-risking your SARs: Building SAR relationship exit strategies into your AML/CFT program

Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Suspicious Activity Reporting and Other Anti-Money Laundering Considerations

This customer action indicates possible money laundering because it could be a sign of layering, which is the second stage of the money laundering process. Layering involves moving the illicit funds around to create distance and confusion between the source and the destination of the money. Transferring all funds to another bank on the same day of large cash deposits could be an attempt to avoid detection by the bank’s transaction monitoring system or by the authorities. It could also be a way to break the audit trail and obscure the origin of the funds.

The other customer actions are not necessarily indicative of money laundering, although they could raise some red flags depending on the context and the customer profile. Continually making weekly small cash deposits could be a sign of structuring, which is a technique to avoid reporting requirements by depositing amounts below the threshold. However, this could also be a legitimate behavior for a tutor who receives cash payments from students. Periodically initiating wire transfers to another account owned by a relative could be a sign of funneling, which is a technique to move funds between accounts that are not related to the business or personal activities of the customer. However, this could also be a legitimate behavior for a tutor who supports their family members financially. Opening a savings account and making frequent transfers from the checking account could be a sign of commingling, which is a technique to mix illicit funds with legitimate funds from a legal source. However, this could also be a legitimate behavior for a tutor who wants to save money for future expenses.

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, pp. 35-40

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, pp. 28-32

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs, Module 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Video 2.2: The Three Stages of Money Laundering

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Question 311, Answer C

 MLROs are responsible for implementing and enforcing an appropriate risk-based approach for their firm, ensuring compliance with the relevant laws and regulations, and reporting any suspicious activities to the authorities. If they fail to discharge their duties, they may face personal liability and civil or criminal sanctions. MLROs are not the only individuals that can be held responsible for AML program deficiencies, as other seniormanagers, directors, or partners may also be liable depending on their role and involvement. However, MLROs are often the primary focus of enforcement actions due to their specific responsibilities and obligations. MLROs cannot avoid liability by agreeing to a civil penalty, as this does not absolve them from their legal duties or potential criminal prosecution. Banks can also be found liable for AML program deficiencies and face fines, penalties, or other sanctions.

Technical factsheet The role of the money laundering reporting officer

Consequences of not complying | AUSTRAC

Money Laundering Reporting Officer: The Role Of MLRO

FinCEN Penalizes U.S. Bank Official for Corporate Anti-Money Laundering Failures

https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/sites/default/files/wb/pdfs/wolfsbergstandards/10.%20Wolfsberg-Private-Banking-Prinicples-May-2012.pdf

2.4 Senior Management Approval

The bank's internal policies should indicate whether, for any one or more among these categories, Senior

Management must approve entering into new relationships.

Relationships with Politically Exposed Persons may only be entered into with the approval of Senior Management.

The Patriot Act, enacted in 2001, introduced several provisions to enhance the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures for U.S. banks and their foreign correspondent relationships. Some of the potential issues for foreign financial institutions (FFIs) maintaining correspondent accounts with U.S. banks under the Patriot Act are:

Cancellation of correspondent banking relationships: The Patriot Act requires U.S. banks to conduct due diligence and enhanced due diligence on their foreign correspondent accounts, and to terminate any account that poses a significant risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. This may result in the cancellation of correspondent banking relationships with FFIs that do not meet the U.S. standards or cooperate with the U.S. authorities. The loss of correspondent banking relationships may affect the FFIs’ ability to access the U.S. financial system and provide services to their customers.

Forfeiture of funds in a U.S. interbank account: The Patriot Act authorizes the U.S. government to seize and forfeit any funds in a U.S. interbank account that are involved in or traceable to money laundering or terrorist financing activities. This means that FFIs may face the riskof losing their funds in a U.S. interbank account if they or their customers are suspected or accused of engaging in illicit activities. The forfeiture of funds may have significant financial and reputational consequences for the FFIs and their customers.

Prohibition of correspondent accounts for shell banks: The Patriot Act prohibits U.S. banks from establishing or maintaining correspondent accounts for shell banks, which are banks that have no physical presence in any country and are not affiliated with a regulated financial group. This means that FFIs that are shell banks or have relationships with shell banks cannot access the U.S. financial system through correspondent accounts. The prohibition of correspondent accounts for shell banks aims to prevent the use of shell banks as vehicles for money laundering and terrorist financing.

CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 4: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), pp. 81-841

USA PATRIOT Act, Title III: International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, Sections 312, 319, and 3132

Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent Banking, October 2014, pp. 3-43

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that sets the global standards for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF). The FATF also monitors the compliance and implementation of its recommendations by its members and other jurisdictions. To enhance its global reach and effectiveness, the FATF works with nine FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) that cover different regions of the world. These FSRBs have similar objectives and functions as the FATF, but they also take into account the specific characteristics and challenges of their regions. Two ways that FSRBs influence AML/CTF standards within their respective regions are:

They issue typologies specific to their geographical region. Typologies are reports or studies that analyze the methods, trends, and patterns of money laundering and terrorist financing in a particular sector, industry, or region. FSRBs produce typologies that reflect the regional context and risks of their members and provide guidance and best practices to address them. For example, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) has issued typologies on trade-based money laundering, wildlife trafficking, and virtual assets in the Asia-Pacific region12.

They administer mutual evaluations of participating members. Mutual evaluations are peer reviews that assess the level of compliance and effectiveness of a country’s AML/CTF system against the FATF standards. FSRBs conduct mutual evaluations of their members and publish the results and recommendations in detailed reports. These reports help identify the strengths and weaknesses of each country’s AML/CTF regime and provide a basis for follow-up actions and technical assistance. For example, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) hasconducted mutual evaluations of its members such as Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago34.

Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, page 27

APG website, section on Typologies

Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) study guide, page 28

CFATF website, section on Mutual Evaluations

An effective anti-money laundering training program should include real-life money laundering examples to illustrate the concepts and strategies for detecting and preventing money-laundering activity. Real-life examples can help employees to understand the risks, methods, indicators, and impacts of money laundering, as well as the roles and responsibilities of different staff members in combating it. Real-life examples can also enhance the engagement, retention, and application of the knowledge gained from the training program.

= The main references for this question are the following sources:

The document titled “Anti-Money Laundering Awareness Training” published by ACAMS. You can access it by clicking here. This document states that “ACAMS AML General Awareness Training equips employees with knowledge of basic anti-money laundering (AML) principles” and that it is “based on real-life industry scenarios with interactive content to help learning stick”.

The document titled “Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Training” published by LIMRA. You can access it by clicking here. This document states that “LIMRA’s AML training program provides training for insurance and securities producers and home office employees” and that it “uses real-life scenarios to help learners understand how to apply AML principles to their everyday work”.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, the institution should develop a system to monitor all the activity of the customer’s accounts to mitigate the risk associated with these accounts. This is because the customer’s behavior and profile may indicate some red flags of money laundering, such as:

Operating an import-export business, which is a common sector for trade-based money laundering, where trade transactions are used to disguise the movement of illicit funds, either by over- or under-invoicing, misrepresenting the quantity or quality of goods, or falsifying documents1.

Receiving funds from a jurisdiction perceived as highly corrupt, which may increase the risk of the funds being derived from bribery, embezzlement, fraud, or other predicate offences2. Transparency International is a global civil society organization that publishes an annual CorruptionPerceptions Index, which ranks countries by their perceived levels of public sector corruption based on expert assessments and surveys3.

Making frequent transfers among the accounts, which may indicate a layering technique, where funds are moved through multiple accounts, institutions, or jurisdictions to obscure the audit trail and the source and ownership of the funds4.

Preferring to manage the accounts separately, which may indicate a lack of transparency or an attempt to avoid detection or reporting by the institution.

By developing a system to monitor all the activity of the customer’s accounts, the institution can:

Identify and verify the identity and beneficial ownership of the customer and the parties involved in the transactions.

Obtain and verify information on the nature and purpose of the business relationship and the source and destination of the funds.

Conduct a risk assessment of the customer and the transactions based on the customer’s profile, behavior, and geographic locations.

Apply enhanced due diligence and ongoing monitoring measures for higher-risk customers and transactions, such as obtaining additional information, documentation, or approval, or conducting more frequent or in-depth reviews.

Detect and report any suspicious or unusual transactions or activities to the relevant authorities.

The other three options are incorrect because:

File a suspicious transaction report is not the best answer, as it is a reactive measure that should be taken after the institution has identified or suspected money laundering or terrorist financing activity, not before. The institution should first conduct due diligence and monitoring of the customer and the transactions, and then file a report if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the activity is suspicious or unusual.

Diminish the importance of the subjective Transparency International rating is not the best answer, as it is a complacent and irresponsible attitude that may expose the institution to legal, regulatory, reputational, or operational risks. The Transparency International rating is not subjective, but based on credible sources and methodologies, and it is widely used as a reference by governments, businesses, civil society, and the public to assess the level of corruption in different countries3. The institution should not ignore or downplay the rating, but rather use it as one of the factors to evaluate the risk of the customer and the transactions.

Conduct a trade-price manipulation analysis is not the best answer, as it is a specific and technical measure that may not be sufficient or appropriate to mitigate the risk associated with these accounts. A trade-price manipulation analysis is a method of detecting trade-based money laundering by comparing the prices of goods or services in a transaction with the market prices or other benchmarks, and identifying any significant discrepancies or anomalies. However, this measure may not be feasible or effective if the institution does not have access to reliable and comparable data, or if the goods or services are not standardized or homogeneous. Moreover, this measure may not address other aspects of the risk, such as the identity, ownership, or behavior of the customer and the parties involved in the transactions.

1: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 108 2: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 107 3: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 3 4: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 106 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 103 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 103 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 104 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 105 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 105 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 109

According to the FATF 40 recommendations, the focus of AML efforts has been expanded beyond financial institutions to include other businesses and professions that are vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing risks. These include:

Casinos, when customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above a designated threshold. Casinos are required to identify and verify the identity of their customers, keeprecords of transactions, report suspicious transactions, and implement internal controls and compliance programs to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. The designated threshold is USD/EUR 3,000 or more1.

Real estate agents, when they are involved in transactions for clients concerning buying and selling properties. Real estate agents are required to identify and verify the identity of their customers and beneficial owners, keep records of transactions, report suspicious transactions, and implement internal controls and compliance programs to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Real estate transactions can involve large amounts of money and complex legal arrangements that can be used to conceal the source or destination of illicit funds2.

Trust and company service providers, when they prepare for or carry out transactions for a client concerning the creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements. Trust and company service providers are required to identify and verify the identity of their customers and beneficial owners, keep records of transactions, report suspicious transactions, and implement internal controls and compliance programs to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. Trust and company service providers can facilitate the misuse of legal persons or arrangements, such as shell companies or trusts, to hide the true ownership and control of assets or funds3.

The other option, dealers in art, when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer at or above a designated threshold, is not covered by the FATF 40 recommendations. However, dealers in precious metals and stones are covered when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer at or above a designated threshold of USD/EUR 15,000 or more. Dealers in art may be subject to national or regional regulations that impose AML obligations on them, depending on the jurisdiction.

FATF Recommendation 22: Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions: Customer Due Diligence

FATF Recommendation 23: Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions: Other Measures

FATF Recommendation 24: Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons

[FATF Recommendation 25: Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal Arrangements]

The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) is a global network of FIUs that facilitates and promotes the exchange of information, knowledge, and cooperation among its members to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes1. The Egmont Group has developed operational guidance for international cooperation and information exchange among FIUs, which includes channels, procedures, and forms for making and receiving requests2. Filing a request under Egmont guidelines is therefore a common and effective way for a regulatory body to obtain international assistance in a money laundering inquiry, as it ensures that the request is made through the appropriate and secure channel, and that it meets the standards and expectations of the requested FIU.

1: Home - Egmont Group

2: EGMONT GROUP OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR …

The compliance officer is the person who has the day-to-day responsibility of communicating and reinforcing the established anti-money laundering (AML) compliance culture and program within the organization. The compliance officer is also responsible for overseeing the implementation, maintenance, and improvement of the AML policies, procedures, controls, and training. The compliance officer should have sufficient authority, independence, and resources to perform their duties effectively and report to senior management and the board of directors on the status and effectiveness of the AML program.

1, Chapter 4: Designing and Implementing an AML Compliance Program

2, FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Compliance Program - Overview

3, FinCEN Advisory, Guidance on Promoting a Culture of Compliance

According to the Basel guidelines on customer due diligence for banks, a trust is a legal arrangement whereby a person (the settlor or grantor) transfers the legal ownership of specific assets to another person or entity (the trustee) to hold for the benefit of a third person or persons (the beneficiaries)1. The Basel guidelines recommend that banks should identify and verify the identity of the following parties to determine the true nature of the trust relationship:

The trustee, who is the person or entity that has the legal authority and duty to manage the trust assets and distribute them to the beneficiaries according to the trust deed2. The trustee may also be the settlor, the beneficiary, or both, depending on the type and structure of the trust3.

The beneficiaries, who are the persons or entities that have a beneficial interest in the trust assets or income, either presently or in the future4. The beneficiaries may be named individuals, classes of persons, or charitable causes.

The settlor or grantor, who is the person or entity that creates the trust and transfers the legal ownership of the assets to the trustee. The settlor or grantor may also retain some rights or powers over the trust, such as the ability to appoint or remove trustees, beneficiaries, or protectors.

The other three options are incorrect because:

Respondents are not trust parties, but rather financial institutions that maintain correspondent banking relationships with other financial institutions. Respondents are not relevant for the identification of the trust relationship, but rather for the due diligence of the correspondent banking relationship.

Payees are not trust parties, but rather persons or entities that receive payments from the trust or other sources. Payees are not relevant for the identification of the trust relationship, but rather for the monitoring of the transactions and activities of the trust.

Trust administrators are not trust parties, but rather persons or entities that provide administrative services to the trust, such as accounting, record-keeping, or tax compliance. Trust administrators are not relevant for the identification of the trust relationship, but rather for the assessment of the risk and complexity of the trust.

1: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Customer due diligence for banks, October 2001, 4, p. 17 2: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Customer due diligence for banks, October 2001, 4, p. 17 3: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5,p. 111 4: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Customer due diligence for banks, October 2001, 4, p. 17 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 111 : Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Customer due diligence for banks, October 2001, 4, p. 17 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 111 : Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Customer due diligence for banks, October 2001, 4, p. 10 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 112 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 112

The Wolfsberg Principles for Private Banking are a set of guidelines for private banking relationships that aim to prevent and detect money laundering and terrorist financing risks. The Principles state that the bank should conduct additional due diligence on clients and beneficial owners in certain circumstances that may indicate a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Among the options given, A, B, and C are the correct choices that reflect the circumstances listed in the Principles.

Foreign jurisdictions are countries or territories other than the one where the bank operates or where the client or beneficial owner resides. The Principles state that the bank should conduct additional due diligence on clients and beneficial owners who are connected to foreign jurisdictions, especially those that have weak or inadequate anti-money laundering standards, or that are subject to sanctions, embargoes, or similar measures.

High Risk Countries are countries or territories that are identified by credible sources, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as having inadequate anti-money laundering standards, or as being a source, transit, or destination of illicit funds. The Principles state that the bank should conduct additional due diligence on clients and beneficial owners who are connected to high risk countries, and apply enhanced measures to mitigate the risks.

High Risk activities are activities that involve clients and beneficial owners whose source of wealth or funds originates from sectors or industries that are known to be vulnerable to money laundering, such as cash-intensive businesses, gambling, arms trade, precious metals and stones, or art and antiquities. The Principles state that the bank should conduct additional due diligence on clients and beneficial owners who are engaged in high risk activities, and verify the legitimacy and origin of their wealth and funds.

= The main reference for this question is the document titled “Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking (2012)” published by the Wolfsberg Group. You can access it by clicking here. You can also find more information about the Wolfsberg Principles and their application on the Wolfsberg Group website and the Lexology website.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, the situation that is the highest risk for money laundering and terrorist financing activity is A. A customer purchases casino chips, using small denomination bank notes, but does not engage in game play before redeeming the chips for a casino check. This is because this situation may indicate some red flags of money laundering, such as:

Using small denomination bank notes, which may be an attempt to avoid detection or reporting by the casino or the authorities, as large amounts of cash are usually associated with criminal activity1.

Not engaging in game play, which may indicate a lack of interest in gambling and a sole purpose of exchanging cash for a casino check, which is a more legitimate and less traceable form of payment2.

Redeeming the chips for a casino check, which may be a way of laundering the cash through the casino, as the check can be deposited into a bank account or cashed at another location, without revealing the source of the funds3.

The other three options are less risky because:

B. A customer purchases casino chips and engages in significant game play before requesting a casino check for the remainder is less risky, as it may indicate a genuine interest in gambling and a legitimate source of funds. However, this situation may still require further investigation and verification, as some money launderers may use gambling as a cover for their illicit activities, or may use the casino check as a way of transferring funds to another jurisdiction or person4.

C. A customer purchases casino chips using a credit card and engages in minimal game play before redeeming the chips for a casino check is less risky, as it may indicate a low level of funds involved and a traceable source of funds. However, this situation may still require further investigation and verification, as some money launderers may use credit cards to obtain cash advances from the casino, or may use the casino check as a way of repaying their credit card debt or transferring funds to another jurisdiction or person.

D. A customer purchases casino chips using credit from an account at an affiliated casino and engages in significant game play before redeeming the chips for a casino check is less risky, as it may indicate a regular and loyal customer of the casino and a legitimate source of funds. However, this situation may still require further investigation and verification, as some money launderers may use credit from an affiliated casino to avoid carrying cash or using credit cards, or may use the casino check as a way of transferring funds to another jurisdiction or person.

1: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 106 2: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 110 3: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 110 4: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 110 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 110 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 110

According to the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, which is a network of over 160 FIUs that promotes international cooperation and information exchange, FIUs should share information with foreign FIUs spontaneously, without prior request, when they have reasonable grounds to believe that the information is relevant for the receiving FIU1. This principle is also reflected in the FATF Recommendation 40, which states that FIUs should exchange information with other FIUs, especially when this information concerns money laundering, predicate offences, or terrorist financing2. Spontaneous information sharing can enhance the effectiveness of FIUs, as it can help to identify new leads, trends, patterns, or typologies, as well as to prevent or disrupt criminal activities1.

The other options are not consistent with the best practices of FIU information sharing. For example:

In accordance with Wolfsberg guidelines, submit the information to the other FIU in written form. The Wolfsberg Group is an association of 13 global banks that issues guidance and standards on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. However, the Wolfsberg guidelines are not binding for FIUs, and they do not specify the format or channel of informationexchange between FIUs3. Moreover, submitting information in written form may not be the most efficient or secure way of communication, as it may cause delays, errors, or breaches of confidentiality.

Take no action until contacted by the other FIU. This option contradicts the principle of spontaneous information sharing, as it implies that the FIU with the relevant information will wait for a formal request from the other FIU, instead of proactively sharing the information. This may result in missed opportunities, inefficiencies, or failures in detecting or preventing money laundering or terrorist financing.

Request approval from the Egmont Group prior to sharing the information with the other FIU. This option is unnecessary and impractical, as the Egmont Group does not have the authority or the capacity to approve or deny individual information requests or exchanges between FIUs. The Egmont Group provides a platform and a framework for FIU cooperation, but it does not interfere with the operational autonomy or the bilateral relations of its members4.

FATF Recommendation 40: Other Forms of International Co-operation

Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units

Wolfsberg Group

Egmont Group

A comprehensive risk analysis is the first and most important step in developing an effective anti-money laundering program. A risk analysis helps a financial institution identify and assess its exposure to money laundering and terrorist financing risks, based on its products, services, customers, geographic locations, and other factors. A risk analysis also enables a financial institution to tailor its policies, procedures, controls, and training to mitigate the specific risks it faces. A risk analysis should be conducted periodically and updated as necessary to reflect changes in the institution’s risk profile.

ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination, 6th Edition, Chapter 2: Compliance Standards for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Section 2.1: Risk-Based Approach, p. 29-30

ACAMS Risk Assessment, What is Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Risk Assessment?

How to Conduct an AML Risk Assessment - Assess Key Risk Drivers

In many jurisdictions, it is a requirement to report certain information regarding STRs to senior management and/or the board of directors. This information may be limited to the number of reports filed, the dollar amounts involved and significant trends as observed by compliance personnel. In some cases, if the activity presents a significant or potentially ongoing risk to the institution, the leaders of the institution should be made aware so that high-level decisions can be made regarding potential changes tosystems, staffing, products, services or particular relationships maintained by the institution.

Banks are required by the SAR regulations of their federal banking agency to notify the board of directors or an appropriate board committee that SARs have been filed. However, the regulations do not mandate a particular notification format and banks should have flexibility in structuring their format. Therefore, banks may, but are not required to, provide actual copies of SARs to the board of directors or a board committee. Alternatively, banks may opt to provide summaries, tables of SARs filed for specific violation types, or other forms of notification. Regardless of the notification format used by the bank, management should provide sufficient information on its SAR filings to the board of directors or an appropriate committee in order to fulfill its fiduciary duties, while being mindful of the confidential nature of the SAR.https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual/AssessingComplianceWithBSARegulatoryRequirements/0

According to the ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, one of the methods that attorneys may use to facilitate money laundering is to make payments to third parties on behalf of their clients, using funds from their client accounts. This may obscure the source and destination of the funds, and create a false appearance of legitimate transactions. Therefore, making payment to various people is a red flag for potential money laundering in this situation.

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, page 117

FATF Report on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals, June 2013, page 341

AML/CFT Red Flags for Lawyers, AML-CFT.net, October 20202

The USA PATRIOT Act is a comprehensive legislation that was enacted in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and aimed to strengthen the US government’s ability to prevent, detect, and prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing. Among its many provisions, the USA PATRIOT Act contains several sections that have extraterritorial reach, meaning that they apply to foreign entities or activities that have a nexus with the US. Three of these sections are:

Section 319(b), which allows for the US Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a subpoena or other legal order to any foreign bank that maintains a correspondent account in the US, requiring the production of records relating to such account or any account at the foreign bank, including records maintained outside the US12. This section also allows foreign banksto voluntarily designate a registered agent in the US to accept service of such subpoenas or orders12.

Section 313, which prohibits US financial institutions from establishing, maintaining, administering, or managing correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks, which are banks thathave no physical presence in any country and are not affiliated with a regulated financial group34. This section also requires US financial institutions to take reasonable steps to ensure that their correspondent accounts with foreign banks are not being used to provide banking services indirectly to foreign shell banks34.

Section 311, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to designate foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions, classes of transactions, or types of accounts as being of “primary money laundering concern” and to impose special measures to address such concerns . These special measures may include requiring US financial institutions to obtain and retain information on the beneficial owners of foreign accounts, prohibiting or imposing conditions on the opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts for foreign financial institutions, or requiring US financial institutions to identify the customers of their foreign correspondent account holders . The Secretary of the Treasury may also order a US financial institution to terminate a correspondent account within 10 days if the foreign bank fails to comply with a subpoena or other request for information under Section 319(b) .

1: USA PATRIOT Act, Section 319(b)

2: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 121

3: USA PATRIOT Act, Section 313

4: ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 120

USA PATRIOT Act, Section 311

ACAMS, CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition, Chapter 4, page 119

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) Manual , 6th edition, if a bank's transaction surveillance system triggers an alert for a deposit of 250.000 USD into a client's account, the bank should take the following actions:

Request information and documentation from the client on the background of the transaction (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 46).

Contact the client advisor to learn if he has any insight on the transaction background (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 47).

Review the transaction background in the bank's transaction platform (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 47).

Discarding the alert as a false positive hit and reviewing the alert if the deposit is made in cash should not be done.

The bank should request additional information and documentation from the client to better understand the nature of the transaction. Additionally, the bank should reach out to the client advisor to learn if they have any insight on the transaction background. Finally, the bank should review the transaction background in the bank's transaction platform to determine if any additional alerts or anomalies are present. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Pages 117-118)

The compliance officer should evaluate the request, determine whether it is valid, and provide the necessary information, subject to management approval. It is important to follow the bank's policies and procedures for responding to law enforcement requests, including verifying the authenticity of the request and the identity of the officer making the request. Additionally, it is important to protect customer privacy and ensure that sensitive information is not released to unauthorized individuals. (Reference: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Chapter 6)

The two red flags indicating potential engagement of a bank employee in money laundering are A. Lavish lifestyle that cannot be supported by an employee's salary, and E. Maintaining friendships with customers and going to restaurants, games, and other events. A bank employee who has a lifestyle that cannot be supported by their salary could be receiving money from illicit activities. Similarly, if the employee is maintaining friendships and going to social events with customers, they could be receiving money in exchange for providing special services. These behaviors should be monitored closely to ensure that the employee is not engaging in activities that could be linked to money laundering.

Under the Egmont Group Principles, information exchange among financial intelligence units (FIUs) should be conducted freely, spontaneously, and upon request, on the basis of reciprocity. This means that FIUs should be willing to share information without the expectation of reciprocity on how the information will be used. The goal is to facilitate the cooperation and exchange of information among FIUs to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes.

Lawyers who lack experience in providing specific services requested by clients or receive unusually high fees can raise red flags for money laundering. Inadequate documentation of case notes may also be suspicious, but the absence of experience and excessive fees are more significant indicators. These behaviors warrant further scrutiny to assess potential money laundering risks12.

 Structuring is a technique used in the placement stage of money laundering, in which the launderer deposits or withdraws cash in amounts below the reporting threshold to avoid detection or suspicion. Structuring is also known as smurfing, because it involves using multiple individuals or locations to carry out the transactions. Structuring is illegal in many jurisdictions and is a red flag for money laundering12.

Option A is not an example of structuring, but of using an alternative remittance system, which is a method of transferring money outside the formal financial sector. Hawala is a type of alternative remittance system that relies on a network of brokers who settle the transactions through trust and honor. Hawala can be used for legitimate purposes, but also poses a risk for money laundering and terrorist financing13.

Option B is not an example of structuring, but of a large cash transaction, which is a common indicator of money laundering. Large cash transactions may involve the proceeds of crime or the attempt to evade taxes or currency controls. Financial institutions are required to report large cash transactions above a certain threshold to the relevant authorities14.

Option D is not an example of structuring, but of a wire transfer, which is a method of moving funds electronically from one account to another. Wire transfers can be used for legitimate purposes, but also pose a risk for money laundering and terrorist financing, especially if they involve high-risk jurisdictions, shell companies, or complex chains of transactions1 .

The financial institution should freeze the funds or assets of designated persons and entities once this decision is approved by the Board. This is to comply with the obligation to implement targeted financial sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or other relevant authorities. Freezing means preventing any access, use, transfer, or disposal of the funds or assets by the designated persons and entities or by any other person on their behalf. The financial institution should also report the freezing action to the competent authority and the relevant sanctions committee12.

Option A is not a sufficient step to comply with sanctions requirements, but rather a tool to facilitate compliance. Adopting automatic screening systems to detect designated persons and entities can help the financial institution to identify potential matches and flag them for further investigation. However, screening systems are not infallible and may generate false positives or false negatives. Therefore, the financial institution should also conduct manual checks and verification of the screening results13.

Option B is not a relevant step to comply with sanctions requirements, but rather a measure to mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Conducting enhanced due diligence for prohibited entities on the sanctions list may be useful to obtain more information about the nature and purpose of the business relationship, the source and destination of the funds, and the beneficial ownership and control structure of the entity. However, enhanced due diligence does not replace the obligation to freeze the funds or assets of the designated persons and entities14.

Option C is not an appropriate step to comply with sanctions requirements, but rather a violation of the obligation to freeze the funds or assets of the designated persons and entities. Changing the risk profile to “high-risk” if an existing customer becomes a sanctioned entity and continuing to monitor further transactions may expose the financial institution to legal and reputational risks, as well as potential sanctions evasion or circumvention. The financial institution should terminate the business relationship with the designated person or entity and freeze their funds or assets without delay1 .

A court order is a legal document issued by a judge or a magistrate that authorizes or requires a person or an entity to perform or refrain from performing a certain action. A court order to freeze an account is a legitimate request that requires the bank to comply, as it is a binding and enforceable order that may be issued for various reasons, such as preventing the dissipation of assets, preserving evidence, or facilitating the recovery of funds. A bank that receives a court order to freeze an account should follow its policies and procedures to verify the authenticity and validity of the order, and to implement the freeze as instructed by the order. A bank should also file a SAR if it suspects or has reason to suspect that the account is involved in suspicious or illicit activity.

The other options are not legitimate requests that require the bank to respond. A verbal request to keep an account open, a written request to seize privileged documents, or a request to producedocuments and testimony without a subpoena are not legally binding or enforceable, and may violate the bank’s obligations to protect the privacy and confidentiality of its customers. A bank may choose to cooperate with law enforcement in these situations, but it is not required to do so. A bank should also consider the potential risks and implications of maintaining an account or disclosing information that may be related to suspicious or illicit activity, and consult with its legal counsel as appropriate.

Money laundering through capital marketsoften involvespump-and-dump schemes, wash trading, and layering funds through rapid trading activity.

Option A (Correct):A sudden spike in demand for a low-priced security is a red flag for pump-and-dump schemes, where criminals manipulate the marketto inflate stock prices artificially before selling off shares for a profit.

Option B (Incorrect):A gradual decline in trading volume and price does not indicate suspicious activity related to money laundering.

Option C (Incorrect):An increase in demand for ETFs is common and not necessarily linked to money laundering.

Option D (Incorrect):Holding securities in one specific emerging market may indicate a geographic investment strategy, not necessarily money laundering.

Common Money Laundering Typologies in Capital Markets:

Pump-and-Dump Schemes– Fraudulently inflating stock prices to cash out illicit funds.

Wash Trading– Conductingself-tradesto create an illusion of high market activity.

Layering Funds Through Rapid Trading– Engaging infrequent buy-and-sell ordersto obfuscate the origin of funds.

Best Practices for AML in Capital Markets:

Monitor unusual trading volume and price fluctuations.

Use AI-driven surveillance systems to detect manipulative behavior.

Investigate transactions involving offshore brokers or shell entities.

According to the ACAMS CAMS Study Guide (the 6th edition), FIUs are central agencies that receive, analyze, and disseminate financial intelligence to support the detection and prevention of money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes1. FIUs have different legal powers and functions depending on their type and jurisdiction, but generally they can use various investigative techniques, such as requesting additional information from reporting entities, accessing databases, conducting analysis, and issuing guidance12. FIUs also have access to a wide range of financial information, such as suspicious activity reports, currency transaction reports, cross-border cash declarations, and other relevant data sources, to identify and assess potential illicit activities13. Moreover, FIUs can cooperate and exchange information with domestic andforeign counterparts, subject to certain legal and operational safeguards, to facilitate cross-border investigations and prosecutions of financial crimes14.

MSBsarehigh-risk for financial crime, requiringstrict AML controls.

Option D (Correct):Hesitancy to provide beneficiary informationis astrong indicator of illicit financial activity.

Option E (Correct):Using multiple accounts under different namesis aknown money laundering technique.

Option A (Incorrect):Currency exchange is common in MSBs, thoughadditional factors must be assessed.

Option B (Incorrect):Large cash deposits are normal for cash-based businesses, butneed further scrutiny.

Option C (Incorrect):Frequent small remittancesare normal, unless linked tostructuring or smurfing.

Sanctions compliance is mandatory for financial institutions (FIs)to prevent transactions withsanctioned individuals, entities, and countries.

Option A (Correct):Automatic sanctions screening is essential for detecting and blocking transactions involving sanctioned individuals or entities.

Option B (Incorrect):If a customer is sanctioned, their transactions must be frozen immediately, not just monitored.

Option C (Incorrect):EDD is not relevant for prohibited entities—sanctions require immediate asset freezing.

Option D (Incorrect):Funds must be frozen immediately, without waiting for board approval.

Best Practices for Sanctions Compliance:

Use automated screening tools to detect sanctioned entities.

Immediately block and report prohibited transactions.

Regularly update sanctions screening lists (e.g., OFAC, UN, EU).

In the context ofgambling and gaming sectors, a well-known money laundering typology is the use of platforms tointroduce illicit funds and withdraw them as "winnings". When a customerdeposits large cash amounts and quickly withdraws themwithout engaging in actual gambling, it indicates"placement and layering"techniques.

This behavior is indicative of attempts todisguise the origin of illicit funds, converting them into legitimate-looking financial flows. It is considered a classic red flag in AML programs related to casinos and online gaming.

Money laundering through real estate transactions involves integrating illicit funds into the legitimate financial system while providing a relatively “safe” property investment. In this context, the most relevant factor to examine is the beneficial owner of the asset. Identifying the true owner behind a property helps uncover potential money laundering schemes. Criminals often use third parties, shell companies, or complex ownership structures to distance the transaction from the source of illicit funds. Investigating the beneficial owner’s identity is crucial for detecting and preventing real estate-related money laundering12.